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As presently construed, the Constitution does not prohibit the
death penalty. 1 The states2 and the federal government3 may punish
I. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976). The Supreme Court's eighth amendment jurispru•
dence would permit reconsideration of the constitutional question should society reject capital
punishment in the future. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see generally Radin, Tire Jurisprudence ofOeath: Evolving Standards/or
the Cruel and UntlSllal Punishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978).
2. Thirty-six states had capital punishment laws in effect as of December 31, 1981.
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEATH-Row PRISONERS 1981, 2-3 (1982)
[hereinafter referred to as DEATH-Row PRisONERS 1981). E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141
(West 1982); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1979); TEX. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 37.071
(Vernon 1981). For a compilation of state death penalty statutes, see Gillers, Oeclding Who
Oies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. I, 101-19 (1980) (App. I). At the end of 1981, a record high of 838
persons were being held under sentence of death in state prisons. DEATH-Row PRISONERS
1981 at I.
3. A number ciffederal statutes impose the death penalty, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1976); 49
U.S.C. § 1472(i)(l)(B) (1979), although their constitutionality is in doubt. No federal prisoners
are currently under sentence of death, with the exception of four inmates held under Armed
Forces jurisdiction in accordance with the capital provisions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. DEATH-ROW PRisONERS 1981, supra note 2 at 2.
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the commission of certain crimes4 with death, so long as the extreme
penalty is not imposed on a mandatory basis5 and so long as the
procedures used in imposing a death sentence meet constitutional
scrutiny.6
One such procedure - subjected to constitutional scrutiny since
19687 - is the means by which a capital jury is selected. Capital
jury selection practices, and the composition of capital juries they
produce, have taken on added importance in recent years. In its
1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, 8 the Supreme Court invalidated
capital punishment statutes leaving the life or death decision to the
unfettered discretion of the jury, in view of the high potential for
arbitrary and discriminatory application of the penalty. In response
to Furman, however, thirty-five states and the federal government
enacted new death penalty statutes, typically attempting to channel
capital sentencing discretion by specifying aggravating and mitigating standards.9 This response led the Court in 1976 to reject the
contention that capital punishment did not reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," the
4. The eighth amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments limits the ability of legislatures to impose death for certain crimes where the penalty would be disproportionate to the offense. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. S84, S99-600 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(unconstitutional for crime of rape of adult woman); Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1039 (1982) (unconstitutional for crime of rape of child under
12). In fact homicide may be the only crime for which death may be imposed under the eighth
amendment, and not all homicides will pass muster. See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368
(1982) (unconstitutional to impose death for conviction for felony murder when defendant
,neither committed the murder himself, attempted to do so, nor intended to take life); Comment, The Constitutionality ofImposing the Death Penaltyfor Felony Murder, lS Hous. L. R.Ev.
3S6 (1978).
S. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam) (unconstitutional to require
death penalty for intentional killing of a firefighter or peace officer engaged in performance of
duties); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). The Court has reserved the question whether mandatory death
laws are permissible in the limited circumstance of a prisoner or escapee serving a life sentence
who ·commits murder. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. S86, 604 n.11 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. at 637 n.S; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 n.9 (1976)
(plurality opinion).
6. E.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430
(1981); Estelle v. Smith, 4S1 U.S. 454 (1981); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 9S (1979) (per curiam); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. S86 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Davis
v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. S10 (1968).
The Court recently reiterated its "insistence that capital punishment be imposed fairly, and
with reasonable consistency, or not at all." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. at 87S.
7. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. S10 (1968); see text accompanying notes 118-133 iefra.
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
9. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 1S3, 179-80 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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Court's traditional standard for applying the eighth amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishments. 10 In so doing the Court relied not only on the actions of legislatures in revealing the society's
standards of decency, but also stressed the conduct of capital juries,
acting as reflectors of community sentiments on 'the death penalty
question. Noting that some 460 death sentences were imposed in less
than four years following Furman, 11 the Court found that these jury
determinations serve as "a significant and reliable objective index of
contemporary values," 12 and indicated that the community had not
rejected the death penalty as an appropriate punishment. At the
same time, the Court rejected as cruel and unusual statutes mandating the death penalty for conviction of certain crimes, relying on the
reluctance of American juries to convict a significant portion of those
charged under such mandatory statutes as indicating a repudiation
of automatic death sentences. 13
The compromise struck by the Supreme Court thus has left the
hard questions involved in imposing the death penalty to the jury
room. 14 The composition of the capital jury is therefore crucial to
the fairness of the death penalty and to its continuing constitutional
validity as a method of punishment. A central premise underlying
the Court's decision to uphold capital punishment is that capital juries reflect the standards of decency of the community on the crucial
life or death question. 15 There is substantial doubt, however, about

-

10. 428 U.S. at 173, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
11. 428 U.S. at 182.
12. 428 U.S. at 181. For similar expressions concerning the importance of jury determinations in assessing the constitutionality of capital punishment, see Erunund v. Florida, 102 S.
Ct. 3368, 3375-76 (1982); 102 S. Ct at 3386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.,
Powell, & Rehnquist, JJ.); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280,293 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 238, 299-300 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring); 498 U.S. at 386 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 498 U.S. at 439-40
(Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, & Rehnquist, JJ.).
13. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976). See also Enmund v. Florida,
102 S. Ct. at 3375-76 (finding that the eighth amendment was violated by a statute authorizing
capital punishment for felony murder where defendant did not co=it the homicide, attempt
to kill, or intend that the killing take place supported by evidence that "American juries have
repudiated imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as" these); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. at 596-97 (finding that eighth amendment was violated by statute authorizing capital
punishment for rape supported by ''the response of juries reflected by their sentencing decisions," declining to impose the death penalty in at least 90% of the rape convictions in Georgia
since 1973).
14. Although jury sentencing in capital cases is prevalent, a minority of states permit the
judge to decide the de;ith penalty question. See Gillers, supra note 2, at 14, 101-19 (App. I).
Professor Gillers has argued that the Constitution requires that a capital defendant be sentenced by a jury, unless waived. Id. at 39-74. The Supreme Court has never resolved this
question. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 609 n.16 (1978).
15. See note 12 supra.
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the accuracy of this underlying premise. Many criminal defense attorneys believe that prosecutors seek to prevent persons who are generally or even vaguely opposed to the death penalty from serving on
capital juries. Although the Supreme Court in its 1968 decision in
Witherspoon v. Illinois 16 limited the prosecutor's ability to use the
challenge for cause for this purpose, it is commonly believed that the
practice continues through use of the peremptory challenge.17
If prosecutors do engage in such a practice, several constitutional
issues are raised. The systematic exclusion of jurors generally opposed to the death penalty by prosecutorial use of the peremptory
challenge may violate a defendant's due process right to an impartial
jury in the determination of sentence or in the determination of
guilt. 18 In addition, if opponents of the death penalty in the community involved are sufficiently numerous and distinctive to comprise a
"cognizable class," the practice may also violate the sixth amendment fair cross-section_ requirement. 19 Perhaps the overriding concern is with the ability of capital juries to reflect accurately the
standards of decency of the comm~ty without which the eighth
amendment prohibits the death penalty.20
A demonstration that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenge in the manner described in a single case probably wouid be
insufficient to support a constitutional challenge in the federal courts
and in the vast majority of state courts. In these courts a prosecutor's
use of the peremptory in a single case is generally beyond review. 21
To raise a constitutional challenge, a defendant may have to show a
systematic pattern in the use of peremptories by prosecutors over a
16. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
17. See Gillers, supra note 2, at 85 n.391; People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 438 n.9, 606
P.2d 341, 348 n.9, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313 n.9 (1979) (quoting prosecutor's statement at voir
dire concerning a venireperson who had expressed opposition to the death penalty, that "if she
were not a challenge for cause, I would kick her off on a peremptory challenge."); In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613,619,447 P.2d 117, 121, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 25 (1968) (''The Attorney General
asserts that since the chances of a jury's being able to determine the penalty impartially are
diminished if the jury contains even one person who is hostile to, or has reservations concerning, the death penalty, it may be assumed that, if the challenges for cause had not been available, the prosecutor would have excluded the veniremen in question by way of peremptory
challenge . . . .").
·
IS. See notes 116-205 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 205-309 infra and accompanying text. The class of opponents of the death
penalty would constitute all with scruples against capital punishment, whether removed for
cause or by peremptory challenge.
20. See notes 310-27 infra and accompanying text.
21. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); see text accompanying notes 30-36 infra.
For the minority view, see People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1978); see notes 38, 40-44 infra and accompanying text.
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significant number of cases,22 including the removal of at least one
juror opposed to the death penalty in the defendant's own case. 23
To determine whether this practice by prosecutors does in fact
exist, the author conducted a study of capital jury selection in Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit. After presenting the results of that
study, this Article analyzes the constitutional issues raised by the
data, and proposes restructuring the voir dire in capital cases to prevent abuse of the peremptory challenge.
Part II of this Article reviews the limits on the prosecutor's use of
the peremptory challenge. Although a strong presumption favors
the propriety and nonreviewability of the peremptory, a showing of
a consistent pattern of behavior with no apparent constitutional justification can overcome this presumption. Where the government's
use of the peremptory reflects a systematic pattern inimical to constitutional values, the jury selection process contravenes the due process of law guaranteed to the defend ant by the fourteenth
amendment. Part III presents the results of a study which reveals
both a systematic use of prosecution peremptory challenges against
death-scrupled jurors and their resulting underrepresentation on juries actually selected. Part IV argues that the use of peremptory
challenges to eliminate potential jurors opposed to the death penalty
offends due process and sixth and eighth amendment values. Part V
argues that a restructured voir dire could cure the constitutional infirmities of unfettered prosecutorial peremptory challenges in capital
cases. This reform would eliminate the possibility of constitutionally
objectionable use of the peremptory challenge while preserving the
state's interest in the nonreviewability of its peremptory challenges
and in excluding jurors within the existing standards for challenges
for cause.
II.

RESTRICTING THE PROSECUTOR'S USE OF THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

The peremptory challenge, although not constitutionally required,24 has a long history as a "necessary part of trial by jury."25 A
22. 380 U.S. at 223.
23. Absent the removal of at least one such juror in his case, any pattern shown would not
have harmed the defendant, and he would lack standing to assert either his own rights or those
of the excluded class.
24. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 219, citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. S83, 586
(1919). But see Babcock, Voir .Dire: Preserving "Its Wondeiful Power," 21 STAN. L. REV. 545,

555-56 (1975).
25. 380 U.S. at 205. Peremptories were historically used by defendants to eliminate jurors
thought to be biased against them. See 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •353. Peremptory
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major purpose of the peremptory challenge is to eliminate bias
which does not fall within the narrow criteria necessary to sustain a
challenge for cause.26 The peremptory challenge is "frequently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to.legal proceedings or
official action, namely the race, religion, nationality, occupation or
affiliations of people summoned for jury duty." 27 A second purpose
is to remove counsel's reluctance to offend venirepersons during
questioning relating to challenges for cause that might not ultimately
be allowed. 28 Close judicial scrutiny of the prosecutor's use of the
peremptory challenge in a single case might limit the utility of the
device, since uncertainty as to its availability would undermine its
salutary effect of encouraging vigorous voir dire examination.29 In
challenges by the prosecution have not always been permitted and were the subject of debate.
See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE JURIES 139-50 (1977). By the beginning of this century, the prosecution had
firmly established both the right to exercise peremptories and the ability to use them to eliminate entire races or classes of people. Id. at 150; see Babcock, supra note 24, at 551 n.20.
The Court in Swain acknowledged the differences in the history of the defendants' and the
prosecutors' right to peremptory challenges, but noted that the American jury system should
guarantee "'not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice
against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held.'" Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. at 220, quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). But see J. VAN
DYKE, supra at 140-57, 167; Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint far the
Perpetuation of the All-Wlzite Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1170-73 (1966).
26. The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both
sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on
the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise . . . . Although historically the incidence of the prosecutor's challenge has differed from that of the accused, the
view in this country has been that the system should guarantee ''not only freedom from
any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held/'
.
The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised wi~out a
reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control. • . .
While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable
and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or
imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable.
Swain v. Alabama, 320 U.S at 220 (citations omitted). Challenges for cause are restricted to
eliminating actual bias - an acknowledged prejudicial state of mind - or implied bias, presumed from the juror's relationships or interests in ways specified by statute. Note, Voir .Dire:
Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise ofPeremptory Challenges, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 1493, 1499-501 (1975); see generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 140-69. By contrast to the peremptory, the challenge for cause, although each side may make an unlimited
number, must be approved by the trial judge, and is based on narrow grounds, such as actual
or presumed specific bias toward a party or witness. See, e.g., H?pt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433
(1887); see ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice - Slandards Relating lo
Trial by Jury 68-69 (Approved Draft, 1968).
·
27. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 220 (footnote omitted).
28. 380 U.S. at 220; notes 103-104 iefra and accompanying text.
29. This assumption underlies the Swain Court's reluctance to find prosecutorial peremptory practice unconstitutional absent compelling proof of a sustained and systematic pattern of
exclusion. The belief that the peremptory challenge cannot survive judicial supervision, however, has been expressly rejected by six state courts. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583
P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); People v. Payne, 31 CRIM. L. RPTR. (BNA)"2229 (Ill. App.,
May 19, 1982); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass.
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Swain v. Alabama,30 however, the Court made it clear that the prose-

cution's use of the peremptory challenge is not totally beyond
review.
A.

Swain v. Alabama

Swain presented the Supreme Court with a challenge by a black
defendant to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove all black members of the venire. The defendant showed that
in selecting his jury, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to
eliminate all six blacks on the jury panel.31 The defendant further
showed that no black had ever served on a petit jury in Talladega
County, Alabama since 1950 because those few who were included
on jury venires were challenged peremptorily or for cause. 32 None461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486,
612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981).
The cases are discussed more fully at notes 40-44 infra and accompanying text. See also
Brown, McGuire & Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative .Device in Criminal
Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 192 (1978); Note, The .Defendant's
Righi lo Object to Proseculorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 370
(1979); Comment, People v. Wheeler: Peremptory Challenges-A New Interpretation, 14 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 370 (1978); Co=ent, A New Standardfar Peremptory Challenges: People v.
Wheeler, 32 STAN. L. REV. 189 (1979).
30. 380
202 (1965).
31. 380 U.S. at 210.
32. 380 U.S. at 226. The defendant also challenged the selection of the grand jury and the
petit jury venire. The defendant produced data showing that while black males constituted
26% of all males in Talladega County only 10 to 15% of the grand jury and petitjury panels
were black. The Court rejected the defendant's contention that he had established a prima
facie violation of equal protection since the burden on the defendant was to show purposeful
discrimination. Purposeful discrimination, according to the Court, required more than a mere
showing that blacks were underrepresented by as much as 10%. 380 U.S. at 208,09. Thus,
although the Court in Swain was willing to accept statistical proof of discriminatory purpose,
the defendant simply had failed to meet the then-required statistical burden.
At the time of Swain, a prima facie case of discrimination could be established by demonstrating a substantial disparity between minority group members in the population and on the
jury list plus the existence of a selection procedure subject to use for discriminatory ends. E.g.,
Avery v. Georgia, 345,559 (1953). The Court in Swain declined to find the disparity shown to
be sufficient, and also declined to treat the Alabama selection procedure as involving a discrimination-prone device. 380 U.S. at 207-09. More recent cases have relaxed both aspects of
the standard. An influential article demonstrated statistically that the disparity in Swain could
have occurred by chance only in one out of 100 trillion venires, and urged the use of statistical
decision theory in jury discrimination cases. Finkelstein, The Application ofStatistical .Decision
Theory to the Jury .Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338, 356-58 (1967). The Court soon
utilized this new statistical tool, C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 455-56 (1980); see, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
U.S. 625, 630 n.9 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 n.2 (1967), and it is now the
accepted method of proving discrimination in jury cases. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 494 n.17 (1977).
·
More recent cases have also relaxed the second aspect of the standard so that a selection
procedure that lends itself to use for discriminatory ends will suffice (in conjunction with a
substantial disparity) to establish a prima facie case even where the procedure is not facially
race-focused. Compare Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, and Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
U.S. 625, with Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, and Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559. Thus
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theless, the Court rejected this challenge on the basis that the defendant did not make a showing of systematic discrimination by the
state because he failed to separate blacks challenged peremptorily by
the prosecution from those challenged by the defense.
Despite its concern for protecting the exercise of peremptory
challenges from routine judicial scrutiny, the Court did recognize
that the challenge was subject to some constitutional restrictions:
We have decided that it is permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the
prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he
is trying, the particular defendant involved and the particular crime
charged. But when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case,
whatever "the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes
who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners
and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no
Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim
takes on added significance. . . .
[S]uch proof might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are
excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of
the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is being
used to deny the Negro the same right to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population.33

Swain, then, acknowledges that prosecutorial peremptory challenge
practices are subject to judicial review of their constitutionality, although the facts in that case did not justify the exercise of that
authority.
The Court in Swain explicitly discussed only the rights of blacks
to serve on juries, although other cases have established the right of
defendants not to have blacks excluded by law from their juries.34
Castaneda treats Spanish surname visibility, 430 U.S. at 495, and the subjectivity of the keyman system, 430 U.S. at 497, as suspect although neither is explicable only as a discriminatory
device. The Court in Swain declined to treat the Alabama version of the key-man system in
this way. 380 U.S. at 207-09.
Thus in both respects, the approach of Swain has been eclipsed by more recent equal protection cases that use statistical decision theory to establish discrimination, and-that treat an
opportunity to discriminate which is not explicable solely as a discriminatory device as sufficient to trigger the Avery rule. Moreover, if the violation asserted is of the sixth amendment
fair cross-section requirement, rather than equal protection, no showing of discriminatory purpose is necessary. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368-69 & n.26 (1~79); see notes 294-96 i'!fra
and accompanying text
33. 380 U.S. at 223 (dicta). "In these circumstances," the Court noted, "it would appear
that the purpose of the peremptory challenge is being perverted." Id at 223-24.
34. E.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). Swain was decided before the sixth amendment was held applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and there- .
fore representativeness was not in issue. Prior cases had established that it is denial of equal
protection to try a minority defendant before a jury from which all members of his race have
been excluded. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Patton v. Mississippi, 332·u.s. 463
(1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauderv. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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Whatever rights defendants might have on their own, the Swain decision clearly indicates that the defendant, at least if he can show
exclusion in his particular trial, would have standing to assert the
rights of the excluded class of jurors.35 But because the defense, as
well as the prosecution, participated in the peremptory process, the
Court held that the defendant had not shown that the underrepresentation of blacks was the result of unconstitutional jury selection procedures by the state.36
Commentators have severely criticized the Swain decision for imposing an impossibly high burden of proof upon defendants seeking
to challenge a prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge. 37 Swain
seriously restricts the way a defendant can demonstrate that the
In Swain the Court was less concerned with the equal protection rights of minority defendants,
380 U.S. at 221-22, but instead was concerned with the rights of blacks to serve as jurors in
general, 380 U.S. at 324.
In Peters v. Kiff, three members of the Court based their decision reversing the conviction
of a white defendant who had been tried by a jury from which blacks had been systematically
excluded on due process grounds. 407 U.S. at 501 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas & Stewart,
JJ.). Three other members of the Court concurred on the basis that 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1976)
expressed a strong policy against excluding qualified jurors on the basis of race. 407 U.S. at
507 (White, J.,joined by Brennan & Powell, JJ.). Since the sixth amendment fair cross-section
requirement has been held applicable to the states, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975),
and since blacks are plainly a cognizable class, their systematic exclusion from juries would
today be considered a violation of the sixth amendment.
35. The Court suggests that if the proper showing of a pattern of exclusion were made, the
case would be sufficiently analogous to the cases cited in note 34 supra (involving other types
of exclusion by the state) as to warrant reversal. A white defendant could not make the same
analogy to those prior cases, but since Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, he should have standing to
assert the Swain claim.
36. Unlike the selection process, which is wholly in the hands of state officers, defense
counsel participate in the peremptory challenge system, and indeed generally have a far
greater role than any officers of the State. It is for this reason that a showing that Negroes
have not served during a specified period of time does not, absent a sufficient showing of
the prosecutor's participation, give rise to the inference of systematic discrimination on
the part of the state.
380 U.S. at 227. The record must show with some "acceptable degree of clarity . . . when,
how often, and under what circumstances the prosecutor alone has been responsible for striking" the underrepresented group. 380 U.S. at 224.
A dissenting opinion accused the majority of confusing priorities by exalting a procedural
device over a constitutional right. 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that the Constitution does not require the use of peremptory challenges, but does
require trial by a representative jury. Moreover, the dissent noted, a finding that the prosecutor's practice in Swain violated the Constitution would not require the abandonment of the
peremptory challenge; only where the prosecutor's use of the peremptory reaches the extreme
level presented in Swain would exercise of the peremptory be subject to restriction. 380 U.S. at
244-45.
37. See, e.g., Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 29; Finkelstein, supra note 32 at 35152; Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise ojthe Peremptol')' to Exclude Non-White Jurors: A
Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. Rav.
555, 560 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Cincinnati Comment]; Comment, supra note 25 at 1160;
Note, Fair Jul')' Selection Procedures, 75 Y ALB L.J. 322, 323 (1965); Note, Limiting the Peremptol')' Challenge: Representation ojGroups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 17 IS, 1723 & n.36 (1977)
(hereinafter cited as Yale Note].

November 1982)

Peremptory Challenges in Capital Cases

11

prosecutor systematically eliminated a disproportionate number of
members of a group by requiring a showing of prosecutorial conduct
in the relevant district over some indefinite period oftim.e. Not only
does such a showing require transcribing voir dires of a large
number of cases, itself an expensive undertaking, but additional investigation would be · required to ascertain the race of each
venireperson, as the voir dire transcripts rarely reflect this factor.
Such a showing is beyond the ability and resources of virtually all
defendants. 38 As a result, prosecutors can continue to eliminate
members of minority groups through the use of the peremptory challenge, virtually without restriction.39
For these reasons a number of state courts have recently rejected
the Swain approach. In the leading case, People v. Wheeler, the California Supreme Court adopted a more lenient standard.40 In
Wheeler, the California court overturned the conviction of a black
defendant because the prosecutor had exercised his peremptory challenges against all seven blacks on the jury panel, leaving an all white
jury.
The California court, expressing the need to "define a burden of
proof which a party may reasonably be expected to sustain in meritorious cases,"41 found the Swain standard inappropriate. To protect
38. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 286, 583 P.2d 748, 768, 148 Cal Rptr. 890, 909
(1978) (rejecting the Swain rationale partially for this reason).
39. The only limitation, outside of establishing the evidence required by Swain, is the
countervailing use of defense peremptories. This limitation is particularly ineffective where
the defense tries to maintain the representation of a minority group by its challenges against
the majority. See note 152 i'!fra and accompanying text.
40. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). The court recognized that the
exercise of a peremptory challenge is presumptively based on legitimate considerations, but
refused to concede that this presumption allows the prosecutor to exercise the challenge without any limitation. While conceding that the peremptory is a challenge for which "no reason
need be given," the court emphasized that it is not a challenge "for which no reason need
exist." 22 Cal 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901. Otherwise, the court noted,
the peremptory could be used to eliminate jurors on the basis of group membership in violation of the fair cross-section requirement of both the state and federal constitutions. 22 Cal. 3d
at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. The court construed the state constitutional
right to an impartial jury to include the fair cro~ section requirement. Although noting that
both the state provision and the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the right, the court rested its
decision on state grounds. 22 Cal 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal Rptr. at 903.
41. 22 Cal 3d at 278, 583 P.2d at 763, 148 Cal Rptr. at 904. The statistical methods required by the Swain decision for showing systematic exclusion, while helpful in attacking the
construction of jury source lists, were found inadequate "during voir dire . . . when counsel
may be trying to expose an emerging pattern of discrimination in time to forestall an unfair
trial." 22 Cal. 3d at 279, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The court rejected the Swain
standard of systematic exclusion over an indefinite period of time for several reasons. The
court found the standard "virtually impossible" to meet statistically in the context of peremptory challenges because of the discretionary nature of the peremptory. Moreover, the court
was concerned that Swain offered no protection to the first defendant who is a victim of
prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge as it would not be possible to establish a
systematic pattern of exclusion using a single case. 22 Cal 3d at 285,583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal.
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effectively the right to a representative jury, the court found it necessary to adopt a standard under which the defense could establish
systematic exclusion of all or nearly all members of a group on the
basis of a single voir dire. Under this approach, a prima facie case
can be established by showing that. the prosecutor excluded all or
nearly all members of a "cognizable group within the meaning of the
representative cross section rule," or that he or she directed a disproportionate number of peremptories at such a group. 42 A defendant
need not compile an extensive statistical record; he or she need only
establish that "from all the circumstances in the case" there was a
"strong likelihood" that these persons were excluded because of their
group affiliations. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden
shifts to the state to show that the challenges were based on trialrelated factors rather than group bias.43
The Wheeler decision has prompted extensive commentary on
the peremptory challenge and the rejection of the Swain standard in
at least four other states.44 Most of the commentators have approved
of Wheeler, citing the deficiencies of the Swain approach in preventRptr. at 908-909. Finally, the court noted that any attempt to meet the Swain burden would
require large expenditures beyond the ability of the typical defendant. Moreover, even if
funds were available, the data are not, and few, if any, judges would interrupt the proceedings
by granting continuances of unpredictable length to permit the necessary investigation. 22
Cal. 3d at 285-86, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
42. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
43. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The defendant in Wheeler
attempted to establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion by showing that the prosecutor removed every black from the jury. However, the trial court would not require the prosecutor to explain his use of the peremptory, on the ground that such use was beyond judicial
scrutiny. 22 Cal. 3d at 264, 585 P.2d at 753, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 894. The California Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a demonstration that the prosecutor had excluded a disproportionate number of blacks required him to explain his motives. The court's remedy was based
on proposals made by J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 166-67; Yale Note, supra note 37, at
1733-41.
In People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978), a companion
case to Wheeler, the California court clarified what a prosecutor must show to rebut a prima
facie case. In Johnson, unlike Wheeler, the prosecutor freely admitted his intent to exclude
blacks from the jury. The prosecutor claimed that he was challenging blacks because the
state's witness had used the word "nigger," and the prosecutor feared that black jurors might
be offended by the language and, as a result, be unable to serve as impartial jurors. 22 Cal. 3d
at 298-99, 583 P.2d at 775, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 916. The court found this reason insufficient to
justify the exclusion of all blacks since many whites are offended by the same language. More
importantly, added the court, the benefit of having black jurors serve in a racially related trial
outweighs any harm of bias that may result. The sixth amendment was intended to include all
community perspectives on the jury including those of people who are offended by the issues at
trial. 22 Cal. 3d at 300, 583 P.2d at 775-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 917,
44. People v. Payne, 31 CRIM. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2229 (Ill. App., May 19, 1982); Commonwealth v. Reid, 424 N.E.2d 495 (Mass. 1981); Commonwealth v. Soares, 347 Mass. 461, 387
N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct.
App. 1980); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981). For cases rejecting
the Wheeler approach, see State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410, 591 P.2d 166 (1979); State v. Grady,
93 Wis. 2d I, 13,286 N.W.2d 607,612 (1979). For cases reserving judgment on the Wheeler
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ing prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge.45 Nonetheless,
the majority of states and the federal courts still follow Swain; in
these jurisdictions a successful attack on prosecutorial use of the peremptory challenge continues to depend upon meeting the heavy burden imposed by that decision.
B. The Burden Imposed by Swain
Nearly every attempt to meet the burden imposed by Swain to
demonstrate prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge has
failed. 46 Almost all of the cases challenging prosecutorial peremptory challenge practices have involved the use of the peremptory to
exclude blacks.47 However, a few have involved peremptory challenges of jurors opposed to the death penalty.48 Most of these attempts have failed to meet the Swain standard because of an
insufficient showing relating to the number of venirepersons chalapproach, see Mallett v. State, 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980); People v. Smith, 622 P.2d 90 (Colo.
App. 1980).
45. See, e.g., Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 29; Note, 17ze Defendant's Right to
Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1770 (1979);
Co=ent, People v. Wheeler: Cal!fomia's Answer to Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 16
SAN.DIEGO L. REV. 897 (1979). For critical co=entary, see Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory
Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Mo. L. REv. 337
(1982).
46. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 286, 583 P.2d 748, 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 909
(1978); Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 29, at-203; Yale Note, supra note 37, at 1715;
see Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14, 24 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
47. 79 A.L.K3d at 27-46.. Attempts to challenge the use of the peremptory to exclude
members-o(otlier ethnic groups have also been unsuccessful. See, e.g., State v. Rossi, 273 So.
2d 265 (La. 1973) (Italian-Americans); State v. Salinas, 87 Wash. 2d 112, 549 P.2d 712 (1976)
(Mexican-Americans).
Some courts have gone so far as to state that even where the prosecutor admits that he is
purposely excluding blacks there is no violation of equal protection. E.g., United States v.
Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), qjfd., 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1980). In Danzey, the
court construed Swain as giving the prosecutor unfettered discretion in the exercise of the
peremptory challenge in a single case. According to the Danzey court, a prosecutor's motive in
exercising the peremptory is wholly irrelevant: a violation of equal protection occurs only
when the prosecutor uses the peremptory systematically to eliminate blacks in case after case
over a sufficient period of time. This conclusion is dubious at best since the only reason the
Swain Court cited for requiring a showing of exclusion in case after case is the presumption
that the prosecutor is acting on the basis oflegitimate considerations in any single case. If the
prosecutor concedes that he is acting on the basis of illegitimate considerations, he is no longer
entitled to that presumption, and a violation of equal protection (or of the sixth amendment if
a "cognizable class" is affected, see notes 233-57 i'!fra and accompanying text) would be established. What constitutes an illegitimate purpose is not entirely clear. Swain indicates that
exclusion of blacks because of race may be legitimate if the prosecutor has reason to believe
blacks are more likely to be biased against the state in a particular case. 380 U.S. at 220-21.
48. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, I Cal. 3d 694, 464 P.2d 64, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1970); Jones v.
State, 243 Ga. 820,256 S.E.2d 907 (1979); Smith v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 93,239 S.E.2d 510 (1977);
Lee v. State, 226 Ga. 162, 173 S.E.2d 209 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 936 (1972);
Brice v. State, 264 Md. 352, 286 A.2d 132 (1972).
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lenged,49 the use of an insufficient number of cases to establish a
systematic pattem,5° or an insufficient showing of state participation
in such challenges.51
All of these cases, although recognizing the heavy burden imposed by Swain, continue to acknowledge the viability of the Swain
exception if the defendant can show systematic exclusion over a sufficient period oftime.52 In one significant case, United States v. Pearson,53 the Fifth Circuit emphasized that "the burden is not
insurmountable."54 The court stated that a defendant's burden under Swain:
might require checking the docket for a reasonable period of time for
the names of defendants and their attorneys, investigation as to the
race of the various defendants, the final composition of the petit jury
and the manner in which each side exercised its peremptory
challenges.55
The court further noted that the burden imposed by Swain did not

require a showing of 100% exclusion of the group in question. 56
In several recent cases defendants have submitted comprehensive
studies concerning the prosecutor's use of the peremptory. In one
such case, United States v. Mc.Daniels, a study of court records in a
particular district for a two-year period showed that 68% of the per49. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
961 (1976) (no showing of systematic exclusion where blacks served on eight of the fifteen
cases included in the defendant's study).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 197.7); United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Green, 246 Pa. Super. 472,400 A.2d 182 (1979); State v. Bolton, 354 So. 2d 517,519
(La. 1978). In Pearson, the defendant's study included only a one-week period. In the other
cases the defendant relied solely on exclusion of blacks from the jury in his own case. The
Eighth Circuit has suggested that even fifteen cases may be insufficient to establish a systematic pattern. United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
961 (1976).
51. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965). Other attempts have failed because the defendant's study did not include all types of cases. See, e.g., McKinney v. Walker,
394 F. Supp. 1015 (D.S.C. 1974) (defendant showed that blacks were excluded in cases where
the defendant was black but failed to show a similar exclusion in cases where the defendant
was white). In United States v. Newman, 549'F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908
(1977), discussed i'!fra note 59, defendant's challenge was rejected because his study included
cases from two independent divisions within the same district, thereby skewing the statistics.
52. See cases cited in Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14, 53-56 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
53. 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971).
54. 448 F.2d at 1218. Other cases, expressing concern over prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge, have also noted that the defendants burden under Swain is not insurmountable. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v,
Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976).
55. 448 F.2d at 1217. The defendant in Pearson failed to meet the Swain burden of proof
because his study of one week did not e_ncompass a sufficient period of time. 448 F.2d at 1218.
56. 448 F.2d at 1217.
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emptory challenges used by the prosecutor were directed against
blacks,57 but in five of the fifty-three cases in the study the prosecutor
challenged no blacks, and blacks actually served on a number of juries. Although the evidence showed that blacks were challenged
three times more frequently than whites, the percentage of blacks
actually serving on juries fairly approximated the percentage of
blacks in the community.58 The court considered this evidence comprehensive but insufficient to meet the heavy Swain burden, emphasizing that, despite the prosecutor's use of the peremptory, the juries
remained fairly representative. The court was sufficiently disturbed
by the pattern in the prosecutor's use of the peremptory revealed by
the study, however, to grant a new trial "in the interest of justice."59
This growing concern over prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory
recently led the Supreme Court of Louisiana to overturn a conviction based on its conclusion that the defendant had met his burden
57. 379 F. Supp. 1243, 1244 (E.D. La. 1974). The probability that the prosecutor used the
peremptory without regard to racial factors was calculated as .00002S68726. 379 F. Supp. at
1246 n.S.
S8. 379 F. Supp. at 1244. The percentage of blacks serving on juries (22.8%) compared
very favorably with the percentage of blacks on voter registration lists (21.4%) from which
prospective jurors were drawn. The court hypothesized that the prosecutors' use of the peremptory against blacks was offset by the defendants' use of the peremptory to exclude whites.
379 F. Supp. at 124S n.3. The conditions under which this offsetting can be accomplished and
the extent to which it justifies the prosecutor's actions are discussed at notes 1S1-S6 i'!fra and
accompanying text.
S9. 379 F. Supp. at 12S0 (applying FED. R. CRIM. P. 33). In a similar case, a federal
district court found that the Swain burden had been met by the defendant. United States v.
Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated sub nom. United States v. Newman, S49
F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 (1977). In Robinson, the defendant's study, including thirty-nine trials, showed that the prosecutor had used his peremptory to exclude
69.5% of blacks and 84.8% of blacks and hispanics from the petitjuries. 4S1 F. Supp. at 472.
Given the percentage of blacks on the final panel before exercise of the peremptory, the expected frequency of a jury containing at least one black member was calculated at 68%, but the
actual frequency of juries with a black member was only 33.3%. 4S1 F. Supp. at 472-73. On
the basis of these findings the court concluded that the prosecutor's use of the peremptory to
exclude blacks had reached an excessive point and that judicial relief was necessary. The court
disallowed the challenges of the black venirepersons and ordered that jury selection continue
with the blacks included. In addition, the court imposed a prospective remedy requiring the
United States Attorney to maintain a record of future use of the peremptory against minority
groups. 4S1 F. Supp. at 474.
The Second Circuit vacated the order on the basis that the district court had erroneously
combined statistics from two independent divisions within the same district. S49 F.2d at 2444S.' In the appropriate division, the actual frequency of blacks appearing on juries was sixty
percent, a figure which compared favorably with the expected frequency of sixty-eight percent.
The district court's conclusion that the prosecutor was systematically eliminating blacks
through use of the peremptory was therefore found to be unwarranted. Newman has been
criticized for adopting the overly restrictive language of Swain requiring absolute exclusion of
blacks to establish a violation. See Cincinnati Comment, supra note 37, at S6S. The court's
separation of the two divisions for purposes of analyzing the statistical data is also questionable since the United States Attorney operates throughout the district. See Recent Decisions,
Constitutional Law - Exclusion ofBlack Veniremen Through Use ofProsecution's Peremptory
Challenges Held to be in Violation ofEqual Protection Clause, 8 CUMB. L. REV. 307, 318 (1977).
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of proof under Swain. In State v. Brown 60 the defendant showed
that the prosecutor had exercised five peremptory challenges, all
against blacks, creating an all white jury in his case. In addition, the
defendant referred the court to several cases recently decided by the
Louisiana courts wherein the same prosecutor or other prosecutors
in the same district had exercised their peremptory challenges to create all white or nearly all white juries. In these prior cases, the Louisiana courts had denied relief, finding that Swain placed beyond
scrutiny a prosecutor's exercise of the peremptory challenge in a single case. 61 In Brown, however, the co~rt found that the defendant
had demonstrated a prima facie case of systematic exclusion on the
basis of the record in his case and the other cases. 62
Several state cases have rejected challenges to the prosecutor's
use of the peremptory to exclude jurors who voice general objections
to the death penalty.63 However, with one recent exception, in each
of these cases the defendant challenged only the exercise of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges in his own case. In these cases the
defense made no effort to establish a systematic pattern of exclusion
extending over a period of time. 64 Therefore, the cases are substantially consistent with Swain and do not suggest that a court would
uphold systematic use of the peremptory challenge to exclude scrupled jurors.65 The recent exception was the Florida case in which the
60. 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979).
61. 371 So. 2d at 752-53.
62. Because the prosecutor failed to justify his exercise of peremptory challenges, the court
reversed the conviction. See also State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979), where the
court, relying on Brown, found systematic exclusion on the basis of testimony by three local
attorneys and the prosecutor's admission that he had consistently used his peremptory challenge to exclude blacks.
63. See, e.g., Smith v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 93,239 S.E.2d 510 (1970); Brice v. State, 264 Md.
352, 286 A.2d 132 (1972); Capler v. State, 237 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1970), vacated on otlter
grounds, 408 U.S. 937 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 515, 184 S.E.2d 786, vacated
on otlter grounds, 408 U.S. 940 (1971). See also People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300
N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973) (death penalty vacated under
Furman, court finding it unnecessary to reach claim that Swain violated where all 33 scrupled
venirepersons remaining after defense and court challenges were removed by prosecutor: 20 by
challenges for cause, and 13 by peremptory challenges). For additional cases, see Annot,, 79
A.L.R.3d 14, 46-50 (1977 & Supp. 1981). In a recent California case, the defendant raised the
issue, attempting to combine Wheeler with Witherspoon. People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733,
631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981) (decided on other grounds).
64. In light of the recent Wheeler decision, see notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text,
in some jurisdictions it may be sufficient to show that jurors generally opposed to the death
penalty were excluded in a single voir dire.
65. Some cases have implied that the use of the peremptory to exclude jurors with rescrva•
tions concerning the death penalty is always permissible. See, e.g., Capler v. State, 237 So. 2d
445, 449 (Miss. 1970), vacated on otlter grounds, 408 U.S. 607 (1972) (objections to the death
penalty may give rise to "doubt on the part of the prosecution that the juror would follow the
law as to imposition of the death penalty" and such doubt is sufficient reason for exercise of
the peremptory); ef. People v. Moore, 42 Ill. 2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299, revd on otlter grounds, 408
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preliminary results of the study described in the following Part were
reported. 66
U.S. 786 (1972) (exclusion of jurors in violation of Witherspoon is harmless error where the
prosecutor has remaining peremptories since the peremptory may permissibly be used to exclude scrupled jurors). But cf. Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558, 564 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting harmless error contention based on remaining peremptories); Burns v. Estelle, 592
F.2d 1297, 1300 (5th Cir. 1979), ajfd en bane, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); People v.
Sears, 71 Cal. 2d 635, 648 n.5, 450 P.2d 248, 257 n.5, 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 881 n.5 (1969), revd on
other grounds, 2 Cal. 3d 180,465 P.2d 847, 84 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1970) (prosecutor's duty to assure
defendant a fair trial includes obligation to refrain from exercising peremptory challenges so
as to produce an unrepresentative jury on capital punishment); In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613,
619-20, 447 P.2d 117, 122, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 26 (1968); Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 596, 280
S.E.2d 623 (1981); Grijalva v. State, 6_14 S.W.2d 420, 425 (fex. Crim. App. 1980).
66. Dobbert v. State, 409 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 1982). Soon after the governor had signed a .
warrant for his execution, Dobbert filed in the trial court - Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit
- a motion to vacate his death sentence. As one of the grounds for relief, the defendant
alleged violation of his due process and sixth amendment rights resulting from the systematic
exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecutors in the circuit to exclude death-scrupled jurors. On January 20, 1982, testimony was presented in the trial court concerning the preliminary results of the study reported in this Article. At the time, only 26 of the 30 cases ultimately
reviewed had been analyzed; transcripts had not yet been completed in four of the cases. The
testimony revealed the systematic pattern presented in greater detail in this Article. No attempt was made by the state to explain the exercise of peremptory challenges on any basis
other than views on the death penalty. The testimony also revealed that the prosecutor challenged all 12 death-scrupled venirepersons in _Dobbert's case who were subject to possible
prosecutorial peremptory challenge, with the result that no death-scrupled juror remained on
the jury that convicted him. The trial court denied the motion; holding that neither the testimony nor the pleadings took the case beyond the scope of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965).
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. 409 So. 2d 1033. The court noted that
the exception recognized in Swain for attacking systematic exercise of peremptory challenges
was based on the systematic exclusion of blacks, and found no indication that the Supreme
Court would extend the exception to the systematic exclusion of other groups. 409 So. 2d at
1057. The court, however, declined to resolve the issue, finding that even ifit were to conclude
that the Swain exception was applicable, the defendant had failed to demonstrate that his
rights had been violated. Without any further explanation, the court concluded that "neither
the record nor the pleading, including the study by Professor Winick, are sufficient to move
this case beyond the general rule of Swain v. Alabama." 409 So. 2d at 1057. As an alternate
holding, tlie court found that the defendant had waived any right to challenge the jury by his
failure to raise an objection at trial concerning the State's use of peremptory challenges. The
court further noted that in any event, the defendant was not prejudiced by the State's use of
peremptory challenges. Although the prosecutor had removed all 12 venirepersons expressing
opposition to the death penalty who were subject to possible prosecutorial peremptory challenge, the court noted that the jury had reco=ended by a vote of IO to 2 that Dobbert receive
a life sentence rather than the death penalty. 409 So. 209 at 1057-58. Since under Florida law
the trial judge may impose a death sentence no matter what the jury reco=ends, see FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1), (2) (West 1982), the court labeled as "frivolous" the defendant's
claim that the judge might have imposed a life sentence had the jury's life recommendation
been unanimous.
The defendant then filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the systematic use of
peremptory challenges and raising a number of other grounds. The habeas court ruled that the
Florida Supreme Court had not reached the merits, but had decided the case on a waiver
theory. Dobbert v. Strickland, 532 F. Supp. 545, 559 (M.D. Fla. 1982). It denied relief, agreeing that the issue had been waived by failure of the defendant to raise a contemporaneous
objection. 532 F. Supp. at 561. The court further found that the "cause" and "prejudice"
exception to the waiver rule recognized by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), was inapplicable because the defendant had shown neither cause nor prejudice. The district court also
expressed the view that defendant's claim was in any event without merit. Noting that the
defendant's legal theory was based on Swain and Witherspoon, the court found Witherspoon
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These recent cases illustrate growing judicial concern with
clearly inapplicable as it dealt only with challenges for cause, and further found that the Swain
exception was limited to racial discrimination. 532 F. Supp. at 561-62.
Dobbert appealed the denial of habeas corpus relief to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which on February 5, 1982, just hours before his pending execution, granted a stay of
execution pending appeal. Dobbert v. Strickland, 670 F.2d 938 (11th Cir. 1982). Assuming
that the Eleventh Circuit does not reverse Dobbert's conviction and death sentence based upon
one of the many other grounds asserted in his appeal, it is likely that the court will reach the
merits of his peremptory challenge claim notwithstanding the waiver problem that troubled
the district court and the Supreme Court of Florida. Even if the appellate court finds that the
Florida court based its decision on its procedural default rule rather than on the merits, compare Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 152 (1979) (if under state law failure to
comply with state procedural rule does not bar consideration of constitutional claim, federal
court may consider the claim on habeas), and Newman v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 969 (1976)
(federal court cannot apply a state waiver rule precluding habeas corpus petition if the state
court had declined to impose the procedural bar), with Ratcliffv. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474, 477-78
(5th Cir. 1979) (federal court may apply state timely objection rule to bar constitutional claim
where state court discussed merits of claim after ruling that there is a procedural defect), and
even if abuse of peremptory challenges is deemed waivable, compare Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 522, 523 n.22 (1968), and Wigglesworth v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (Witherspoon error not waived by failure contemporaneously to object), with Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979) (Witherspoon error
waived by failure of counsel to order transcript of voir dire; however, court indicated that such
failure might not have barred the claim, had it been deemed meritorious), cause and prejudice
should be found on these facts.
The Supreme Court, although originally leaving open the definition of "cause" and
"prejudice," Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 (1977), has recently discussed both requirements. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982); United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584
(1982). In Engle, the Court suggested that both take their meaning from principles of comity
and finality, which counsel against revision of state court convictions absent a showing that the
incarceration attacked is fundamentally unjust. 102 S. Ct. at 1575. The Court declined to find
"cause" where, although the petitioner did not know of the constitutional defect at the time of
trial, the basis of the constitutional claim was available and had been litigated by others. 102
S. Ct. at 1574-75. In .Dobbert, the claim advanced is a novel one, never previously litigated,
Moreover, at the time of voir dire, Dobbert "lacked the tools to construct" his constitutional
claim. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1574. Although the legal tools (Witherspoon and Swain)
were available, they had not previously been put together for use in this context; nor did the
factual predicate to their combined use exist at the time of the voir dire, which occured in 1974.
At that time Dobbert would not have been able to raise the constitutional claim. The voir dire
in his case, held about a year after Florida had reenacted its post-Funnan death penalty statute, occurred at the very beginning of the pattern found to exist in the study. At that time any
objection to the use of peremptory challenges would have been rejected under the holding of
Swain. The evidence of the pattern and practice necessary to support a Swain claim was
unavailable at that time, and became available only with the completion of this study.
Thus, a contemporaneous objection in .Dobbert wouJd have been futile, not merely in the
sense that the trial court under existing law would have rejected it, see Engle v. Isaac, 102 S.
Ct. at 1572 & n.35, but also in the sense that the claim was not ripe and would not have
become ripe for several years. As a result, there is no possibility that Dobbert's failure contemporaneously to raise the issue was a deliberate choice to withhold the claim "in order to 'sandbag' - to gamble on acquittal while saving a dispositive claim in case the gamble doesn't pay
off." Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1572 n.34; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89-90; see
Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 1981).
Moreover, contrary to the view of the Supreme Court of Florida, Dobbert was prejudiced
by the practice complained of. Had his jury contained at least some of the 12 death penalty
objectors excluded by prosecutorial peremptory challenges, it might have decided his guilt
differently. Moreover, it might have voted unanimously for a life sentence, rather than voting
10 to 2 for life. Certainly it cannot be assumed that a sentencing judge would be unaffected by
the difference between disagreeing with a unanimous jury reco=endation and one in which
two jurors agreed with him if he imposed death. There thus is a substantial "risk of a funda-
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prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge. The prosecutor's
exercise of the challenge is increasingly seen as no longer beyond
judicial reproach. Even in those jurisdictions adhering to the strict
rule of Swain, a defendant who can compile an adequate statistical
record of prosecutorial use of the peremptory in a particular district
over a several year period should be able to meet the Swain burden
and invoke judicial review of the prosecutor's conduct.
The defendant's heavy burden under Swain should as a matter of
law be at least somewhat easier to carry when the alleged systematic
pattern in the use of peremptory challenges has been applied in
death penalty cases. Capital cases are unique, different even from
race cases, and this fact should make courts especially sensitive to
the use of peremptory challenges to produce a jury disposed toward
death. As the Supreme Court has recognized in every 4eath penalty
case since Furman, "death is a punishment which is different from
all other sanctions in kind rather than degree." 67 As a result, the
Court has acknowledged that more in the way of due process is required to impose the death penalty than a sentence to a term of
years:
mental miscariage of justice in this case." United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. at 1596. The
Court in Frady, in a substantial tightening of the standard of "actual prejudice," stated that a
habeas petitioner must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of
prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infe_cting his entire
trial with error of constitutional dimensions." 102 S. Ct. at 1596. The error complained of in
Frady, however, concerned jury instructions, and the Court's analysis of the evidence and of
the jury's verdict led it to conclude that there was "no substantial likelihood" that the instructions "prejudiced Frady's chances with the jury." 102 S. Ct. at 1597-98. With regard to certain
errors, however, including those involving jury composition, such an assessment as to prejudicial impact is not possible. For this reason, the Supreme Court _in the closely related context of
applying the rule of harmless error has declined to require a showing of particularized
prejudice and has automatically reversed convictions where the jury was improperly composed. E.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); see
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge with pecuniary interest in outcome); Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. at 219 (denial or impairment of peremptory challenge); Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (same). It would seem inappropriate to read the actual
prejudice approach of Frady to ban a habeas petitioner in Dobbert's situation from challenging jury selection practices that create a substantial risk of material prejudice. See Huffman v.
Wainwright, 651 F.2d at 350.
It thus seems likely that the Eleventh Circuit will reject the waiver argument accepted by
both the Supreme Court of Florida and the federal district court, and resolve the merits of
Dobbert's constitutional attack.
67. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3377; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 30304 (1976) (plurality opinion). See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869, 874 (1982); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality
opinion of Burger, C.J.); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S
349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.); 430 U.S. at 363-64 (White, J., concurring);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187-89 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-91
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (noncapital
case). For a philosophical analysis of the notion that death is different, see J. MURPHY, Cruel
and Unusual l'unishmenl, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE AND THERAPY 223-49 (1979).
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[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long . . . . Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in
the determination that death is tlie appropriate punishment in a specific case.68

Not only is this sentiment frequently expressed, but in a variety of
contexts the courts have actually treated death penalty cases differently than other cases. 69 Thus, the use of peremptory challenges in
capital cases should be subjected to closer scrutiny than in noncapital cases.70
68. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). The most
recent expression of this view came from the Court's newest member, Justice O'Connor:
[T]his Court has gone to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be
executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the
sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869, 878 (1982) (concurring opinion). An earlier expression
came in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring):
[C]apital cases . . . stand on quite a different footing than other offenses. In such cases
the law is especially sensitive to . . . procedural fairness . . . . I do not concede that
whatever process is "due" an offender faced with a fine or prison sentence necessarily
satisfies the requirements of the Constitution in a capital case. The distinction is by no
means novel . . . ; nor is it negligible, being literally that between life and death.
See also cases cited in note 67 Sllpra; Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (opinion of Jackson, J.); Andres v. United
States, 33 U.S; 740, 752 (1948) (opinion of Reed, J.); Gillers, S11pra note 2, at 31-35, 60-61, 8689; Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect far Persons: Super .Due Process far .Death, 53 So.
CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1155-63 (-1980); White, .Death-Qual!fied Juries: The "Prosecution-Proneness" Argument Reexamined, 41 U. P1rr. L. REv. 353, 353-54, 402-04 (1980).
This approach is fully consistent with the Supreme Court's general due process calculus,
under which the level of process that is required in a particular situation depends on a balancing of several factors, including the private interest affected by governmental action and the
risk and cost of error. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604-08 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319,335 (1976); Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65
MINN. L. REV. 331, 399-400 (1981).
69. Compare United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (provision of Federal Kidnapping Act authorizing the death penalty following jury verdict, but not where jury trial waived,
unconstitutionally burdens right to trial by jury), with Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212
(1978) (state homicide statute authorizing life sentence following jury verdict, but lesser sentence where defendant pleads non vult and waives jury trial, held not to burden defendant's
rights unconstitutionally under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments); compare Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (standardless death penalty statutes violate eighth amendment), with Britton v. Rogers, 63l F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980) (standardless sentencing statute in
noncapital case held not to violate eighth amendment); compare Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory death penalty statute violates eighth amendment), with Commonwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 344 N.E.2d 166 (1976) (mandatory one-year sentence
for carrying firearm without a license held not to violate the eighth amendment); compare
Powell v. Ala.bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (capital defendant unable to employ counsel or make
his own defense has due process right to assigned counsel), with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942) (refusal to appoint counsel for robbery suspect held not to violate due process).
70. One difference might be to permit a lower level of statistical significance to demonstrate a prima facie case under Swain in a capital case than in noncapital contexts. See D.
BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 318 (1980),
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STUDY OF PROSECUTORIAL USE OF THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE To EXCLUDE SCRUPLED JURORS

The Swain test is empirical, requiring proof of a pattern of
prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge over a substantial
period of time. The study presented here addresses the issue of
whether a careful review of the data on capital jury selection in a
single district would reveal such a pattern. The data indicate that the
prosecution relied on its peremptory challenges to systematically exclude death-scrupled individuals from capitaljuries.71 This result, at
least for the district studied, brings the government's conduct within
the ambit of Swain, justifying judicial review to ensure that the prosecution's peremptory challenges conform to constitutional standards.
A. The Study
The study analyzes data drawn from Florida's Fourth Judicial
Circuit. To comply with the requirements imposed by Swain for
showing systematic exclusion of a particular group over a period of
time, the study covers the five-year period72 from January '1974, soon
after Florida's reenactment of the death penalty,73 through December 1978.
The Swain analysis focuses on prosecutorial practices in a particular district. In Florida the relevant district is the judicial circuit, of
which there are twenty in the state.74 Each circuit contains one or
more counties. Because of considerations of manageability and cost,
the study examines only the Fourth Judicial Circuit, located in the
northeast portion of the state. The Fourth Circuit includes Dµval
County, which is coterminous with the City of Jacksonville, a large
urban area, and two principally rural counties, Clay and Nassau.75
71. The term "death qualified" could be used to describe the resulting jury although the
term usually is used to describe the result of challenges for cause of venirepersons because of
their death penalty attitudes. The term, although frequently used, is ambiguous. See Hovey v.
Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d I, 16 n.34, 616 P.2d 1301, 1307 n.34, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 134 n.34
(1980); Hoffman, Witherspoon After Wheeler: Death-Qualifying Is Bad For Defendant, 1
CRIM. JUSTICE J. 1, 3-4 (1979). As used here, it shall refer to the use of challenges by the
prosecutor, either for cause or peremptory to remove venirepersons who at voir dire express
opposition to the death penalty. The venirepersons are here referred to as "scrupled" or
"death-scrupled," in accordance with prevailing usage.
72. See United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243, 1248 n.6 (E.D. La. 1974) {two-year
period held sufficient in the context of Swain challenge to the systematic exclusion of blacks).
73. 1974 Fla. Laws. ch. 74-379.
74. A. MORRIS, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 517-18 {18th ed. 1981). ·
75. According to 1970 figures, Duval County had a population of 528,865 (98% urban),
Clay County had a population of32,059 (47.7% urban), and Nassau County had a population
of20,626 {33% urban). A. MoRRis, supra note 74, at 517-18. Juries in the Fourth Circuit are
selected from voter registration lists. According to voter registration lists for the 1976 general
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Court records revealed the cases during this five-year period in
which defendants were indicted for capital offenses - first degree
murder76 or involuntary sexual battery of a child under twelve, 77 the
two capital crimes at the time. The data presented do not include
cases in which prior to jury selection defendants plead guilty, had
their charges nolle prosequed, died, or were adjudicated not guilty
by reason of insanity. Nor do they include two other cases, one because the prosecution and defense attorneys had stipulated prior to
jury selection that the state would not seek the death penalty,78 and
the other because the prosecutor, who failed to mention the death
penalty during voir dire, admitted that he did not treat the case as a
death penalty case. 79 Finally, three cases were eliminated because
neither transcripts nor court reporter notes existed. 80
Several of the cases involved joint trials of more than one defendant in which a single voir dire occurred. Thus a total of thirtythree juries were selected during the five-year period in cases treated
as death penalty cases, and the study includes all thirty available voir
dires.

B. Methodology
To establish a prima facie case under Swain it should suffice to
show that th(? prosecution uses the peremptory challenge to remove
scrupled jurors to an extent that can be characterized as "systematic."81 A number of circuit court opinions make clear that "systemelection, the voters of the Fourth Circuit were 21.3% black (23% for Duval County, 5% for
Clay County, and 14% for Nassau County) and 15.5% white (73.6% for Duval County, 91.1%
for Clay County, and 84.9% for Nassau County). THE 1978 FLORIDA ALMANAC 392-93 (D.
Marth & M. Marth eds. 1978). Eighty-one and one-third percent of voters were Democrats
(81.5% for Duval County, 73% for Clay County, and 93% for Nassau County), 15.4% were
Republicans (15.2% for Duval County, 23% for Clay County, and 6% for Nassau County), and
3.3% were registered with other parties or as independents (3.3% for Duval County, 4% for
Clay County, and 1% for Nassau County). Id.
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (West 1982).
77. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (West 1982). The Supreme Court of Florida, applying
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), has since ruled that the death penalty under this statute
would offend the eighth amendment. Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1039 (1982).
78. State v. Walker, No. 78-1622 (Duval County Ct., Fla.).
79. State v. Freeman, No. 76-818 CF (Duval County Ct., Fla.).
80. State v. Swain, No. 77-4172 CF (Duval County Ct., Fla.); State v. Freeman, No. 76-818
CF (Duval County Ct., Fla.); State v. Turner, No. 73-179 (Nassau County Ct., Fla.). For a
discussion of nomesponse error treatment, see note 106 infra.
81. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S .. 202, 227 (1965); United States v. Nelson, 529
F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929, 930 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971).
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atic exclusion" does not require a showing of 100% exclusion. 82 How
much less than 100% is an open question as Swain and its progeny
set no specific standard for when use of the peremptory to eliminate
members of a class qualifies as "systematic." Guidance can be found
in the parallel context of selection of the pool of eligible jurors for
the formation of grand and petit juries, where "systematic exclusion"
is necessary to demonstrate a prima facie case of violation of the fair
cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment or of equal protection. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Swain cited cases involving selection of jury pools in its discussion of the demonstration required
to "show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges
. . . over a period of time." 83 In both contexts unrepresentative juries can be seen as products of "systematic" official action when the
underrepresentation produced is "inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized." 84 In both, similar statistical methods
should be acceptable to determine whether the discrepancy produced
qualifies as "systematic."
In cases involving challenges to the jury selection methods used
to form grand and petit jury pools, the courts hold that a prima facie
case of constitutional violation is established by showing substantial
underrepresentation of a group. 85 Such underrepresentation is established by a "method of proof, sometimes called the 'rule of exclusion' " involving a statistical comparison of ''the proportion of the
group in the total population to the proportion ... [actually serving
as] jurors, over a significant period of time." 86 This methodology,
using statistical probability theory to demonstrate s~tisfaction of the
legal standard of "systematic exclusion,"87 should be acceptable in
82. United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971); accord, circuit court
cases cited in note 81 supra.
83. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 226-27, citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
480 (1954); Patton v. Mississippi, 322 U.S. 463 (1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
The Court required a more detailed showing that prosecutorial conduct produced the unrepresentative result in the peremptory challenge context because of the possibility in the peremptory process but not in the selection process that defense counsel peremptory practices may
have produced the result. 380 U.S. at 227.
84. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366-67 (1979).
85. "While the earlier cases involved abs9lute exclusion of an identifiable group [due to the
system by which juries were selected], later cases established the principle that substantial
under-representation of the group constitutes a constitutional violation as well, if it results
from purposeful discrimination." Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977); see Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
86. Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 494. See also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. at 630
& n.9; Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967); Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S at 552 n.2.
81. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70; Finkelstein, supra note 32, at 338, 353-56 ;
Kairys, Juror Selection: The Law, A Mathematical Method ofAnalysis, and a Case Study, 10
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771, 785-89 (1972); Sperlich & Jaspovice, Statistical .Decision Theory and
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the peremptory challenge context and can be adapted to test whether
prosecutors systematically use their peremptory challenge to eliminate from capital juries those expressing opposition to the death
penalty. 88
Analysis of the transcripts of the voir dires of capital cases over a
significant period of time can establish ho:w the prosecutors use their
peremptory challenges for nonscrupled venirepersons and for scrupled venirepersons. By comparing prosecutorial practices for the
two groups, the. probability that the number of scrupled jurors challenged occurred by chance can be calculated by using the binomial
distribution. If the difference between the number of scrupled
venirepersons expected to be challenged (based on the prosecutor's
pattern in the use of peremptories for nonscrupled venirepersons)
and the number actually challenged is greater than two or three standard deviations - a probability between 5% (.05) and 1% (.01) then the hypothesis that the result was achieved at random ''would
be suspect to a social scientist." 89
the Selection ofGrand Jurors: Testingfar Discrimination in a Single Panel, 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 75 (1975); Co=ent, The Civil Petitioner's Right to Representative Grand Juries and a
Statistical Method of Showing Discrimination in Jury Selection Cases Generally, 20 UCLA L,
REv. 581, 620-31 (1973). In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,496 n.17 (1977), the Supreme
Court used this methodology to reach its conclusion that a prima facie case of discrimination
in the selection of grand juries in a Texas county had occurred. The Court cited the Finkelstein article, Sllpra, as well as several standard statistics texts: P. ~OEL, INTRODUCTION TO
MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS (4th ed. 1971); F. MOSTELLER, R. ROURKE & G. THOMAS,
PROBABILITY WITH STATISTICAL APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1970). The Supreme Court has used
statistical probability theory in other contexts as well. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 237
(1978), for example, the Court relied on this methodology for its finding that reduction injury
size below six would reduce minority group representation on juries, citing Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscemible" Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 13 MICH, L,
REV. 643 (1975). This methodology is also co=only used in employment discrimination
cases. See generally D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70.
88. See cases cited at note 81 supra (prima facie case of systematic exclusion through use of
the peremptory is established by a statistical showing that the prosecutor has systematically
exercised his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks over a period of time); United States v,
Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 472-73 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 (1977) (approving use of statistical
probability theory to carry Swain burden); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243,
1246 n.5 (E.D. La 1974) (same).
89. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,497 n.17 (1977). In explicitly approving this methodology in the jury selection context, the Court has indicated that for large samples, "if the
difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three
standard deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be suspect to
a social scientist." The two or three standard deviation rule has been applied by the courts in
other contexts as well. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 443 U.S. 299, 308,
311 nn.14&17 (1977); Hameed v. International Assn. of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers Local 396,637 F.2d 506, 513-14 (8th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. United Va. Bank, 615 F.2d
147, 151-52 (4th Cir. 1980); Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 784 n.29 (2d Cir. 1980);
see D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70, at 294-95. Two standard deviations is the equivalent
of a probabilty of 5% (.05), the point normally regarded by statisticians and social scientists as
"statistically significant." Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d I, 26 n.58, 616 l>.2d 1301, 1314
n.58, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 141 n.58 (1980); R. WINKLER &
HAYES, STATISTICS:

w.
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Of course, variables other than the venireperson's views on capital punishment could account for any relationship found. To control
for any such potentially confounding variables, analysis of the voir
dire transcripts can also identify other possibly relevant variables demographic characteristics of the venireperson and his or her responses to certain voir dire questions. Twenty-nine such potential
confounding variables were identified, 90 and multivariate analysis is
used to determine if a statistically significant relationship exists between venirepersons' attitudes concerning capital punishment and
the exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenges, after removing
the potentially confounding effects of these variables.
If a statistically significant relationship, i.e., one exceeding the
two or three standard deviation rule, is demonstrated between the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges and attitudes toward
capital punishment, and if this relationship remains statistically significant after removal of the effects of potentially confounding variables, then a prima facie case of prosecutorial abuse of the
peremptory may be found. 91 Under the traditional approach applied
PROBABILITY, INFERENCE AND DECISION 413 (2d ed:-1975); Finkelstein, supra note 37, at 359.
Three standard deviations is the equivalent of a probability of 1% (.01), regarded as "highly
significant" Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 26 n.58, 616 P.2d at 1314 n.58, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 141 n.58.
In Castaneda, the Supreme Court described the method of computing the standard deviation and illustrated it with the facts of the case before it:
Given that 79.1% of the population is Mexican-American, the expected number of Mexican-Americans among the 870 persons summoned to serve as grand jurors over the 11year period is approximately 688. The observed number is 339. Of course, in any given
drawing some fluctuation from the expected number is predicted. The important point,
however, is that the statistical model shows that the results of a random drawing are likely
to fall in the vicinity of the expected value. . . . The measure of the predicted fluctuation
from the expected value is the standard deviation, defined for the binomial distribution as
the square root of the product of the total number in the sample (here 870) times the·
probability of selecting a Mexican-American (0.791 ) times the probability of selecting a
non-Mexican American (0.209).
430 U.S. at 496-97 n.17. The difference between the expected and observed number of Mexican-Americans was approximately 29 standard deviations, the likelihood that such a substantial departure from the expected value would occur by chance was less than 1 in 10 140• Thus,
the Court found that a prima facie case of discrimination against Mexican-Americans had
been established. 430 U.S. at 496 & n. 17. Similar methodology has been approved in cases
raising Swain challenges to the systematic exclusion of black venirepersons. See United States
v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 472-73 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated sub nom. United States v.
Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 (1977); United States v. McDaniels,
379 F. Supp. 1243, 1246 n.5 (E.D. La 1974).
90. See text following note 100 i'!fra.
91. Even though potential confounding variables were analyzed in this study, it should not
be legally necessary for a defendant to perform this analysis to demonstrate a prima facie case
ofprosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge. The lower federal courts, in d~cu_ssing the
burden imposed by Swain, have not mentioned any need for the defend~t to eliminate ~e
possibility that variables other than race may explain the_ prosecutors exerctSe _of per~mptones.
See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th. Crr. 1981). Moreover, 1!1 the Jury selection context, a prima facie case of violation of the sixth amendment cross-section requirement
or of equal protection is demonstrated by a statistical showing of substantial underrepresenta-
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in jury selection cases, such a prima facie case would shift to the
prosecutor the burden to demonstrate that the challenges were based
on trial related factors, rather than merely on opposition to the death
penalty. 92
This methodology can also be used to assess the impact of such a
systematic practice by prosecutors on the representative character of
the juries selected. For this purpose a typical application of the "rule
of exclusion" will suffice. Thus, a statistical comparison can be
made of the proportion of scrupled venirepersons in the cases in the
period studied who remained after challenges for cause and exercise
of defense peremptories to the proportion actually selected as jurors.
Establishing a statistically significant discrepancy between the expected number of scrupled jurors and the number actually selected
would further support a constitutional challenge. In addition, an
analysis of both defense and prosecutorial peremptory practices
would meet the Swain requirement that any unrepresentative product of peremptory challenge practices be attributed to the action of
prosecutors rather than of defense counsel.93
C. TheData

Table 1 represents the total number of venirepersons in the voir
dires studied who were examined as potential jurors or alternates,
subdivided into nonscrupled venirepersons (those not expressing opposition to the death penalty) and scrupled venirepersons (those extion of a cognizable class in the jury pool selected, without the necessity of eliminating the
effect, if any, of other potential variables. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979)
(sixth amendment); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (equal protection). For example, in Castaneda, a challenge to composition of grand juries, the defendant relied on statistical
methods to demonstrate substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans in the county
over a substantial period of time. The state courts had rejected this equal protection claim,
finding that the defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case because, among other
things, he did not demonstrate that factors other than race - age, poor health, lack of citizenship, illiteracy, unsound mind, lack of moral character, criminal charges pending or a criminal
record - had not accounted for the disproportionate results shown. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that a prima facie case had been established even though the defendant had
not attempted to control for these potentially confounding variables, each of which would have
disqualified a juror under state law. 430 U.S. at 484-85, 496, 504.
92. This "question-raising, burden-shifting" use of statistical proofs is the approach commonly used in discrimination cases. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70, at 27-30.
93. Because defense attorneys are involved in the peremptory challenge system, the majority in Swain stated that the rule of exclusion, "a proof standard developed in a context where
there is no question of state responsibility for the alleged exclusion . . ., cannot be woodenly
applied to cases where the discrimination is said to occur during the process of peremptory
challenge of persons called for jury service." 380 U.S. 202,227. However, if a study identified
the use of peremptory challenges by both prosecutors and defense attorneys, it would be possible to assess the extent of state responsibility for any unrepresentative result that had occurred.
If this could be done, the rule of exclusion would seem the applicable method of demonstrating the existence of a pattern of "systematic exclusion."
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pressing such opposition at the voir dire). 94 The characterization of
venirepersons reflects only their responses to inquiries at voir dire, 95
94. Venirepersons were separated into two groups for purposes of the study: those who
voiced opposition to the death penalty and those who did not. It is useful to subdivide these
categories further to delineate some of the issues made relevant by Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968). See text accompanying notes 118-33 ln.fra. With certain modifications, the
typography of the spectrum of attitudes on capital punishment developed in Hovey v. Superior
Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 20,616 P.2d 1301, 1311, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 138 (1980), will be used. The
group expressing opposition to the death penalty, also referred to here as "scrupled" venirepersons, can be further subdivided into three categories: (1) the "automatic acquittal" group,
those opposed to the death penalty who could never return a verdict of guilt, and who therefore are subject to challenge for cause under Witherspoon, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
596 (1978); (2) the "automatic life imprisonment" group, those opposed to the death penalty
who although. they could consider a verdict of guilt, could never recommend a sentence of
death, also subject to removal under Witherspoon; and (3) the "oppose death penalty'' group,
those opposed to the death penalty who will not automatically vote against it or against guilt in
every case, and who therefore may not be removed by challenge for cause consistent with
Witherspoon. The group not expressing opposition to the death penalty, also referred to here
as "nonscrupled" venirepersons, can be further subdivided into three categories: (1) the "automatic death penalty'' group, those who favor the death penalty and will automatically vote for
it if the defendant is convicted, and who are presumably subject to challenge for cause by the
defendant, see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 n.20 (1968), clllng Crawford v.
Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 303-04 (4th Cir.), vacated and remandedfar further conslderatlon ln light
ef Witherspoon, 393 U.S. 76 (1968), reinstated (unreported), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970)
(alternative holding); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 393 U.S. at 536 (Black, J., dissenting); Smith v.
Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578,79 (5th Cir. 1981) (dictum); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at
20 n.48, 616 P.2d at 1310 n.48, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 137 n.48; Gillers, supra note 2, at 99 n.452
(suggesting that permitting such jurors to serve may undercut Woodson, invalidating legislatively mandated death sentences, and Lockett, commanding that a capital defendant receive
individualized consideration); (2) the "favor death penalty" group, those who favor the death
penalty but will not vote to impose it in every case; and (3) the "indifferent" group, those who
express indifference to the death penalty, neither favoring nor opposing it, or who state they
are undecided about the death penalty. The last two categories ofvenirepersons would not be
subject to challenge for cause based on their views on capital punishment.
95. While it is possible that some jurors who actually oppose the death penalty failed to
voice objection (as well as that some who favor the penalty lied and voiced opposition, perhaps
in an effort to avoid jury service), this should not affect the value of the study. First, under the
method of questioning used in capital voir dires, persons who oppose the death penalty are
asked to state their opposition. As Witherspoon forbids the prosecutor to inquire as to the
venireperson's views of the propriety of death in the case at issue, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21, the
questioning usually concerns whether the venireperson is opposed to the death penalty in general or harbors moral or religious scruples against it. In a typical capital voir dire, the prosecutor questions each venireperson intensively on the issue of capital punishment if the
venireperson expresses any opposition or even hesitancy concerning capital punishment in order to determine whether the person may be challenged for cause under Witherspoon. Moreover, the practice condemned by Witherspoon is the challenge of jurors "simply because they
volced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples
against its infliction." 391 U.S. at 522 (emphasis added).
Of course the verbal responses of venirepersons do not tell the entire story. Prospective
jurors also communicate through paralinguistic behavior ("aspects of speech - such as
breathing, pauses and latencies, pitch and tone of voice, and speech disturbances") and kinetic
behavior or "body language" ("facial expressions, body movements, body orientation, eye contact, and hand movements"). Suggs & Sales, Using Communication Cues to Evaluate Prospective Jurors During the Voir Dlre, 20 .ARiz. L. REv. 629, 630-31 (1978). However, a study of this
kind- dependent as it is on the transcribed record of the voir dire - is necessarily limited to
the verbal communication of venirepersons. As venirepersons in capital cases are asked to
verbalize their opposition to the death penalty, this is not a shortcoming. Moreover, as appellate challenges to jury selection practices in capital cases raising Witherspoon error are adjudi-
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typically by the prosecutor, as to whether they opposed the death
penalty. Table 1 also shows the numbers of venirepersons removed
for cause,96 those removed by defense peremptory challenges, and
those remaining, the latter category constituting venirepersons subject to exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenge.
Table 1 shows several interesting trends. First, the fraction of
scrupled jurors in this area of the country amounts to about thirteen
percent, approximately half the national average. 97 The high
number of challenges for cause among the scrupled jurors indicates
that slightly more than half of the scrupled jurors could not vote for
the death penalty under any circumstances, or were biased on the
issue of guilt. 98 The breakdown of venirepersons remaining after
challenges for cause consequently includes only about 6% scrupled
potential jurors. The defense peremptory challenges are extremely
one-sided in favor of keeping scrupled jurors, and have the effect of
increasing their representation from about 6% to about 8% of the
potential jurors.
Table 2 shows how the prosecutors used their peremptory challenges on potential jury members and altemates, 99 subdivided into
scrupled and non-scrupled venirepersons.
Table 2 shows that while the prosecution used peremptory challenges against 28% of the nonscrupled jurors, it eliminated 77% of
the scrupled jurors. And whereas 13% of the community opposed
the death penalty, and 6% opposed it in a manner not justifying recated purely on the transcribed record, this should be sufficient as a matter of law in the
peremptory challenge context as well.
96. Venirepersons were removed for cause on the motion of the prosecutor or defense, and
sometimes by the court without motion. The trial court traditionally has the discretion to excuse a juror on its own motion. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 582 F.2d 968, 969 (5th Cir.
1978) (per curiam).
97. Opposition to the death penalty has dramatically lessened in the past 15 years. At the
time of the Witherspoon decision, approximately 47% of the population fell into the "generally
opposed to capital punishment" category. See 391 U.S. at 520 n.16 (citing 2 POLLS, INTERNA•
TIONAL REVIEW ON PuBLIC OPINION No. 3, at 84 (1967)). Gallup polls conducted periodically
since indicate that the nation's views have changed significantly, with only 25% opposing capital punishment and 66% favoring it in 1981. SoURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
- 1981, 209-12 (T. Flanagan, D. van Alstyne & M. Gottfriedson eds. 1982) (hereinafter cited
as SOURCEBOOK).
98. Based on the experience with nonscrupledjurors, one would expect about 18 of the 147
scrupled venirepersons to be challenged for cause independent of their death penalty attitudes,
Of the remaining 129, 74, or about 57%, were challenged for cause, presumably because of
their views on the death penalty.
99. In Florida each party generally has 10 peremptory challenges in a capital case. FLA,
STAT. ANN.§ 913.08(l)(a)(2) (West 1982); FLA._ R. CRIM. P. 3.350(a). (Each party is given an
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror selected. FLA. R. CRIM, P. 3.3SO(f),
Two alternates are usually selected.
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moval for cause under Witherspoon, fewer than 3% of the actual jurors and alternates opposed the death penalty.
The Appendix includes a breakdown of the data shown in Tables
1 and 2 according to the venireperson's status as either a potential
juror or potential alternate. These data do not suggest any different
conclusions regarding these two categories, particularly in view of
the relatively small number of potential alternates.
For each ·of the 629 venirepersons subject to exercise of
prosecutorial peremptory challenge, data was also collected concerning twenty-nine potentially confounding variables. Based on the
transcripts of the voir dires, 100 data were collected concerning such
demographic factors as the venireperson's sex, marital status, age,
number of children, occupation (based on eleven occupational categories), employment status, level of education, and length ohime in
the community. Data were also collected concerning the venireperson's response to typical voir dire questions such as whether he or
she knew or had a relative who knew the defendant, the prosecutor,
the defense attorney, the judge, a witness or another juror; whether
he or she had previously been the victim of a crime or had a relative
who had been such a victim; whether he or she had previously served
as a juror; and whether he or she had previously served as a juror in
a capital case. In addition, data were collected concerning whether
the prosecutor had attempted to remove the venireperson for cause,
had attempted to remove him or her for cause based on death penalty attitudes, and had questioned the venireperson concerning his or
her ability to be impartial in deciding the defendant's guilt.
In the case of twenty-two of these potential confounding variables, the transcripts did not contain sufficient information to permit
100. The inability of a study of the kind undertaken here to go beyond the transcribed voir
dire places obvious limits on the consideration of possibly confounding variables. For many
venirepersons, the transcripts did not contain information on some of the control variables
sought to be analyzed. However, unless the prosecutors had prior knowledge concerning the
members of the venire (or in the case of a few of the demographic variables, unless the prosecutors were able to identify these factors visually), the absence of information in the transcripts
also indicates that the prosecutors lacked information concerning these variables, making it
highly unlikely that they significantly affected the exercise of peremptories. Of course, some
demographic variables not revealed by the transcripts were subject to visual observation - the
race, personal appearance, and style of dress of the members of the venire, for example. And it
is possible that prosecutors had access to out-of-court sources of information concerning the
venirepersons that might influence the exercise of peremptory challenges. However, in the
Florida case in which the study was raised, the state made no attempt to explain the exercise of
peremptories on any of these bases. See note 66 supra. In the face of the strong inference
created by the data, see notes 106-13 iefra and accompanying text, this omission suggests that
additional variables were not related to the exercise of peremptories by the prosecutors.
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TABLE 1
TOTAL VENIREPERSONS EXAMINED (JURORS AND ALTERNATES)
(Based on 30 cases)
Venire persons
examined as
potential jurors
-lon-scrupled
not opposed
:> death
ienalty
!crupled
opposed to
leath penalty)
~otal

Challenged for
cause by
prosecutor

Challenged for
cause by
defense

Excused for
cause by court
without motion

Venire persons
remaining after
excuse for
cause

Excused by
defense
peremptory
challenge

Subject to exercise of
prosecutorial peremptory
challenge (those remaining
after excuse for cause and
defense peremptories)

~

?;·

:::ctq·

§

969

36

25

60

848

271

577

t

(86.83%)

(34.95%)

(96.15%)

(71.43%)

(93.91%)

(98.9%)

(91.73%)

~

147

67

1

24

55

(13.17%)

(65.05%)

(3.85%)

(28.57%)

(6.09%)

(1.1%)

(8.27%)

1116

103

26

84

903

274

629

~

~~

3

52

~

-00
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TABLE2
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
IN SELECTING JURORS AND ALTERNATE JURORS
(Based on 30 cases)
Potential jurors subject to
exercise of prosecutorial
peremptory challenge
(those remaining after
excused for cause and
defense peremptories)
Non-scrupled
(not opposed
to death
penalty)
Scrupled
(opposed to
death
penalty)
Total

Challenged

Not challenged
(those selected as
jurors or
alternates)

163

414

(28.25%)

(71.75%)

40

12

(76.92%)

(23.08%)

203

426

(32.27%)

(67.73%)

577

52

629

the multivariate analysis planned. IOI Further analysis of these variables was not attempted because of the biases in statistical computa101. The following table reports the percentage of missing data for each variable considered to have severe missing data problems.
Percentage missing
(out of 629)
Variable
89.83%
1) age ofvenireperson
24.96%
2) number of children of venireperson
23.69%
3) occupation of venireperson
82.83%
4) level of education of venireperson
24.17%
5) time of venireperson in community
22.58%
6) venireperson knew prosecutor
22.58%
7) venireperson knew defense lawyer
96.98%
8) venireperson knew judge
92.85%
9) venireperson knew other juror
36.88%
IO) venireperson knew witness
99.52%
11) relative of venireperson knew defendant
99.84%
12) relative of venireperson knew prosecutor
99.36%
13) relative of venireperson knew defense lawyer
96.18%
14) relative of venireperson knew judge
96.18%
15) relative of venireperson knew other juror
96.18%
16) relative of venireperson knew witness
74.09%
17) venireperson had criminal record
82.35%
18) relative of venireperson had criminal record
54.21%
19) venireperson was victim of crime
66.3 %
20) relative of venireperson was victim of crime
37.68%
21) venireperson had previously served as juror
34.82%
22) venireperson had previously served as juror in capital case.
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tion which would be caused by the missing data. In the case of seven
of the potential confounding variables there either was no missing
data or the extent of missing data (less than 5%) was regarded as
minimal. These variables were the venireperson's sex, marital status,
and employment status, and whether the venireperson knew the defendant, was unsuccessfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor,
was unsuccessfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor based on
death penalty attitudes, and was questioned by the prosecutor as to
ability to be impartial in deciding guilt. Table 3 presents summary
data on the use of prosecutorial peremptory challenges as a function
of each of these variables, for scrupled and nonscrupled venirepersons. A more detailed breakdown of the data is tabulated in the
Appendix.
TABLE3
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL CONFOUNDING VARIABLES
Venireperson Characteristics

Male
Female
Married
Not Married
Employed
Not Employed
*Know Defendant
Not Know Defendant
*Challenged for Cause
Not Challenged for Cause
*Challenged for Cause (Death)
Not Challenged for Cause (Death)
Questioned on Guilt Impartialty
*Not Questioned

Percent

Percent of Venireeersons Challenged

Scrueled

Total

Scrueted

Nonscrueled

7.5
8.9.

33.5
31.3

77.3
76.7

29.9
26.8

6.7
11.0

22.5
49.2

64.3
90.5

44.1

7.4
8.7

29.9
36.0

73.5
84.6

26,5
31.4

0.0
8.4

83.3
31.9

0.0
76.0

83.3
27.8

61.1
6.7

94.4
30.4

90.9
73.2

100.0
27.4

100.0
6.8

100.0
31.2

100.0
71.4

28.2

8.5
0.0

31.0
73.7

76.9

19.5

26.7
73.7

*Small number of venirepersons (less than 3% of total)

This Table illustrates a slight difference 102 only between the use
of peremptory challenges for males (33.4%) and for females (31.3%).
However, a substantial disparity between the use of peremptories for
scrupled and for nonscrupled venirepersons is shown for both males
The prosecutors' failure to inquire as to these variables suggests that they did not relate to
the exercise of peremptories, unless, of course, the prosecutors had independent knowledge
concerning these factors. See note 100 mpra.
102. The use of the terms "slight difference" and "substantial disparity" in the description
of the data appearing in Table 3 is not intended to convey any statistical conclusion.
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(77 .3% of scrupled male venirepersons were challenged compared to
29.9% of those who were nonscrupled) and females (76.7% of scrupled females were challenged compared to 26.8% for those who were
nonscrupled). Thus although as shown in Table 3, women are
slightly more likely to be death-scrupled than are men, there is no
indication that the study results are the result of challenges based on
sex rather than death penalty attitudes.
The prosecutors challenged 22.5% of married venirepersons compared to more than twice this percentage (49.2%) for those not married. And unmarried venirepersons are more likely to be scrupled.
Nonetheless, within each sub-category a substantial disparity is
shown between the use of peremptories for scrupled and nonscrupled venirepersons: for those not married, 90.5% of scrupled
venirepersons were challenged compared to 44.1% for- those nonscrupled; for those who were married, 64.3% of scrupled venirepersons were. challenged compared to 19.5% for those who were
nonscrupled.
A slight difference only is observed between the exercise of peremptory challenges for employed venirepersons (29.9%) and for
those who were unemployed (36%). Again, within each sub-category, a substantial disparity between the use of peremptories for
scrupled and for nonscrupled venirepersons is shown: for those employed, 73.5% of scrupled venirepersons were challenged compared
to only 26.5% for those who were nonscrupled; for those who were
not employed, 84.6% of scrupled venirepersons were challenged
compared to 31.4% for those who were nonscrupled.
Not surprisingly, a substantial percentage (83.3%) of those responding affirmatively to the question of whether they had previously known the defendant were challenged. All six of these were
nonscrupled venirepersons. For those who did not know the defendant previously - 99% of total venirepersons - a substantial disparity between the use of peremptories for scrupled and for nonscrupled venirepersons is shown: 76% of scrupled venirepersons
compared to 27.8% of those who were nonscrupled were challenged.
One of the principal functions of peremptory challenges is to facilitate exercise of the challenge for cause; 103 indeed, their availability minimizes tensions inherent in our system of challenges for
cause. 104 As a result, it can be expected that prosecutors will chal103. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1965); 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*353; Lempert, Jury Size And The .Peremptory Challenge, in THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE
349, 353-54 (R. Cover & 0. Fiss 1979).
104. Lempert, supra note 103, at 354.
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lenge peremptorily all or virtually all of those who they had previously attempted to remove for cause. This table reveals the expected
result as 17 of the 18 venirepersons unsuccessfully challenged for
cause (94.4%) were removed peremptorily. All seven of these who
were nonscrupled were removed, but perhaps suprisingly, one of the
11 scrupled venirepersons unsuccessfully challenged for cause (9.1%)
was not excused peremptorily. For those venirepersons not challenged for cause - 97% of total venirepersons - a substantial disparity between the use of peremptories for scrupled and for nonscrupled venirepersons is shown: 73.2% of scrupled venirepersons in
this category were excused by peremptory compared to only 27.4%
for those non-scrupled.
The next comparison in Ta,ble 3 examines a subset of those unsuccessfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor - those so challenged based on their attitudes concerning the death penalty. All ten
venirepersons in this category were removed peremptorily; by definition, all venirepersons in this category were scrupled. For those not
challenged for cause as a result of their attitudes on the death penalty - representing more than 98% of the total - a substantial disparity between the use of peremptories for scrupled and for nonscrupled venirepersons is shown: 71.4% of scrupled venirepersons
are removed for cause compared to 28.2% of those who are
nonscrupled.
As the peremptory challenge is primarily " a device for eliminating from the jury individuals whose capacity for impartial judgment
is suspect, but not so much as to require their exclusion as a matter
oflaw," 105 one would expect that a higher percentage of those whose
impartiality was questioned by the prosecutor would be removed by
peremptory challenge than those whose impartiality was not questioned. Surprisingly, the data showed the contrary. For those questioned as to their ability to be impartial in deciding guilt - 97% of
total venirepersons - 31% were removed. Although only 19
venirepersons were not so.questioned (perhaps because a decision to
challenge them had already been made on other grounds), of these,
73.7% were removed by peremptory challenge. All 52 scrupled
venirepersons were questioned as to impartiality, as were 97% of
those who were non-scrupled, but 76.9% of the scrupled in this category were removed compared to 26. 7% for those who were nonscrupled.
105. Id.
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D. Analysis
The question under investigation is whether prosecutors· in the
Fourth Judicial Circuit systematically used their peremptory challenges to eliminate from capital juries those potential jurors expressing opposition to the death penalty. Table 2 shows that for scrupled
jurors subject to prosecutorial peremptory challenge, 40 out of 52
(76.9%) were challenged. Given that prosecutors used peremptory
challenges for 28.2% of nonscrupled potential jurors, one would expect that 15 of the 52 scrupled jurors would have been challenged.
The chance of 40 or more scrupled potential jurors being removed
by prosecutorial peremptory challenge at random is approximately
eleven in one hundred billion (.000,000,000,11), or the equivalent of
7.6 standard deviations. This presents an astronomical degree of statistical significance; the result could be pure chance to approximately
the same extent that flipping 33 heads in a row could be a chance
result using an unbiased coin. 106
Moreover, the data demonstrate that, despite even more onesided (in the opposite direction) use of defense peremptories, the pattern in the use of peremptories by the prosecutors produced a substantial underrepresentation of scrupled jurors on the jury panels
selected. Table 1 reveals that 147 out of 1116 (13.2%) venirepersons
examined as potential jurors expressed opposition to the death penalty, and that 969 (86.8%) did not. After those excused for cause and
by defense peremptory challenge were eliminated, 629 venirepersons
remained. Of these, 52 (8.3%) were scrupled and 577 (91.7%) were
nonscrupled. Table 2 reveals that 426 jurors and alternates were actually selected. Of these, one would expect that 35 (8.3%) would
have been scrupled. In fact, as Table 2 reveals, only 12 scrupled
106. Although the transcripts in three cases were unavailable, see note 80 supra and accompanying text, their unavailability did not appear to be related to any variable that would
suggest that the 30 voir dires analyzed were in any way unrepresentative. Confidence in drawing conclusions based on 30 out of33 voir dires is also appropriate in view of the response rate
(90.91%), which is extremely high for studies of this type, involving court records that are
rarely complete. Accordingly, the small nonresponse error problem encountered is not serious.
To demonstrate further the strength of the conclusions reached on the basis of the 30 voir
dires studied, a ''worst case" analysis was performed in which the incredible assumption was
made that in each of the three missing cases, all 12 jurors selected were opposed to the death
penalty. This would add 36 scrupled potential jurors subject to prosecutional peremptory
challenge who were not challenged, resulting in 39 out of 84 (46.43%) scrupled jurors challenged. See Table A.I at page 91 infra .. Given that the prosecutors used peremptory challenges for 30.08% of nonscrupled potential jurors, one would expect that about 25 of these 84
scrupled jurors would have been challenged. The chances of39 or more of the scrupled potential jurors being removed by prosecutorial peremptory challenge at random is calculated at
thirteen in one million (.000,013), or the equivalent of 4.2 standard deviations. Thus, even a
''worst case analysis" of the three missing cases reveals a result that is statistically significant to
an extremely high degree.
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venirepersons were selected, the remaining 40 having been removed
by prosecutorial peremptory challenge. The chance of 12 or fewer
scrupled jurors being selected at random is calculated at approximately 32 out of one million (.000,032), or the equivalent of 4.0 standard deviations. This presents a high degree of statistical
significance; the probability of such a result occurring by chance is
approximately equal to that of flipping 14 heads in a row with an
unbiased coin.
Of course, the Supreme Court in Swain warned that the rule of
exclusion, "a proof standard developed in a context where there is no
question of state responsibility for the alleged exclusion," should not
be ''woodenly applied" in the peremptory challenge context, where
the unrepresentative result may well be attributable to action of defense counsel. 107 The substantial underrepresentation of scrupled jurors just demonstrated, however, resulted exclusively from
_ prosecutorial action - the exercise by prosecutors of peremptory
challenges to remove 40 out of 52 scrupled potential jurors who but
for these challenges would have served on the juries selected. Tables
1 and 2 demonstrate that the substantial underrepresentation of scrupled jurors occurred despite, rather than because of, defense action.108 Of the 43 scrupled venirepersons removed by either party by
means of peremptory challenge, 40 were removed by the prosecution
and only 3 by the defense. By contrast, the defense accounted for
271 of the 434 peremptory challenges to nonscrupled venirepersons.
Several methods may be used to test for the effects of potential
confounding variables 9n the preceding results. 109 A trivariate chi107. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,227 (1965); see note 93 supra.
108. If the above calculation of the effect of prosecutorial peremptory challenges on the
representative character of panels of jurors and alternate jurors selected is recomputed by adding back in those potential jurors subject to defense peremptory challenge, the results still
indicate a statistically significant underreprese~tation in the number of scrupled jurors and
alternates selected. Table 1 reveals that 147 out of 1116 venirepersons examined (13.17%)
expressed opposition to the death penalty, and that 969 (86.83%) did not. After those excused
for cause were eliminated, 55 scrupled venirepersons (6.09%) and 848 nonscrupled venirepersons (93.91%) remained. Table 2 reveals that 426 venirepersons were actually selected as jurors and alternate jurors. Given that 426 venirepersons were actually selected, one would
expect that 26 of them (6.09%) would have been scrupled venirepersons. In fact, as Tables 1
and 2 reveal, only 12 scrupled venirepersons were selected, the remaining 43 having been
eliminated by peremptory challenge (40 by prosecutors and 3 by defense attorneys). The
chances of 12 or fewer scrupled venirepersons being selected at random is approximately 33
out of 10,000 (.0033), or the equivalent of2.72 standard deviations. Moreover, this substantial
underrepresentation was produced overwhelmingly by prosecutorial peremptory challenges.
Of the 43 scrupled venirepersons removed by peremptory challenge, 40 (93.02%) were removed
by prosecutorial peremptories and only 3 (6.98%) by defense peremptories.
109. See, e.g., D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70, at 211-86; Y. BISHOP, s. FEINBERG &
P. HOLLAND, DISCRETE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: THEORY & PRACTICE (1975); D. MORRI·
SON, MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL METHODS (2d ed. 1976).
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square analysis was used to assess the effect of each of the seven
potentially confounding variables on the relationship between exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenges and death penalty attitudes.110 For the variables of sex, marital status, and employment
status, a trivariate chi-square analysis was appropriate and demonstrated that a statistically significant relationship remained between
the exercise of peremptory challenges and death penalty attitudes after removing the effects of these variables.In For the remaining four
I IO. See B. WINER, STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 855-59 (2d ed.
1971). A related methodology is sometimes used in employment discrimination cases. See D.
BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70, at 2ll-17 (subgroup comparison). Because this study examined an entire population - all death penalty cases in which a jury was impanelled in
Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit for the five-year period - rather than a sample, there is
controversy concerning whether chi-square analysis may be applied. Compare N. NIE, C.
HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER & D. BENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 224 (2d ed. 1975) (inappropriate for entire populations), with Gold, Statistical Tests
and Substantive Significance, 4 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 42 (1969), and Winch & Campbell, Proof?
No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of Significance, 4 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 140 (1969)
(appropriate).
An alternate method of analysis that could not be used here is multiple regression, a device
for making quantitative estimates of the effects of different factors on a dependent variable.
See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70, at 239-86; Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of
Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex .Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737
(1980); Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1442
(1973); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980); Smith
& Abram, Quantitative Analysis and ProofofEmployment .Discrimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv.
33; Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment .Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof
and Rebullal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975). Where the dependent variable is dichotomous, as
it is here (challenged or not challenged), a number of threats to validity are presented that
render multiple regression analysis generally unavailable. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra
note 70, at 267-72. An emerging methodology, "logit" analysis or "probit analysis," is available in certain instances with dichotomous dependent variables. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE,
supra, at 271-72 n.55; Id. 1981 Supplement at 55; Y. BISHOP,
FEINBERG & P. HOLLAND,
supra note 109; E. HANUSHEK & ]. JACKSON, Statistical Methodsfar Social Scientists 190-200,
204-05 (1977). For recent legal studies using this methodology, see Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, Ident!fying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of .Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. I (1980); Nagel & Hagan, 17,e Sentencing of White-Collar Criminals
in Federal Courts: A Socia-Legal Exploration of .Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1427 (1982).
Unfortunately, as the computer programs for these methods were unavailable at the University
of Miami, it could not be determined whether the data were amenable to these techniques of
analysis.
111. For sex, the disparity shown was significant at the .000,000,000,3 level of statistical
significance. No other relationship (i.e., between challenges and sex, with the effects of death
penalty attitude removed; or between death penalty attitude and sex, with the effects of exercise of challenges removed; or the three-way interaction among all of them) was significant
beyond the .27 level of statistical significance.
For employment status, the disparity shown was significant at the .000,000,000,2 level of
statistical significance. No other relationship (i.e., between challenges and employment status,
with the effects of death penalty attitude removed;. or between death penalty attitude and employment status, with the effects of exercise of challenges removed; or the three-way interaction among all of them) was significant beyond the .157 level of statistical significance.
For marital status, the disparity shown was significant at the .000,000,000,21evel of statistical significance. However, marital status was statistically related to the exercise of challenges
at the .000,000,000,3 level The relationship of death penalty attitude with marital status, having removed the effects of exercise of challenges was not statistically significant (at the .693
level). The three-way interaction among all of them was statistically significant at the .000,28

s.
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variables - whether the venireperson knew the defendant, whether
the venireperson was unsuccessfully challenged for cause by the
prosecutor, whether the venireperson was unsuccessfully challenged
for cause by the prosecutor based on death penalty attitudes, and
whether the venireperson was questioned by the prosecutor on ability to be impartial in deciding guilt - the small number of
venirepersons in some entries in the detailed data tabulated in the
Appendix indicates that the trivariate chi-square analysis is not appropriate and a descriptive discussion of the impact of these variables on peremptory challenge practices and death penalty attitudes
is all that is possible. As none of the venirepersons who knew the
defendant were scrupled, a comparison was possible only for those
(99% of the total) who did not know the defendant. In this subgroup,
the disparity between scrupled (76% challenged) and nonscrupled
venirepersons (27.8% challenged) mirrored the overall disparity
shown. With respect to the variable of prior unsuccessful challenge
for cause by prosecutor, a slight difference is shown between scrupled (90.9% challenged) and nonscrupled venirepersons (100% challenged) for the small number of venirepersons (3% of the total)
previously challenged. For those not so challenged (97% of the total), however, the disparity between scrupled (73.4% challenged) and
nonscrupled venirepersons (27.4% challenged) mirrored the overall
disparity shown. As none of the venirepersons who were unsuccessfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor based on death penalty
attitudes were nonscrupled, a comparison was possible only for those
(more than 98% of the total) who were not challenged for cause on
this basis. In this subgroup, the disparity between scrupled (71.4%
challenged) and nonscrupled venirepersons (28.2% challenged) mirrored the overall disparity shown. As all of the scrupled venirepersons were questioned by the prosecutor concerning their ability to be
impartial, a comparison was not possible for those not so questioned.
For those questioned on impartiality (97% of the total), the disparity
between scrupled (76.9% challenged) and nonscrupled (26.7% challenged) mirrored the overall disparity shown.
Thus, the binomial distribution analysis demonstrates a relationship between exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenges and
death penalty attitudes that is statistically significant to an astronomical degree, a relationship that remains unchanged after removing, through trivariate chi-square analysis, the effects of the three
level. These relationships found for the variable of marital status do not in any way detract
from the conclusion that exercise of challenges and death penalty attitudes are related to a
statistically significant extent.
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potential confounding variables for which there was sufficient data
to perform the analysis. This should certainly suffice to satisfy the
burden imposed by Swafn. For the five-year period studied a prim.a
facie case has been demonstrated that prosecutors in Florida's·
Fourth Judicial Circuit systematically used their peremptory challenges to eliminate from capital juries venirepersons expressing opposition to the death penalty. 112 And, because those opposed to the
death penalty are in the minority, 113 this practice resulted in their
substantial underrepresentation despite the best countervailing efforts of the defense.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SYSTEMATIC
EXCLUSION OF SCRUPLED JURORS

Under Swain, the prosecution's use of the peremptory challenge
is subject to review if the defense can show a pattern of abuse extending over a sufficient number of cases 114 Part II discussed the
requirement of systematic use of the peremptory; Part III presented
data indicating such a pattern in the district studied. The remaining
requirement to make out a case under Swain is that the Constitution
must forbid the particular systematic practice challenged by the defense. In Swain, the exclusion of blacks from juries clearly violated
their right to equal participation in the criminal justice system and,
arguably, the right of the defendant to a representative jury. 115 The
systematic use by prosecutors of their peremptory challenges to eliminate from capital juries those who express opposition to the death
penalty implicates a number of constitutional rights, including the
112. Under the traditional approach in jury selection cases, the establishment of such a
prima facie case shifts to the state the burden of demonstrating that the challenges were based
on legitimate trial related factors rather than merely on opposition to the death penalty. See,
e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972);
see note 91 supra and accompanying text. In the Florida case in which the study was raised,
the state made no attempt to explain its exercise ofperemptories on any basis other than views
on capital punishment See note 66 supra. Under the traditional approach, such a failure to
offer evidence to rebut the inference suggested by the data results in judgment for the defendant. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482.
• 113. See note 97 supra.
114. To have standing to question the prosecutor's pattern of peremptory abuses, the defendant probably would have to show that the jury composition in his case was adversely
affected, although this was not an issue in Swain.
115. Swain did not raise the issue of representativeness, since it was decided before the
sixth amendment was held applicable to the states. See note 34supra. However, representativeness clearly was involved in earlier equal protection jury cases, see, e.g., Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1880), and arguably Swain simply held that the state could not
achieve through the use of the peremptory what it could not do by statute under Strauder.
Thus representativeness seems to have been an underlying, if not explicit concern.
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fourteenth amendment due process right and the fair cross-section
right inherent in the sixth and eighth amendment guarantees.
A. Systematic Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors and the .Due Process
Right to an Impartial Jury
I. Witherspoon and the Right to Jury "Impartiality on Sentence
The right to trial by an impartial jury lies at the very heart of due
process. Even before the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to jury trial applied to the states as a matter of due process, 116 the Court declared that due process guarantees to the
criminally accused "a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent'
jurors." 117 It was this due process right - and not the fair crosssection requirement of the sixth amendment right to jury trial - that
the Court found to have been violated by the practice condemned in
Witherspoon v. Illinois .118
In Witherspoon, the United States Supreme Court restricted the
use of the challenge for cause to remove from capital juries persons
generally opposed to the death penalty. The Court did not condemn
all challenges for cause based on opposition to the death penalty. It
specifically declined to disapprove of the removal of venirepersons
who made it "unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically
vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to
any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before
them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's
guilt." 119 However, the Court ruled out the removal for cause of
potential jurors who merely express general opposition to the death
116. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
117. Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963). The Court has more recently noted that the right to an impartial jury arises from both
the sixth amendment and principles of due process. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6
(1976).
118. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Although the Court used the language of due process, 391 U.S.
at 523, and cited prior due process cases, it also mentioned the sixth amendment, and its reference to the jury's role of "express[ing] the conscience of the community" in assessing punishment suggests that it was. applying the fair cross-section requirement. 391 U.S. at S18-19.
However, Witherspoon could not have been a sixth amendment case, as the trial in Witherspoon occurred before the sixth amendment was held applicable to the states in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and the Court, two weeks after Witherspoon was decided,
declined to give.Duncan retroactive effect. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). Witherspoon can thus be viewed as applying the constitutional principles "of due process as seen
through the filter of Sixth Amendment values." Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 10-11
n.17, 616 P.2d 1301, 1304 n.17, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 131 n.17 (1980).
119. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21 (emphasis in original). Accord,
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 (1969).
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penalty but who are willing to consider the possibility of its imposition in at least some cases and to make an impartial decision on the
issue of the defendant's guilt. 120 In the years since its decision the
Court has consistently adhered to Witherspoon, applying it repeatedly to invalidate death sentences imposed by juries from which
even one prospective juror was excluded for cause because of views
on capital punishment on "any broader basis" than authorized by
Witherspoon .121
Prior to the Court's decision, under the generally prevailing practice prosecutors ascertained on voir dire whether prospective jurors
harbored any opposition to the death penalty, and removed for cause
all who did. 122 The desire to select an impartial jury was not necessarily the only factor that led prosecutors to use the challenge for
cause in this manner. The practice may also have been fueled by the
prosecutor's desire to select a jury inclined to impose a death sentence as well as one that would likely identify more with the prosecution than with the defense and thus be more likely to convict. 123
In Witherspoon, the defendant was tried pursuant to a statute
which gave the jury wide discretion in choosing between life imprisonment and the death penalty, and also permitted the prosecutor to
challenge for cause any juror who stated "that he has conscientious
scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the
same." 124 The trial court eliminated forty-seven venirepersons because of their opposition to the death penalty. Of those eliminated,
120. Just as veniremen cannot be excluded for cause on the ground that they hold such
views [against capital punishment], so too they cannot be excluded for cause simply because they indicate that there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital punishment. And a prospective juror cannot be expected to say in
advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before
him. The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to
consider all of the penalties provided by state law and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts
and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21. Moreover, even a ''.juror who believes that
capital punishment should never be inflicted and who is irrevocably committed to its abolition" might be able to "subordinate his _personal views to what he perceived to be his duty to
abide by his oath as a juror and to obey the law of the State." 391 U.S. at 514 n.7. See also
Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 484 (1969).
121. E.g., Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Davis v:Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per
curiam); Mathis v. New Jersey 403 U.S. 946 (1971) (reversing death sentences in consolidated
petitions). See also Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (remanding); Boulden v. Holman,
394 U.S. 478 (1969) (remanding).
122. See note·17 supra.
123. See generally Bedau, The Courts, Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L.
REv. 201,209; Oberer, .Does .Disqual!ficat/on efJurorsfar Scruples Against Capital Punisqment
Constitute .Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 545, 555 (1961); White,
supra note 68, at 405.
124. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959); see 391 U.S. at 519.
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only five had stated that they would not vote for the death penalty
under any circumstances; the remainder were dismissed before it
could be ascertained whether they could vote for death in an appropriate case despite their general opposition to capital punishment. 125
By permitting the automatic removal for cause of jurors who had
scruples against capital punishment, Illinois had denied Witherspoon his due process right to an impartial jury on the issue of sentence. When the state "swept from the jury all who expressed
conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment and all
who opposed it in principle," 126 it produced a "hangingjury," 127 one
"uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die." 128 Under the jury
selection practices at issue, Illinois had "stacked the deck" 129 against
the defendant, producing a "tribunal organized to return a verdict of
death." 130 This violated one of the "basic requirements of procedural fairness ... that the decision whether a man deserves to live
or die must be made on scales that are not deliberately tipped toward
death."131
The Witherspoon Court thus held that a jury culled of all who
opposed the death penalty could not be neutral on the question of
sentence, as the due process right to. an impartial jury requires, but
would be biased in favor of returning a sentence of death. Moreover, a defendant suffering Witherspoon error need not demonstrate
particularized prejudice; the Court found it "self-evident that, in its
role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed, this jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled." 132 The Court left open the question of whether such a jury
125. 391 U.S. at 514.
126. 391 U.S. at 520.
127. 391 U.S. at 523.
128. 391 U.S. at 521.
129. 391 U.S. at 523.
130. 391 U.S. at 521.
131. 391 U.S. at 521-22 n.20.
132. 391 U.S. at 518. At another point, the Court noted that by excluding all who opposed
capital punishment, the state had "crossed the line of neutrality." 391 U.S. at 520. No empirical support was deemed n~cessary to justify the conclusion of bias as to sentence. In a number
of cases, both prior to Witherspoon and more recently, the Court has also employed a presumption that the fact-finder was biased. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973)
(state licensing board with pecuniary interest in outcome may not conduct license revocation
proceedings); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (a judge who was the subject of
the defendant's contemptuous utterances at trial may not preside over his post-trial criminal
· contempt proceeding); Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1964) (per curiam) (prospective
jurors who had heard guilty verdict announced in open court against defendant about to be
tried in second trial on similar charges presumed biased); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)
(judge who had conducted prior grand jury inquiry may not preside at defendants' trials for
criminal contempt stemming from their grand jury appearances); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510

November 1982)

Peremptory Challenges in Capital Cases

43

could fairly consider the question of a defendant's innocence or
guilt.133
When prosecutors use their peremptory challenges in a systematic fashion to exclude from capital juries those not subject to removal for cause under Wltherspoon, precisely the same result as that
condemned in Witherspoon ensues. 134 A jury culled of all capital
punishment objection - whether by removal for cause or by peremptory challenge - may be considered just as much a '-'hanging
jury," as one "organized to return a verdict of death." As Witherspoon seeks to protect the fundamental principle of jury impartiality,
it would seem to condemn capital sentencing decisions "made on
scales that ·are ... deliberately tipped toward death" 135 no matter
how accomplished. There is more than one way to "stack a deck,"
and when the prosecutor accomplishes indirectly through use of the
peremptory challenge the precise result condemned in Witherspoon
through use of the challenge for cause, the constitutional conse(1927) (judge with pecuniary interest in outcome may not hear case). For lower court applications of implied bias rules, set'., e.g., McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1981) (bias
implied where juror conceals information at voir dire that would have resulted in disqualification for cause); United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977) (new trial required where
two of the jurors in robbery trial had worked for bank that had been robbed); Haak v. State, Ind.-, 417 N.E.2d 321 (1981) (juror whose husband was offered a job by prosecutor's office
on day ofjury selection impliedly biased). In other contexts the Court has rejected an implied
bias approach in favor of a procedure at which the defendant is given the opportunity to prove
actual bias. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 102 S. Ct 940 (1982) (juror's submission during trial of
job application to prosecutor's office does not violate defendant's due process rights absent
proof of actual bias); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 277 (1954) (attempted bribe ofjuror);
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950) (jury members in trial for criminal contempt for
failure to appear before House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities were
U.S. Government employees subject to discharge for disloyalty).
133. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,517, 518 (1968). The Court was presented with
the preliminary and unpublished results of several studies indicating that death-qualified juries
(those from which all prospective jurors generally opposed to the death penalty are removed)
are biased in favor of the prosecution on the issue of guilt. 391 U.S. at 517 n.10; see notes 163.
& 164 infra. The Court rejected this evidence as ''too tentative and fragmentary." 391 U.S. at
517; but see notes 164-76 infra and accompanying text.
134. The ~alifornia Supreme Court, in deciding a related issue, has recognized that systematic use of the peremptory challenge to exclude jurors with conscientious scruples against
the death penalty would violate the principle of Swain:
(l]n light of the Witherspoon definition of a capital jury which is "impartial" on the issue
of imposing the death penalty it cannot be assumed that a prosecutor who uses peremptory challenges to remove all jurors who have reservations concerning the death penalty is
acting on the basis of "acceptable considerations." . . . [A] prosecutor who uses peremptory challenges for the purpose of producing [a death qualified] jury is violating his obligation to assure the defendant a fair trial.
People v. Sears, 71 Cal. 2d at 648 n.S, 450 P.2d at 257 n.5, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 881 n.5. The court
reasoned that although Swain compels the presumption that the state is using its peremptories
to obtain an impartial jury, the prosecutor as an "agent of sovereignty" has a duty to ensure a
fair penalty determination within the limits of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 {!,S. 510 (1968).
See also In re Anderson, 69 Cal 2d 613, 619-20, 447 P.2d 117, 122, 73 Cal Rptr. 21, 26 (1968);
Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 858 (Fla. 1969).
·
135. 391 U.S. at 521-22 n.20.
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quences should be the same. In both cases the resulting jury is not
neutral on the question of sentence, but is biased in favor of capital
punishment.
The Witherspoon principle, as the Court has recently noted in
Adams v. Texas, constitutes "a limitation of the State's power to exclude: if prospective jurors are barred from jury service because of
their views about capital punishment on 'any broader basis' than inability to follow the law or abide by their oaths, the death sentence
cannot be carried out." 136 The Witherspoon principle thus reflects a
careful balance between conflicting interests - the state's interest in
enforcing its capital punishment scheme and the defendant's interest
in an impartial jury on sentence. The state's interest would be satisfied if the prosecution could exclude jurors who would automatically
vote against death in any case 137 or whose views would prevent them
from being impartial on the question of guilt. Accordingly Witherspoon does not forbid exclusion of these jurors. 138 But once the
state's interest in avoiding nullification of its statutory scheme is accomplished, the state's power to exclude comes to an end. At that
point, the defendant's right to an impartial jury prohibits exclusion
of scrupled jurors on "any broader basis" than is necessary to satisfy
the state interest in avoiding nullification.
The Court's approach in Adams suggests that it would not sanction the upsetting of the careful balance struck in Witherspoon
through means of the peremptory challenge, or indeed through any
other means of exclusion. In Adams, the state brought about the exclusion of capital punishment objectors on a "broader basis" than
approved by Witherspoon through means not of removal for cause
based on scruples against the death penalty, but of disqualification
for unwillingness or inability to swear, in accordance with a state
statutory requirement, that the possibility that the defendant will be
executed will not affect the juror's deliberations on any issue of fact.
That the Court found that this method of exclusion violated Witherspoon indicates that it will not tolerate the infringement of the
Witherspoon principle by other methods of exclusion, including systematic use of the peremptory challenge.
Arguably, the use of the peremptory challenge to achieve the re136. 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980).
137. Professor White has argued, however, that so long as the state has left the death penalty decision to jury discretion, "it is not apparent why a juror's consciettious scruples against
capital punishment or even her total unwillingness to vote for it in any case would incapacitate
her from participating in the discretionary judgment." White, supra note 68, at 355.
138. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,522 n.21 (1968); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
596 (1978).
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sult described in Witherspoon can be distinguished from that case
and from Adams because peremptory practice involves somewhat
different state interests. Prohibiting the use of peremptories to
achieve the proscribed result necessarily involves review of the motivation behind the challenges, threatening the important policies
which underlie them. Swain, however, makes clear that the peremptory is not sacrosanct 139 and may not be used systematically by prosecutors to accomplish an unconstitutional result. Although Swain
involved racial equality interests, traditionally protected by heightened scrutiny and solicitude from the courts, the defendant's interest
in death penalty cases - literally a matter of life and death should weigh no less against the state interest in the peremptory system.140 Just as use of the peremptory systematically to exclude
blacks would constitute a perversion of the challenge that is not beyond judicial review, 141 its use systematically to exclude prospective
jurors in death cases because of their views about capital punishment
on a "broader basis" than approved by Witherspoon would seem no
less offensive to the Constitution.
The state's primary interest in the peremptory challenge - the
avoidance of juries biased against the state142 - is similar to the
state interest protected in Witherspoon. As in Witherspoon, this interest is fully protected by limiting exclusion in such a way that jurors may not systematically be removed because of their views on
capital punishment on " 'any broader basis' than inability to follow
139. If anything, the prosecutorial conduct to which this Article objects should be subject
to more searching judicial scrutiny than the conduct alleged in Swain. The presumption of
prosecutorial propriety underlying that decision clearly made· very difficult the inference that
government officers deliberately and universally removed potential jurors because of the blatantly unconstitutional criterion of race. But presuming that prosecutors will not deliberately
subvert constitutional values does not lead to the conclusion that they would not engage in the
systematic exclusion of death-scrupled individuals from capital juries; they almost certainly,
albeit erroneously, believe the practice to be constitutional. See note 17 supra. The unconstitutionality of peremptorily challenging death-scrupled venirepersons involves considerations
of due process, trial by jury, and cruel and unusual punishment which are far subtler, if no less
compelling, than the naked racism which the Court in Swain was so reluctant to infer from the
record before it. The judiciary, therefore, would express no disrespect for prosecutorial motives by restricting peremptory challenges as advocated here.
Nor does the second policy underlying the Swain result, the need for the ability to challenge venirepersons whom vigorous voir dire examination may offend, as distinct from the
presumption of prosecutorial good faith, weigh heavily against the rule this Article proposes.
Since restructuring the voir dire by limiting inquiry into venirepersons' general attitudes toward the death penalty would not deprive the prosecution of any peremptories, see notes 33651 i,yra and accompanying text, the government need not fear that vigorous investigation of
potential jurors' attitudes might result in alienating venirepersons who could not later be ·removed for cause.
140. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
141. 380 U.S. at 223-24.
142. See note 26 supra.
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the law or abide by their oaths." 143 To permit systematic use of the
peremptory to remove the very group of jurors that Witherspoon
held should serve on capital juries if they were to remain impartial
would thus produce the very jury Witherspoon condemned as biased
on sentence. Unless there are significant additional state interests in
the peremptory challenge, Witherspoon would seem dispositive.
Of course, to some extent, the state interest in the peremptory
challenge can be seen as obtaining favorable jurors, not merely as
avoiding jurors biased against the state. Whether the state interest in
this partisan function of the peremptory should be deemed legitimate has never been decided. The purpose of the peremptory is typically seen as attempting "to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try
the case before the court." 144 The Swain Court's description of the
functions of the peremptory does not mention the purely partisan
interest in obtaining favorable (as opposed to avoiding biased) jurors. 145 Indeed, some commentators have questioned the legitimacy
of the prosecutor's purely partisan interest in the peremptory. 146
However, even assuming the legitimacy, as an aspect of our adversary system, of the peremptory as a partisan tool to select favorable
jurors, this interest would not justify systematic use of the challenge
to achieve what would otherwise be an unconstitutional result.
Thus, prosecutors might attempt to remove all black jurors peremptorily, on the assumption that black jurors as a class tend to be more
pro-defense than white jurors. 147 Any attempt to justify such a use
of the peremptory by reference to its partisan objectives, however,
would violate the dicta in Swain .148 Systematic use of the peremp143. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980).
144. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222-(1965).
145. See 380 U.S. at 219-20 (to eliminate extremes of partiality; to assure the party that the
jurors will decide on the basis of the evidence and not otherwise; to facilitate the exercise of
challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring a juror's hostility through examination
and challenge for cause). See also Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899) ("The manner of selection is one calculated to secure an impartial jury . . . • The right to challenge is the
right to reject, not to select, a juror."); 4 W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES •353 (peremptory
challenges "grounded on two reasons": (1) to allow a defendant to remove jurors conceived to
be prejudiced, thus insuring that he has "a good opinion of the jury, the want of which might
totally disconcert him"; and (2) to facilitate the exercise of challenges for cause since if such a
challenge to a juror is rejected, "perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes
provoke a resentment").
146. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 167 ("it is the duty of the prosecutor, as an officer
of the state, to see that the accused is tried by a fair, impartial, and representative jury; it is not
the role of the prosecutor to attempt to empanel a jury composed of those most likely to convict"); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 25, at 357 n.97 (''the use of peremptories to obtain a
partial jury would defeat its purpose").
147. See Yale Note, supra note 45, at 1733 n.77.
148. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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tory against members of a particular group, even though serving
what might be a legitimate goal of the peremptory, cannot be permitted to produce the effect ~ondemned by an overriding constitutional
value - the value of equal protection in the Swain context, or of the
fair trial guaranteed by due process in the capital trial context.
Viewed in· this way, the Swain dicta finds support in a number of
constitutional contexts, where what would otherwise constitute legitimate state interests have not been permitted to violate overriding
constitutional values. 149 In short, Swain, like Witherspoon, represents a careful balance between conflicting interests. It permits the
prosecutor to seek partisan ends by partisan means without judicial
oversight so long as the prosecutor does not act according to a general formula that produces a result in conflict with the constitutional
command against excluding blacks as a class from jury service.
When the prosecutor does act according to such a general formula,
he "systematically'' excludes blacks, and no partisan objective of the
prosecution can justify that result. The constitutional value of protecting capital defendants against ''hanging juries," recognized in
Witherspoon, is entitled to the same predominance over the partisan,
interest of the prosecutor in exercising peremptory chall~mges. 150
The state might object to the characterization of its partisan interest in the peremptory as merely an interest in obtaining a
favorable jury. Rather, it might contend that given defense peremptories that are nonreviewable 151 and clearly exercised for partisan ends - to remove death penalty advocates - the state must be
able to use its peremptories to offset those of the defense. Otherwise,
a jury will result that is more biased toward the defense on the death
penalty question than would be one not subject to the peremptory
process. Several considerations render this objection unpersuasive.
First, it is almost impossible to predict how much systematic use of
the peremptory would offset, but not surpass, the effect of the defense peremptories. For example, if only ten percent of the venire
remaining after challenges for cause is opposed to the death pen149. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353-74 (1976) (plurality opinion); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-75 (1968); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1962);
Schlochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1956).
150. Striking the balance in favor of the relevant constitutional value is particularly appropriate as the state interest in the peremptory challenge is enshrined in neither the Constitution,
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919), nor the common law. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 242-43 & n.4 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); People v. Payne, 31 CRIM..
L. RPTR. (BNA) 2229, 2230 (Ill. App., May 19, 1982); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 147-50,
166-67.
151. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 219; Harrison v. United States, 163 U.S. 140,
14~ (1896); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
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alty, 152 the defense will have to challenge nine death penalty advocates for each opponent challenged by the prosecution to maintain a
constant percentage of death-scrupled jurors. The defense, however,
usually enjoys the same, or at most perhaps a slightly larger, number
of challenges as the prosecution. 153
A second argument against permitting the state to attempt to offse~ the defense's use of the peremptory is that the prosecution has
such a substantial initial advantage in being able to exclude one half
to two thirds of the death penalty opponents for cause under Witherspoon before using its first peremptory challenge. 154 That advantage, which admittedly is necessary to protect the state's interest in
enforcing its death penalty laws, 155 makes the jury more death-prone
than the general population. It is unlikely that the defense challenges, even if used exclu~ively against death penalty advocates, are
adequate to offset this initial bias.
Finally, the prosecution has a higher duty than the defense of
assuring a fair trial. 156 In view of that duty, and the uncertainty in
trying to gauge how many challenges (if any) are required to balance
the defense peremptories, use of the peremptory systematically to remove jurors solely because of death penalty opposition (not rising to
152. In the study reported in this Article, scrupled venirepersons constituted only 6% of the
total venire remaining at this stage. See text following note 98 supra. Admittedly, it is an
oversimplification to view potential jurors as either scrupled or nonscrupled. There is a continuum of attitudes on the death penalty, and it is conceivable, but not likely, that the net effect of
defense and prosecution peremptories is a jury no more inclined to the death penalty than the
average of the population, despite the reduction in the percentage of jurors classified as
"scrupled."
153. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (each side entitled to twenty peremptory challenges
in capital cases); FLA. STAT.§ 913.08(l)(a) and FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350(a) (each side entitled to
ten peremptory challenges in capital cases); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § l 15-4(e) (20 peremptories). Although historically the prosecutor enjoyed less peremptory challenges than the defense, see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214-15, 220 (1965), in most jurisdictions today both
are entitled to the same number. E.g., FLA. STAT.§ 913.08 (I); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350. In a
few jurisdictions, the defendant may be entitled to a few more than the prosecutor. E.g., FED.
R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (in noncapital felony cases, defendant entitled to 10 peremptories and prosecutor to 6). The number of peremptory challenges may also increase with the severity of the
crime. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b); FLA. STAT.§ 913.08(l)(a)-(c); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350 (a)(c). For a detailed compilation of peremptory challenge systems in various states, see J. VAN
DYKE, supra note 25, at 281-85 (Appendix D).
154. See notes 98 supra & 319 i'!fra.
155. But see note 137 supra.
156. See People v. Sears, 71 Cal. 2d at 648 n.5, 450 P.2d at 257 n.5, 74 CAL. RPTR. at 881
n.5 (suggesting that "a prosecutor who uses peremptory challenges for the purpose of producing [a death qualified] jury is violating his obligation to assure the defendant a fair trial."),
The court reasoned that although Swain compels the presumption that the state is using its
peremptories to obtain an impartial jury, the prosecutor as an "agent of a sovereignty" has a
duty to ensure a fair penalty determination within the limits of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968). See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976); Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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the Witherspoon standard) should not be justified by any state interest in attempting to offset defense peremptory practices.
Although Witherspoon involved the removal of all scrupled jurors, whereas systematic use of the peremptory may result only in
removing a substantial number, somewhat less than all - in this
study 81.3% of scrupled jurors who but for prosecutorial peremptory
challenge would have served were removed 157 - this should make
no difference. The Supreme Court has held that the Witherspoon
principle is violated, and any ensuing death sentence must be vacated, where even one juror was excluded on "any broader basis"
than authorized in Witherspoon . 158 Thus, as a matter of law, a jury
from which even one scrupled juror was improperly removed is
deemed to be biased on the issue of sentence. Identical bias results
whether that one juror is removed by challenge for cause or by peremptory challenge, assuming in the latter case that his or her removal was part of a systematic pattern satisfying the Swain standard.
Thus, although the methods of exclusion differ somewhat, in
both cases it can be said that the state "cross[es] the line of neutrality"159 and exceeds "the state's power to exclude." 160 The ensuing
prejudice is identical. To execute a death sentence imposed by a jury
selected in either way ''would deprive [the defendant] of his life
without due process of law." 161
157. See Table A.3 at p. 93 infra. Including those removed by challenge for cause by the
prosecutor or the court, 89.8% of scrupled venirepersons who but for prosecutorial challenge
would have served as jurors were removed (115 in all - 76 for cause and 39 by peremptoryout of 128). See Tables A.I and A.3 at pp. 91 & 93 infra. If jurors and alternates are considered together, then 76.9% of all venirepersons who but for prosecutorial challenge would have
served were removed. See Table 2 at p. 31 supra. For this combined group, including those
removed by challenge for cause by the prosecutor or the court, 89.11% of scrupled venirepersons who but for prosecutorial challenge would have served as jurors or alternates were removed (131 in all-91 for cause and 40 by peremptory-out of 147). See Tables l & 2 at pp.
30 & 31 supra.
158. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam).
159. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968).
160. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980).
161. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 523. This conclusion is buttressed by the eighth
amendment's strong concern for reliability in capital sentencing processes. In its recent eighth
amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has focused on the "uniqueness" of the death
penalty for the requirement, for example, that a state not limit the mitigating circumstances a
capital defendant may ask the sentencer to consider, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
(plurality opinion), even through application of an otherwise valid hearsay rule. Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam). In so doing, the Court stressed the need for "a
gre~ter degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed," Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at
605, and for avoiding the "risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty." 438 U.S. at 604. These concerns, which Professor Gillers
has argued should disable the state from excluding any scrupled venirepersons, Gillers, supra
note 2, at 84-91, should certainly support the view that the state may not through systematic
use of the peremptory challenge produce a jury that is biased in favor of death.
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2. The Right to Jury Impartiality on Guilt

a. Witherspoon's invitation and the conviction-proneness studies.
The Witherspoon Court was unwilling to assume that a jury composed by excluding all death scrupled venirepersons, although biased in favor of death, was also biased in favor of conviction. The
incomplete and unpublished versions of the three studies cited on
appeal were considered ''too tentative and fragmentary" to justify
such a conclusion. 162 Nevertheless, the Court regarded the question
as an open one and suggested that future studies might result in a
different ruling:
A defendant convicted by such a jury in some future case might still
attempt to establish that the jury was less than neutral with respect to
guilt. Ifhe were to succeed in that effort, the question would then arise
whether the State's interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury
capable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated at the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of
guilt or innocence - given the possibility of accommodating both interests by means of a bifurcated trial, using one jury to decide guilt and
another to fix punishment. I63

The time has come to reassess this possibility.
In the intervening years, two of the three studies before the Court
in Witherspoon were completed and published, 164 and a variety of
new empirical studies were performed. 165 Moreover, extensive ex162. 391 U.S. at 517. The three studies relied upon were difficult for the Court to evaluate.
As they were unpublished, they had never been subjected to the scholarly analysis of works in
the public domain. Moreover, since they were submitted for the first time on appeal and in the
case of one on certiorari, they had not been subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination. As
a result, the Court noted that it could "only speculate . . . as to the precise meaning of the
terms used in those studies, the accuracy of the techniques employed, and the validity of the
generalizations made." 391 U.S. at 517 n.11.
163. 391 U.S. at 520 n.18.
164. H. ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARDS CAPITAL PuNISHMENT
(1968) (University of Chicago Center for Studies in Criminal Justice); Goldberg, Toward Expansion ef Witherspoon: Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use efPsychological .Data lo Raise Presumptions in tlte Law, 5 HARV. C.R. • C.L. L. REv. 53 (1970). The third study was never published.
W. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (unpub. 1957).
165. See unpublished studies by Ellsworth et al. cited in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.
3d 1, 27-60, 616 P.2d 1301, 1315-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 142-68 (1980); Boehm, Mr. Prejudice,

Miss Sympathy and tlte Authoritarian Personality: An Application ef Psychological Measuring
Techniques to tlte Problem efJury Bias, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 734; Bronson, .Does tlte Exclusion ef
Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make tlte Jury More Likely lo Convict? Some California Evidence, 3 WOODROW WILSON J.L. 11 (1980); Bronson, On tlte Conviction Proneness and Representativeness ef tlte .Deatlt-Qual!fted Jury: An Empirical Study ef Colorado Veniremen, 42 U.
CoLO. L. REV. I (1970); Buckhout, Baker & Speigel, Jury Altitudes and tlte .Death Penalty, 3
SOCIAL ACTION & LAW 80 (1977), Crosson, An Investigation into Certain Personality Variables
among Capital Trial Jurors, (unpub. doctoral dissertation), reported in PROC. 76TH ANN,
MEETING AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL AssN. (1968); Haney, Juries and tlte .Dea/It Penalty: Readdres•
sing tlte Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 512 (1980); Jurow, New .Data on
tlte Effect efa ".Death Qua/flied" Jury on tlte Guilt .Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567
(1971); Mitchell & Byrne, The .Defendant's .Dilemma: Effects efJuror's Allltudes and Autltorlla-
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pert testimony concerning these studies and related social science issues has been presented in a number of cases in which defendants
accepted the Witherspoon invitation and attempted to demonstrate
that juries are conviction-prone when formed by eliminating capital
punishment objectors who, although unable to impose a death sentence, would be able to make an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. 166 A substantial body of research on the· conviction
proneness issue has thus emerged since Witherspoon, with the result
that it is no longer possible to regard the evidence as "too tentative
and fragmentary/' 167 The new studies extensively examine differences between groups expressing opposition to the death penalty and
those without such opposition in regard to such factors as conviction-proneness or juror voting behavior, attitudes concerning various
aspects of the criminal justice system that might be associated with
conviction-proneness, demographic characteristics like race and sex,
and juror evaluation of evidence. 168
In its recent decision in Hovey v. Superior Court, 169 the Supreme
Court of California gave extensive consideration to these studies. It
quoted expert testimony that the studies designed to test for conviction-proneness had "convincingly established a strong correlation
rianism on Judicial .Decisions, 25 J. PERSON & Soc. PSYCH. 123 (1973); Rokeach & McLellan,
.Dogmatism and the .Death Penalty: A Reinterpretation ofthe ..Duquesne Poll .Data, 8 DuQ. U. L.
REV. 125 (1969-1970); Thayer, Attitudes and Personality .D!!ferences between Conventional Jurors Who Could Return a .Death Verdict and Those Who Could Not, PROC. 78TH ANN. MEET·
ING AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL AsSN. 445 (1970); Comment, Grigsby v. Mabry: A New Look at
.Death-(lual!fted Juries, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145 (1980); White supra note 68; White, The
Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by .Death-(lual!ftedJuries, 58 CORNELL L. REv.
1176, 1178 n.12, 1185-86 (1973) (summarizing study by Louis Harris & Assoc.). The studies by
Professor Ellsworth and her colleagues summarized in Hovef will soon be published in a special edition of LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR dedicated to the question of death qualification and
the Hovey case under the following titles: Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of
.Death-(lual!ftcation on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of.Deliberation, Ellsworth, Bukety, Cowan & Thompson, The .Death-Qual!fted Jury and the .Defense of Insanity,
Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, .Due Process vs. Crime Control· .Death-(lual!ftcation and Jury Attitudes,
Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth & Harrington, .Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness:
The Translation ofAttitudes into Verdicts.
166. E.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ala.), mod!fted, 637 F.2d 525 (8th
Cir. 1980); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d I; 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
167. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. at 1388; Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d, 2760, 616 P.2d 1301, 1314-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 142-68; White supra note 68, at 370. Several
courts, on records that contained none or few of the recent studies, have, however. continued
to find insufficient evidence to prove that death-qualified juries are conviction prone. See, e.g.,
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 593-95 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976
(1979); United States ex. rel Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1064 (1977); United States ex rel Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350, 362-63 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972); Craig v. Wyse, 373 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (D. Colo. 1974).
168. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 26, 616 P.2d at 1314, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 141
(1980).
·
169. 28 Cal 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
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between the tendencies of jurors to vote for conviction and juror attitudes toward capital punishment." 170 The several attitude surveys
introduced into evidence, considering juror attitudes toward a variety of criminal justice issues such as the privilege against self-incrimination and the role of defense counsel, established a significant
relationship between death penalty opposition and pro-prosecution
attitudes. 171 The studies of demographic characteristics found that
exclusion of capital punishment objectors results in the disproportionate exclusion of blacks and women. 172 The research relating to
juror evaluation of evidence revealed a significant difference between the two groups in their thresholds of reasonable doubt and in
their perceptions of the credibility of defense and prosecution witnesses.173 These consistent differences between death penalty opponents exdudable under Witherspoon and those not so excludable, led
the California court to find that the defendant "has shown . . . that
if a state used all four 'Witherspoon-qualified' groups in a capital
trial, the jury would not be neutral." 174
The Witherspoon-qualified groups referred to by the Hovey court
were labeled the "automatic death penalty" group, those who will
vote automatically for the death penalty; the "favor death penalty"
group, those who although favoring the death penalty, will not vote
to impose it in every case; the "indifferent" group, neither favoring
nor opposing the death penalty; and the "oppose death penalty"
group, those with opposition or doubts about the death penalty but
who will not automatically vote against it in every case. 175 The defendant in Hovey had contended that a jury composed of these four
groups, but excluding a fifth group - the "automatic life imprisonment" group, those who oppose the death penalty and will automatically vote for life imprisonment but whose opposition will not affect
their consideration of guilt - violated his right to an impartial jury
on guilt. 176 Although finding that a jury composed of the first four
groups, but excluding the fifth, ''would not be neutral," the Califor:iria court rejected the defendant's challenge on the basis that California is not a state that uses all four "Witherspoon-qualified"
170. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal 3d. at 40, 616 P.2d at 1325, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
171. 28 Cal 3d at 43-54, 616 P.2d at 1326-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 153-64.
172. 28 Cal. 3d at 54-57, 616 P.2d at 1337-39, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 164-66.
173. 28 Cal 3d at 57-60, 616 P.2d at 1337-39, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 166-68.
174. 28 Cal. 3d at 68, 616 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
175. 28 Cal. 3d at 20, 616 P.2d at 1311, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
176. A sixth group, which could be termed the "automatic acquittal" group-those whose
opposition to the death penalty will lead them automatically to vote to acquit in evey case was conceded by the defendant in Hovey to be properly excludable.
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groups. 177 Rather, California law excludes the first group - the
"automatic death penalty" group 178 - and, cons~quently, the court
found that the studies, although sufficient to establish that deathqualification in general results in juries that are not neutral on the
question of guilt, had "failed to make such a showing as to 'deathqualified' juries in California." 179
b. Applying the conviction-proneness argument to the combined
use of cause and peremptory challenges to exclude scrupled jurors.
The Hovey court's treatment of the prosecution-proneness question
raised there, although different from the issue presented by the systematic use of the prosecutorial peremptory, is helpful in analyzing
how the latter issue could be raised and how it would be dealt with
by the courts. Indeed, it may be advantageous for defendants raising
the latter issue - an attack on systematic use of the prosecutorial
peremptory to exclude all or a substantial number of the "oppose
death penalty" group - to combine this challenge with the one
raised in Hovey to the use of challenges for cause to exclude the
"automatic life imprisonment" group.
When prosecutors systematically use their peremptory challenges
to remove the "oppose death penalty" group, and their challenges
for cause to remove the "automatic life imprisonment" group, only
at most three groups remain - the "a~tomatic death penalty," the
"favor death penalty," and the "indifferent" groups. As it is assumed that the· "automatic death penalty" group is removable for
cause by the defendant not only in California, but elsewhere as
well, 180 and will be so removed, only the "favor death penalty" and
the "indifferent" groups will actually remain to serve on capital juries. Thus, one way to state the question presented by the systematic
use of prosecutorial peremptory challenges to exclude the "oppose
death penalty" group is whether the remaining jury - composed
only of the "favor death penalty" and "indifferent" groups-is conviction-prone and therefore not neutral or impartial on the question
of guilt.
Of course, "conviction-proneness" is a comparative notion. To
177. 28 Cal. 3d at 67, 616 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
178. 28 Cal. 3dat63-64&n.ll0, 616 P.2dat 1343 &n.110, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170 &n.110.
179. 28 Cal. 3d at 68-69, 616 P.2d at 1346, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74.
180. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 n.20 (1968), citing Crawford v.
Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 303-04 (4th Cir.), vacated and remandedfar further consideration in light
efWitherspoon, 393 U.S. 76 (1968), reinstated (unreported), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970)
(alternative holding); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578-79 (5th Cir. 1981) (dictum); Gillers,
supra note 2, at 99 n.452.
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what should the jury remaining after this combination of exclusions
be compared? Witherspoon does not shed much light. Although
suggesting the possibility that the exclusion of all scrupled jurors
might produce a conviction-prone jury that failed to meet the due
process requirement of an impartial jury as to guilt, the Court in
Witherspoon failed to establish a benchmark against which a jury's
propensity to convict should be measured. 181 The lower courts and
the commentators discussing the Hovey-type challenge to exclusion
of the "automatic life imprisonment" group treat the relevant comparison as that between "Witherspoon-qualified" juries -composed
of the "favor death penalty," the "indifferent," and the "oppose
death penalty" groups, and the nondeath-qualified jury utilized in
noncapital cases. 182 Adapting this methodology to a combined attack on the systematic use of peremptories to remove the "oppose
death penalty" group and challenges for cause to remove the "automatic life imprisonment" group would call for a comparison between the jury remaining after this combination of exclusions - a
j~ry composed only of "favor death penalty" and "indifferent" jurors183 - and a "neutral" jury, one selected without regard to views
concerning the death penalty. 1s4
Defendants attacking the combined exclusion of the "oppose
181. White, supra note 68, at 373-74.
182. Grigsby v. Mabry, 637 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1980) (''whether death-qualified jurors
are more likely to convict than jurors selected without regard for their views on the death
penalty"); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d I, 18-22, 67-68, 616 P.2d 1301, 1309-12, 1346,
168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 136-39, 173 (1980); White, supra note 68, at 375, 381.
183. Two other groups whose removal is concededly proper would be excluded in conducting the comparison: the "automatic acquittal" group whose removal for cause Wither•
spoon authorizes, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978), and the "automatic death
penalty" group, which would presumably be removable for cause by the defendant, see cases
cited in note l80supra; Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 63-64 & n.110, 616 P.2d at 1343
& n.110, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170 & n.110.
184. The "neutral" jury would consist of the entire spectrum of attitudes on the death
penalty- the "favor death penalty" group, the "indifferent" group, the "automatic life impris•
onment" group, and the "oppose death penalty" group, see note 94 supra, with one exception.
The only group excluded from the "neutral" jury would be the "automatic acquittal" group,
those who could never return a verdict of guilt and who therefore are biased against the state,
Some of the members of the "automatic death penalty" group - those who could not be fair
and impartial in deciding guilt - would also be excluded. These jurors are biased as they will
base their decision on something other than the legally relevant facts. See, e.g., Dobbert v.
Florida, 431 U.S. 282, 302 (1977), quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975)
(impartial juror is one who will "render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court");
Irwin v. Dowd, 366 {!.S. 717, 722 (1961) (defining an "indifferent" juror as one whose "verdict
must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial"), The courts considering the 'Hoveytype challenge that treat the "neutral" jury for comparison purposes as a jury selected without
regard to death penalty attitudes would also exclude the "oppose death penalty" group and
presumably those members of the "automatic death penalty" group who could not be fair and
impartial in assessing guilt. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 17, 22 n.54, 616 P.2d at
1308, 1312 n.54, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 135, 139 n.54.
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death penalty" and "automatic life imprisonment" groups, would
thus have to show that resulting capital juries - composed only of
"favor death penalty" and "indifferent" juries - are more conviction-prone than juries containing these two groups plus the "automatic life imprisonment" and "oppose death penalty" groups 185 and .
those members of the "automatic death penalty" group who could be
fair and impartial in deciding guilt. The existing empirical studies
do not establish this proposition, as they do not make the relevant
comparison. The studies performed prior to Witherspoon compare
groups opposed to the death penalty with those not opposed to capital punishment. 186 The more recent ·studies generally compare the
"automatic life imprisonment" group with the four Witherspoonqualified groups - the "automatic death penalty," the "favor death
penalty," the "indifferent," and the "oppose death penalty"
groups. 187 It may be possible that some of these studies can be
reevaluated to realign the comparison groups. 188 If not, and perhaps
in any event, new empirical studies will have to be designed that
compare the relevant groups as to relative conviction-proneness.
c. Assessing the state's interest in removing jurors who cannot impose death: the h!furcated trial alternative. If empirical studies com-

paring the resulting capital jury with the "neutral" jury reveal that
the former is more conviction-prone than the latter, then the question _will need to be resolved whether the state's interests underlying
the exclusion of "oppose death penalty" and "automatic life imprisonment" jurors can justify the nonneutral result. Witherspoon itself
18S. In making this showing, a defendant may only have to establish a "substantial doubt"
whether resulting juries are neutral with respect to guilt. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.
3d 1, 17 n.37, 616 P.2d 1301, 1308 n.37, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 135 n.37 (1980); cf. Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (applying "substantial doubt" standard in sixth amendment
context).
186. See studies cited in note 163 supra; Hovey v. Superior Court, supra note 185, at 27-33,
616 P.2d at 131S-19, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 142-46 (discussing studies). The Bronson Colorado
study compares four groups - those who strongly favor capital punishment, those who favor
it, those who oppose it, and those who strongly oppose it - and also compares the two favor
capital punishment groups with the oppose groups. Bronson, supra note 16S, at 8-9.
187. See studies cited in note 16S supra. Hovey v. Superior Court, supra note 186, at 3340, 43-54, 57-60, 616 P.2d at 1319-25, 1327-37. 1339-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 142-52, 154-64, 16668 (discussing studies).
188. The Hovey court equated the five-part spectrum of attitudes toward capital punishment used in the Jurow study, supra note 16S, based on Jurow's "Capital Punishment Attitude
Questionnaire" part B, or CPAQ (B), with the five-part Hovey spectrum. Hovey v. Superior
Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 33-36 n.70, 616 P.2d at 1319-21 & n.70, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 144-48 n.70.
However, the two spectrums do not in fact correspond. Other studies, if capable of reorganization and reanalysis, may permit an inference as to the ultimate fact of prosecution-proneness
considered here. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (studies considering effects of
reducing jury size from 12 or 10 to smaller numbers relied on for finding concerning consequences of reducing jury size from 6 to 5).
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recognized that a balancing of the state's interests and those of the
defendant would be necessary by its statement that even if a defendant could demonstrate that juries formed by excluding the "automatic life imprisonment" group were "less than neutral with respect
to guilt," the question would then arise whether the state's interest
"in submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital
punishment may be vindicated at the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of guilt or innocence." 189
The Court suggested that it might be possible to accommodate both
interests by means of a bifurcated trial, using one jury to decide guilt
and another to fix punishment. 190 This same approach could be used
to assess the validity of the combined exclusion of the "automatic life
imprisonment" and the "oppose death penalty" groups.
In effect, the Witherspoon Court suggested the applicability of the
"least restrictive alternative" doctrine 191 to assess the constitutional
validity of the means chosen - the use to decide both guilt and punishment of one jury from which "automatic life imprisonment" jurors were excluded - to accomplish the state's significant interest in
having the penalty issue determined by a jury capable of imposing
capital punishment. As those courts that have considered "prosecution-proneness" arguments have either rejected them on the basis
189. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
190. 391 U.S. at 520 n.18; see Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (E.D. Ark.),
mod!fted on other grounds, 631 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980) (dictum).
191. See Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1981). In a variety of constitutional contexts, the Supreme Court has ruled that if alternative means exist which would accomplish the government's interest in a manner that intrudes less on the fundamental
constitutional right at issue, the government may not choose the more intrusive means - the
"less drastic means" or "least restrictive alternative" must be chosen. The doctrine orginated
in first amendment cases. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), the Supreme Court struck
down an Arkansas statute that required school teachers to disclose all of the organizations to
which they belonged. The Court ruled:
(E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth oflegislative abridgment must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
364 U.S. at 488. Similarly, in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972), in which a durational residence requirement that interfered with the right to vote and the right to travel was
held unconstitutional, the Court reiterated:
It is not sufficient for the State to show that durational residence requirements further a
very substantial state interest. . . . (I]f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those
goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a state may not choose
the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means."
405 U.S. at 343, quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. at 488. The doctrine has also been ap•
plied in cases involving the sixth amendment right to jury trial, where broad exclusionary rules
that impinge on jury representativeness have been condemned on the ground that more precisely focused exclusions or exemptions would have served the states' asserted justifying interests with less intrusion upon the representative character of the jury. Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 367-70 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533-35 (1975); see notes 296 & 301

i'!fra.
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that the empirical evidence was too "tentative and fragmentary" 192
or that the studies addressed the wrong issue, 193 this "least restrictive
alternative" question remains unresolved.
Undoubtedly the state has a significant interest in submitting the
penalty issue to a jury_ capable of returning a death sentence. The
question, however, is whether this interest requires exclusion of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors and all or a substantial number of
"oppose death penalty" jurors, or whether the state's interest can be
accomplished by means that do not result in a nonneutral jury on
guilt. Addressing the exclusion of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors, Witherspoon suggested the possibility that the state's and- the
defendant"s interests could be accommodated by means of a bifurcated trial using two juries - one to determine guilt (from which
"automatic life imprisonment" jurors would not be removed) and
one to determine punishment (from which these jurors would permissibly be removed).
Obviously, this would impose some costs on the state in excess of
those incurred pursuant to the present system in which one jury is
used to make both determinations. These potential additional costs,
however, would seem fairly modest. First, capital cases constitute a
relatively small number of criminal trials. Moreover, the number of
these cases in which a penalty determination will be necessary is
even smaller. A penalty determination will occur only where a verdict on guilt has been returned that authorizes the possible imposition of capital punishment, and only where the prosecutor decides
that a death sentence should be sought. Even in cases in which a
penaJty d~termination will occur, the impaneling of a new penalty
jury may not always be necessary. In some cases, it may be possible
to have alternate jurors replace any "automatic life imprisonment" ·
jurors who served at the guilt determination trial. 194
192. See cases cited in note 167 supra.
193. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d I, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170; Justus v.
Commonwealth,- Va.-,-, 283 S.E.2d 905, 909 (1981); State v. Peyton, 29 Wash. App. 701,
630 P.2d 1362, 1367-68 (1981):
194. The trial judge typically has considerable discretion in selecting the number of alternate jurors. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) (not more than six alternate jurors). Moreover, although FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) provides that an alternate juror "who does not replace a regular
juror shall be -discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict," this provision has been
held not to be violated by the replacement of a regular juror by an alternate after deliberations
have commenced. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. Fla. 1979); see also Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175, 179 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 986 (1980) (substitution of alternate juror after regular juror suffered heart attack held not to violate state defendant's right to trial by jury under six~ and
fourteenth amendments); People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 552 P.2d 742, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782
(1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1977) (substitution of alternate juror after jury deliberations
had begun permissible under California constitution); but see People v. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d 100,

58

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 81:1

Certainly, however, some cases would require a second voir dire
and the impaneling of a second jury. This would involve additional
state time and expense, and will likely also lengthen the total time of
trial as some portion of the evidence previously submitted at the
guilt phase of the trial would have to be repeated at the penalty
phase. 195 These costs can be minimized, however, through means of
the trial courts' supervision of voir dire 196 as well as by a number of
devices - stipulations to introduce summaries of prior evidence, the
reading of portions of prior testimony to the penalty jury, or the
showing of a video-tape of material portions of the guilt trial to the
new penalty jury. 197 Moreover, against the added costs of impaneling a second jury, it must be considered that a portion of the death
qualifying that presently occurs at voir dires in every capital case
will be eliminated.
In any event, these state interests are essentially financial - savings in court time and costs - and precisely these interests were held
ins~cient justification for a state's attempt to reduce the size of misdemeanor juries to five members. 198 The five-member jury would
224 N.E.2d 710, 278 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1966) (New York constitution prohibits substitution of
alternate juror after jury deliberations have begun).
A proposed amendment to the Federal Rule would expressly permit the substitution of
alternate jurors for 'jurors who become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform
their duties," even after deliberations have begun. COMMl'ITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 42-43 (1981)
(proposed FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(d)). The bifurcated capital trial may present special difficulties,
however, for the substitution of alternate jurors. In a typical trial where juror substitution
occurs before any decision has been reached, it may be reasonable to indulge the assumption
that the reconstituted jury can consider the matter anew and that the new jurors will play a full
role in deliberations. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971; United States v. Barone, 83
F.R.D 565. Bui see J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 24.05 (2d ed. 1980) (''The inherent coercive effect upon an alternate who joins a jury leaning heavily toward a guilty verdict may result in the alternate reaching a premature guilty verdict."), In the capital case,
however, the substitution would occur after verdict, and the jurors who voted to convict may
therefore play a dominant role. Of course, in any case where the defendant wished to forgo
such an objection, alternate juror substitutions could occur by agreement of the parties. See
United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1980).
195. A number of states authorize the impanelling of a new jury at the penalty phase of a
bifurcated capital trial, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141 (West 1981); ILL. STAT, ANN, ch.
38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979), thus recognizing that these added costs are warranted in appropriate circumstances.
196. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976).
191. See White, supra note 68, at 401.
198. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 244 (1978). Accord, Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S.
130, 139 (1979) (state interest in reducing time and expense of criminal justice administration
insufficient justification for use ofnonunanimous six-person juries); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 535 (1975) ("the administrative convenience of dealing with women as a class is
insufficient justification for'' their wholesale exclusion). This is consistent with the Court's
approach in other contexts rejecting the state interest in saving money as sufficient justification
for infringing upon fundamental rights. E.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 29 (1977); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147-49
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have applied in all misdemeanor trials, an enormous number of
cases, and therefore would have resulted in considerable cost savings
to the state even if the savings in each individual case were minim1:1l.
As capital cases make up a relatively small number of criminal trials,
the savings here would be considerably less. Moreover, in view of
the Court's inclination to demand more in the way of due process in
capital cases than in any other kind of case, it would seem that if the
greater cost savings accomplished in the five-member misdemeanor
jury context were deemed insufficient justification for the resulting
infringement on defendant's jury trial rights, then a fortiori the lesser
savings would be deemed insufficient in the capital punishment
context.
The Fifth Circuit has raised a more fundamental objection to inclusion of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors even in a bifurcated
trial system. In its view, a jury that included this group, rather than
being neutral, might be biased in favor of the defendant, and therefore deny to the state its right to an impartial jury. I 99 This conclusion appears inconsistent with Witherspoon's central holding that
exclusion of "oppose death penalty" jurors results in an unconstitutionally death-prone jury. As applied to Witherspoon's facts, the
Fifth Circuit approach would presumably call for affirmance of
Witherspoon's death sentence on the basis that juries including "oppose death penalty'' jurors are more life imprisonment-prone than
death-qualified juries, and therefore biased in favor of the defendant. But Witherspoon explicitly rejected this contention in favor of ·
a jury that the Court deemed more impartial than one which ex(1972); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971); Shapiro v. _Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
633 (1969); see Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L.
REv. 331, 381 (1981).
199. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578-79 (5th Cir. 1981); Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
578 F.2d 582, 594, 594-96 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979). Underlying the
Fifth Circuit's concerns may be the suspicion that "automatic life imprisonment" jurors may
really be "automatic acquittal" jurors, although they swear at voir dire that they are not. However, any such suspicion could not alone justify the exclusion of these jurors consistent with the
explicit holding of Witherspoon and Adams that the factual basis for a venireperson's exclusion
on account of death penalty attitudes must be ''unmistakably clear." See note 119 supra and
accompanying text Moreover, if death penalty opponents constitute a cognizable class for
sixth amendment cross-section purposes, see Section IV-B, i'!fra, the exclusion of these jurors
based on such suspicion would also violate the Taylor-Duren prohibition of the use of rough
rules of thumb in the jury selection context See notes 191 supra and 296 & 301 i,!fra.
Indeed, if the Fifth Circuit's view is correct, prosecutors presumably should be able to
interrogate venirepersons in noncapital cases (assuming that their prosecution proneness
would apply there as well) concerning their view on the death penalty, and remove for cause
those who could never impose it Nowhere, however, is this allowed. Haney, Juries and the
Death Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 512,.514
(1980) (The process of "death qualification" is ''unique to capital cases. In no other instance
are prospective jurors systematically queried about their attitudes toward a particular legal
punishment and then excluded, as a matter of law, depending on how they answer.")
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eludes all death penalty objectors. Witherspoon thus suggests that if
a capital jury resembling the jury200 that sits in the typical noncapital
case - universally regarded as fair and impartial - is found to be
significantly less conviction-prone than a death-qualified jury, then
the latter would be constitutionally suspect as a trier of the defendant's guilt.
The Fifth Circuit has recently suggested an additional concern
that might militate against use of a bifurcated trial with one jury to
determine guilt and another to fix punishment.201 The court suggested that the "less restrictive alternative" remedy proposed - the
bifurcated trial - might be unacceptable because it would deprive
the capital defendant at the penalty phase of the benefits of any
"whimsical doubt" on the issue of guilt that the jurors might carry
over into their penalty deliberations. 202 Of course, whether a capital
defendant would be more disadvantaged by the destruction of the
"whimsical doubt" that would accompany the bifurcated trial remedy than he would by a unitary trial system in which "automatic life
imprisonment" jurors would be excluded from the determination of
guilt is itself an unexplored empirical question. 203 In any event, the
Fifth Circuit's approach seems unduly paternalistic. The state's sub200. The comparison jury would resemble, but not be identical to, the typical jury in noncapital cases, as it would not include the "automatic acquittal" group. See note l84supra and
accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit's concern that adoption of the bifurcated trial system
proposed would result in a jury biased in favor of the defendant would certainly be more
understandable if "automatic acquittal" jurors would serve on the jury asked to assess guilt.
Yet the defendant in Smith expressly disclaimed any desire to challenge the exclusion of these
jurors. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), at 11.
According to the Fifth Circuit, the defendant in Smith also suggested the propriety of excluding the "automatic death penalty" group, a suggestion criticized by the court as seeking
"the best of both worlds." 660 F.2d at 579 n.14. The court appears, however, to have misconstrued the defendant's contention, which was that "death-qualified juries are guilt-prone by
comparison with the norm of all jurors who could fairly and impartially try guilt or innocence
- that is, by comparison with the entire pool of prospective jurors from which juries are
ordinarily drawn in criminal cases." Petitioner-Appellant John Smith's Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 at 7; see also id. at 4, 8. Thus the defendant
in Smith seems to concede that "automatic death penalty" jurors who can be fair and impartial
in assessing guilt should be included in the first stage of a bifurcated trial. In any event, the
Fifth Circuit's concerns about the exclusion of"automatic death penalty" jurors from this first
stage may be largely theoretical. There are probably few jurors in this category to begin with,
see Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 49 (1980) ("it is undeniable . . . that such jurors willl be few
indeed as compared with those excluded because of scruples against capitfl punishment"), and
of those, there may be few so strongly in favor of capital punishment that they would automatically impose it, regardless of the facts, who also could be fair and impartial in deciding guilt.
Of course, virtually nothing is actually known concerning the size or behavior of the "automatic death penalty" group.
201. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573.
202. 660 F.2d at 579-82.
203. The court acknowledged that its ''whimsical doubt" concern "is not based upon review of the record in this case," but upon its own intuitions about juries. 660 F.2d at 582.
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stantial interest in a penalty jury capable of imposing capital punishment in accordance with the state's statutory scheme can be satisfied
either by removal of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors from participation in the determination of both guilt and punishment, or by
the bifurcated trial mentioned in Witherspoon. As the state's interest
in avoiding added costs should not itself justify the existing system, it
would seem appropriate to allow a defendant himself to resolve the
question as to which alternative would be more consistent with his
own interests.204
d. Assessing the state's interest in removing scrupled jurors who
can consider imposing capitalpunishment. If the "least restrictive alternative" question is resolved in favor of a defendant's assertion
that a bifurcated trial system with one jury to determine guilt and
another to determine penalty would accommodate the state's and defendant's respective interests, then the exclusion of "automatic life
imprisonment" jurors and a substantial number of "oppose death
penalty" jurors should be held to violate the defendant's due process
right to an impartial jury on guilt. Whatever additional interest the
state may assert in use of the peremptory challenge to remove members of the "oppose death penalty" group would seem fully protected
by limiting exclusions in such a way that jurors may not systematically be removed because of their views on capital punishment on
" 'any broader basis' than inability to follow the law or abide by
their oaths."205
Moreover, even if the ''least restrictive alternative" argument
with regard to the removal for cause of the "automatic life imprisonment" group is rejected- or if a defendant does not attack the removal of this group, but seeks to challenge only the removal by
peremptories of the "oppose death penalty'' group - the due process
challenge may still succeed. ·If empirical studies show that deathqualified juries brought about by a combination of prosecutorial
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges of all or virtually all
death scrupled jurors were less than neutral with regard to guilt
when compared with "neutral" juries, then the lack of justification
for the state's systematic use of the peremptory challenge should result in denial of the defendant's right to an impartial jury on guilt in
any event. Thus, a potentially potent due process argument may be
204. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (even though self-representation may
disadvantage a defendant compared to representation by appointed counsel, defendants entitled to choose self-representation).
·
205. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 "(1980).
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raised that the systematic use by prosecutors of peremptory challenges to remove death-scrupled jurors, either alone or in combination with the removal for cause of "automatic life imprisonment"
jurors, would require not only the vacating of the defendant's death
penalty, but the reversal of his conviction as well. The validity of
this argument, however, depends upon empirical studies that have
not as yet ·been performed.

B. Systematic Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors and the Sixth
Amendment

I. The Sixth Amendment Fair Cross-Section Requirement
Witherspoon was not a sixth amendment case.206 Although two
weeks before Witherspoon was decided, the Court in .Duncan v. Louisiana ,207 held the jury trial guarantee of the sixth amendment applicable to the states, the trial in Witherspoon occurred beforehand and
.Duncan was not given retroactive effect.208 The requirements of the
sixth amendment, considerably different from the due process right
to an impartial jury involved in Witherspoon, may thus pose a separate constitutional basis to invalidate the systematic exclusion of
death-scrupled jurors.
/ In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court recognized that fundamental to the jury trial guarantee of the sixth amendment is the right
to a ju~ ~lected from a representative "cross section of the community."23/In so doing, the Court subsumed within the sixth amendment the concern for jury represent~tiveness previously articulated
as a matter of equal protection or through the Court's supervisory
powers over the lower federal courts. Use of equal protection doctrine to limit jury composition practices dates from the 1880 case of
Strauder v. West Virginia, which invalidated a state statute that excluded all blacks from serving onjuries.210 The Supreme Court first
articulated the representativeness principle in Smith v. Texas, 211 another equal protection case involving racial discrimination in state
206. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
207. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
208. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
209. 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
210. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The Court's opinion.expressed a concern with the "constitution
of juries," not merely with discrimination based on race:
The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person
whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows,
associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.
100 U.S. at 308.
211. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
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jury selection. The Court deemed it "part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury
be a body truly representative of the community." Race discrimination in jury selection is not only unconstitutional, the Court noted;
"but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a
representative government."212 Two years later, in Glasser v. United
States, the Court first spoke of the "concept of the jury as a crosssection of the community."213 The first case to apply the cross-section requirement to reverse a jury verdict was Thiel v. Southern Pac!ftc Co. , a civil case involving the seventh amendment right to jury
trial in which the Court used its supervisory powers to invalidate the
exclusion of daily wage earners from lists of prospective jurors:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection
with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. This does
not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all
the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical
groups of the community; frequently ·such complete representation
would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be
selected by couq officials without systematic and intentional exclusion
of any of these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that
those eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it
is to open the door to cl~s distinctions and discriminations which are
abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.2 14

The cross-section requirement is violated if the jury pool is made up
solely from "segments of the populace or if large, distinctive gr_oups
are excluded from the pool."21s
The use of peremptory challenges, of course, does not affect the
representatives of the jury pool - the venire from which jurors are
selected by a process of elimination occurring through exercise of
challenges for cause and peremptory chalJ,enges. However, such
challenges can affect the representativeness of the juries actually selected. Although the Fifth Circuit has recently suggested that the
sixth amendment cross-section requirement may apply only to
212. 311 U.S. at 130.
213. 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
214. 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (citations omitted). For further discussions of the crosssection requirement, see generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25 at 45-83; Daughtrey, Cross
Sectionalism in Jury-Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REv. I
(1975); Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate far Multiple Source
Lists, 65 CAL. L. REv. 776, 780-88 (1977).
·
215. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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venires," and not to actualjuries,216 this suggestion seems inconsistent
with the policies underlying the constitutional requirement. The
purpose of the fair cross-section mandate is the selection of representative juries, not merely representative venires. 217
The concept of the jury as representing a fair cross-section of the
community serves not only the interest of the litigants in a fair trial,
ie., the assurance of at least some degree of what Mr. Justice Frankfurter called "diffused impartiality,"218 but significant societal goals
as well. Community participation in the jury system comports with
"our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government."219 Moreover, it is also "critical to public confidence in the
fairness of the criminal justice system."220 These goals would not be
accomplished if the representativeness requirement pertained only to
jury pools, and if challenges systematically could be used in such a
way that the juries actually selected are "made up of only special
segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded."221 Moreover, the essential purpose of the jury - to interpose the "common sense judgement of the community as a hedge
against the over-zealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to
the professional or perhaps over-con~tioned or biased response of a
judge"222 - is not achieved if the over-zealous prosecutor or overconditioned judge can eliminate the representative character of the
jury through the jury challenge process.
The systematic use of jury challenges should thus be subject to
scrutiny under the sixth amendment cross-section requirement. 223
216. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 583 n.26 (5th Cir. 1981).
217. See People v. Payne, 31 CRIM. L. RPrR. (BNA) 2229, 2229 (Ill. App., May 19, 1982)
(''The desired goal of interaction of a cross-section of the community does not occur within the
venire, but rather, is only effectuated by the petit jury that is selected and sworn to try the
issues."); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, <182, 387 N.E.2d 499,513, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 881 (1979) (''The desired interaction of a cross-section of the community does not occur
[at the venire]; it is only effectuated within the jury room itself.")
218. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
quoted In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975).
219. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530 (1975) ("our democratic heritage"); A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127-28
(New American Library ed. 1956).
220. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 53p (1975).
221. 419 U.S. at 530. See]. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 168-69.
222. 419 U.S. at 530. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
223. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1376-85 (E.D. Ark.), modified on other
grounds, 637 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980) (exclusion for cause in capital case of "automatic life
imprisonment" group scrutinized under cross-section requirement); People v. Payne, 31 CRIM.
L. RPrR. (BNA) 2229 (Ill. App., May 19, 1982) (peremptory challenge of 6 of 7 blacks on
venire scrutinized under sixth amendment cross-section requirement); People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d 258, 274, 583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 901 (1978) (peremptory challenge of all
blacks on venire to produce all-white jury scrutinized under state constitution cross-section
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The Supreme Court's decision in Ballew v. Georgia ,224 scrutinizing
under the cross-section requirement a statutory reduction in jury size
to five persons in misdemeanor cases, supports this conclusion. The
Court noted that the sixth amendment mandates a jury of sufficient
size ''to provide a representative cross-section of the community,"225
and invalidated the five-person jury in part because of its concern
that this size "prevents juries from truly representing their communities."226 No issue was raised concerning the representativeness of the
jury pools from which Georgia selected five-person juries, or concerning the arbitrary exclusion of any particular class from five-person juries. Yet the Court noted that the absence of an equal
protection problem did not dispose of "the question of representation," which combined with other factors created "a problem of constitutional significance under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. " 227 If the cross-section requirement places limits on
statutory reductions in jury size because resulting juries may not
truly represent the community, then it should also be deemed to
place limits on jury challenges which interfere with the representative character of resulting juries.
To subject jury challenges to scrutiny under the sixth amendment, however, is not to say that the absence or substantial underrepresentation of any p~cular group on a petit jury violates the
cross-section requirement. A defendant is not entitled to "a jury of
any particular composition,"228 or to a jury that mirrors the community.229 The random ·application of unobjectionable jury selection
methods, or the legitimate exercise of challenges for cause or peremptory challenges, will often result in particular juries that do not
even approximately mirror the community. Indeed, a jury of twelve
requirement); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
881 (1979) (peremptory challenge of 12 of 13 blacks on venire scrutinized under state constitution cross-section requirement).
224. _435 U.S. 223 (1978).
225. 435 U.S. at 230.
226. 435 U.S. at 239. Mr. Justice White concurred solely on the ground that a jury of fewer
than six persons "would fail to represent the sense of the community and hence not satisfy the
fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." 435 U.S. at 245.
227. 435 U.S. at 242.
228. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
229. 419 U.S. at 538; United States v. D'Alora, 585 F.2d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 1978); United
States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094,
1103 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977); Stewart v. Ricketts, 451 F. Supp. 911,
917 (M.D. Ga. 1978); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 274, 583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890,903 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461,488,387 N.E.2d 499,516, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
·
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could never reflect all the distinctive groups in the population. 230 A
defendant is entitled only to jury selection procedures which do not
"systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community."231 If a
particular type of challenge for cause, or the systematic use of peremptory challenges against a distinctive group, by its nature results
in unrepresentative petit juries, then it should be subject to scrutiny
under the sixth amendment cross-section requirement no less than
are selection methods that produce unrepresentative jury wheels,
pools of names, panels or venires.
As was discussed before, it is not absolutely certain that the jury
resulting after peremptory challenges by both the defense and the
prosecution is more likely to impose the death penalty than a random sample of the population would be.232 The sixth amendment
claim, however, is not that the attitude of the jury on a particular
issue does not accord with that of the population at large, but instead
that a "cognizable class," sharing a wide range of attitudes bearing
on how it might view evidence, judge credibility or assess reasonable
doubt, in addition to how it might recommend penalties, has been
systematically excluded.
2. The Cognizable Class Requirement Applied
to Scrupled Jurors

In .Duren v. Missouri, the Supreme Court defined the elements of
proof necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement:
[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is
a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of
this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;
. and-(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury-selection process.233

The requirement of a "distinctive" group, also frequently referred to
as a "cognizable class," has been said to include "economic, social,
religious, racial, political, and geographical groups of the
community."234
·
The concept of cognizability, however, is not free of ambiguity,
and Supreme Court treatment of the issue has not always been con230.
231.
232.
233.
·234_

Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. at 481-82, 387 N.E.2d at 512.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,220 (1946).
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sistent. In Rawlins v. Georgia, the Court said that the test was
whether those excluded would "act otherwise than those who were
drawn would act." 235 Justice Frankfurter, in his frequently cited dissenting opinion in Thiel, said the test was whether the persons excluded "have a different outlook psychologically and economically,"
whether they "adopt a different social outlook," and whether they
"have a different sense of justice, and a different conception of a
juror's responsibility." 236 In Ballard v. United States, 231 the Court
invoked its supervisory powers to reverse a conviction where women
had been systematically excluded from grand and petit juries. The
Court was willing to assume that women constituted a cognizable
class, without requiring proof that they share attitudes or perspectives different from that of men. It rejected the argument that because women did not tend to act as a class, they should not be
considered a cognizable group. The Court stressed that
community made up exclusively of one [of the sexes] is different from a
community composed of both . . . . A flavor, a distinct quality is
lost if either sex is excluded."238
In Hernandez v. Texas, finding Mexican-American~ to be a cognizable group, the Court noted that "[w]hether such a group exists
within a community is a question of fact" that defendant had the
"initial burden" of proving.239 Hernandez had satisfied the burden
by demonstrating the "attitude of the community," which subjected
Mexican-Americans to different treatment from whites. 240 In more
recent cases, the Court has spoken of a cognizable class as "any large
and identifiable segment of the community,"241 and any group that.is
"sufficiently numerous and distinct."242
These varying formulations of the cognizability test leave application of the standard somewhat unclear. 243 Race and national ori-

"a

235. 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906) (upholding the exclusion from grand juries of certain occupational groups).
236. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. at 230. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (Marshall, J.) (stressing the psychological "perspective" of a group).
·
237. 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946).
238. 329 U.S. at 193-94..
239. 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954).
240. 347 U.S. at 479-80.
241. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (plurality opinion).
242. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975). In finding women to be a cognizable
class, the Court relied in part on sociological studies reporting that women brought different
"perspectives and values" to jury service than men. 419 U.S. at 532 n.12.
243. See, e.g., Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 16 MICH. L.
REV. 1045, 1057-61 (1978).
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gin have easily met the standard,244 as has sex245 and religious
belief.246 A variety of groups based on economic, occupational or
social class status have met the standard,247 as have groups based on
political beliefs and values. 248 The cases on the cognizability of age
groups, however, are inconsistent.249 Courts have rejected ex244. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (Mexican-Americans); Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940)
(blacks); United States v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (Latins); Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78 (D. Conn. 1980) (Puerto Ricans); United States ex rel.
Leguillou v. Davis, 115 F. Supp. 392 (D.V.I. 1953), revd on other grounds, 212 F.2d 681 (3d
Cir. 1954) (Puerto Ricans); United States v. Fujimoto, 105 F. Supp. 727 (D. Hawaii 1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 852 (1953) (non-Caucasians); International Longshoremen's Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1949), revd on other grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1951)
(Filipinos); Montoya v. Colorado, 141 Colo. 9, 345 P.2d 1062 (1959) ("Spanish-sounding
names"); State v. Plenty Horse, 85 S.D. 401, 184 N.W.2d 654 (1971) (American Indians).
245. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
246. See, e.g., State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265,213 A.2d 8?0 (1965); Schowgurow v. State,
240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965) (agnostics and atheists); People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274,
420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (Jews); Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091
(1925) (Roman-Catholics); State v. Holmstrom, 43 Wis. 2d 465, 168 N.W.2d 574 (1969).
247. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (daily wage earners);
Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Commrs., 622 F.2d 807 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964 (1981) (incomes below poverty level); United States v.
Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970) (less educated); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir.
1966) (en bane), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967) (daily wage earners); United States v. Andrews, 342 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Mass.), revd on procedural grounds, 462 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1972)
("paupers"); United States v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1967) (less educated); International Longshoremen's Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1948), revd on other
grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1951) (laborers); Colvin v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 181
(Ky. 1978) (teachers); State v. Jenison, 405 A.2d 3 (R.I. 1979) (academic community); hut see
Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906) (upholding exclusion of doctors, ministers, lawyers,
engineers, dentists and other occupational groups); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th
Cir. 1977) (less educated persons, i.e., high school or less, not a cognizable class); United States
v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (blue-collar workers and persons with
less than a high school education not cognizable classes); Quadra v. Superior Court, 378 F.
Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (blue-collar workers not cognizable); United States v. McDaniels,
370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. La. 1973), q/fd sub nom. United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.
1975) ("poor" not a cognizable class); State v. Porro, 158 N.J. Super. 269, 385 A.2d 1258
(1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S 1047 (1978) (students not a cognizable class); Comment, Underrepresentation of Economic Groups on Federal Juries, 57 B.U. L. REV. 198 (1977); Comment,
The Questionable Validity of the Automatic Exemption of Allorneysfrom Jury Service, 14 U.
RICH. L. REV. 837 (1980).
248. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,220 (1946); Simmons v. Jones, 317 F.
Supp. 397, 406 (S.D. Ga. 1970), revd on other grounds, 418 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1973) (political
affiliation); Kentucky v. Powers, 139 F. 452 (E.D. Ky.), revd on other gounds, 201 U.S. I (1905)
(political party); State v. McCarthy, 76 N.J.L. 295, 69 A. 1075 (N.J. 1908) (political faction);
State v. Holmstrom, 43 Wis. 2d 465, 168 N.W.2d 574 (1969).
249. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the Court assumed, without deciding, that the young are a cognizable group, but then ruled that no showing of systematic exclusion was established. The lower courts are divided on the issue. Compare Cuidadanos Unidos
de San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Commrs., 622 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964 (1981); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970); Simmons v.
Jones, 317 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Ga. 1970), revd on other grounds, 418 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1973);
and Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 409 N.E. 2d 796 (Mass. App. 1980), recognizing that cer-
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felons 250 and resident aliens251 as cognizable classes.
Clearly, to be cognizable, a group must be identifiable in some
objective sense. As one lower court put it, such a group must have a
"definite composition," i.e., there must be "some factor which defines and limits the group." 252 A cognizable group is not one ''whose
membership shifts from day to day or whose members can be arbitrarily selected."253 In addition, the group must have "cohesion" there must be a "common thread which runs through the group, a
basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or experience."254 Another court
has termed this a ''unifying viewpoint," a requirement that members
of the group share "a common perspective arising from their life experience in the group, i.e., a perspective gained precisely because
they are members of that group . . . a common social or psychological outlook on human events."255 In addition, some lower courts
have recently added a new and controversial requirement - "that
no other members of the community are capable of adequately representing the perspective of the group assertedly excluded." 256 Fi:nally, application of the concept of cognizability may differ from
time to time and from place to place. ''What is a fair cross section at
one time or place is not necessarily a fair cross section at another
time or a different place."257
Applying these criteria to death-scrupled jurors leads to the contain age groups are cognizable classes, with United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Allen, 445 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. CabreraSarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Fla. 1982); and United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140
(S.D.N.Y.), affd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973), holding that
certain age groups are not cognizable. See generally, Zeigler, supra note 243.
250. Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 r.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979).
251. United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975); Rubio v. Superior
Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979).
252. United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y), affd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 973 (1973).
253. 337 F. Supp. at 143.
254. 337 F. Supp. at 143; accord, United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977);
Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 97-98, 593 P.2d 595, 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. 737, 737
(1979).
255. Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d at 98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
256. 24 Cal. 3d at 98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737; accord, United States v. Potter,
552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1973); Grigsby
v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1382-85 (E.D. Ark.), modified on other grounds, 637 F.2d 525 (8th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 468 F.2d 1245
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 4lp U.S. 937 (1973); State v. Brewer, 247 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1977). But
see Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d at 105-17, 593 P.2d at 603-11, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 742-50
(dissenting opinion ofTobriner, J.,joined by Bird, C.J., and Newman, J.) (criticizing this additional requirement as being unsupported by prior cases, impossible to apply and inconsistent
with the policies underlying the cross-section requirement).
257. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 {1975).
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clusion that the cognizable class requirement has been satisfied.
Those with conscientious scruples against imposition of the death
penalty form a coherent and sizable group within the community.
This was recognized in Witherspoon, where the Supreme Court, although not discussing the cross-section requirement, concluded that
a jury composed exclusively of persons who believe in the death penalty "cannot speak for the community."258 Although at the time the
Court spoke, approximately forty-seven percent of the American
public opposed the death penalty,259 more recent polls indicate that
only about twenty-five percent currently oppose it. 260 Moreover,
whether death-scrupled jurors are "sufficiently numerous" to constitute a cognizable class depends upon the extent of their representation in the community in question. 261 The study reported on in this
Article indicates that about thirteen percent of the population of
Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit during the five-year period studied
opposed the death penalty.262 The extent of death penalty opposition in the community studied is comparable to the representation of
Catholics (thirteen percent),263 Republicans (fifteen percent),264 and
blacks (between seventeen and twenty-one percent)265 in the community during roughly the same period. As these three groups would
undoubtedly meet the cognizability standard, the number of deathscrupled individuals in the community should certainly satisfy at
least the numerical requirement for cognizability.266
Death-scrupled jurors also seem sufficiently identifiable to meet
the cognizability standard. The group has a "definite composi258. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968).
259. 391 U.S. at 520 n.16.
260. See note 97 supra.
261. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531, 537 (1975).
262. See Table I at p. 30. A survey conducted in September of 1979 in Metropolitan
Jacksonville, Florida, strongly confirms the reliability of the study result that 13.17% of
elegible jurors in the community are opposed to the death penalty. Research Department,
Florida Publishing Company, What Residents ofMetro Jacksonville Think About Capital Pun•
ishment (unpublished, Sept. 1979) (hereinafter referred to as "Survey"). The survey included
Duval and four adjacent counties - Clay, Nassau, Baker and St.Johns. Although the latter
two are not within the Fourth Judicial Circuit, only 9% of the respondents resided in these two
counties. Id. at 6. The survey consisted of interviews with 3,621 men and women age 18 or
over. Id. at 1, 2. Fifteen per cent of those interviewed responded that they were opposed to
the death penalty (7% opposed "somewhat," and 8% opposed "strongly"). Id. at 4.
263. Survey, supra note 262, at 5.
264. Survey, supra note 262, at 6.
265. Note 75 supra & accompanying text.
266. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark.), mod!fied on other grounds, 631
F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980) (comparing percentage of blacks in population to percentage of death
penalty opponents to support conclusion that death penalty opponents are sufficiently numerous to meet the cognizability standard).

November 1982)

Peremptory Challenges in Capital Cases

71

tion," 267 defined and limited by i~s members' expressed views on
capital punishment. Moreover, the group seems to be cohesive in the
sense that there is a "common thread which runs through the group,
a basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or experiences."268 This "common thread" or "unifying viewpoint,"269 is their common perspective on the death penalty. In addition, a number of empirical studies
have shown that attitudes about the death penalty are related to
other social and legal attitudes and to personality variables.270
These studies clearly establish that an individual's attitude toward
capital punishment is not an isolated phenomenon, but rather is
closely related to other deeply held attitudes and values. 271 Zeisel's
study found that "attitude towards the death penalty is but a part of
a larger syndrome of values that are roughly characterized by being
'liberal' - or being less so."272 Jurors who have scruples against the
death penalty are "clearly distinguishable" from those who do not different in "background," in ''basic attitudes," and in "psychological makeup." 273 Jurow concluded, based on his study as well as his
review of the literature, that there is "strong evidence indicating that
groups in favor and groups opposing capital punishment constitute
cohesive and different classes in terms of community attitudes." 274
Vidmar and Ellsworth reviewed several studies examining whether
persons favoring the death penalty differ from persons opposing it in
terms of attitudes, values and personality dispositions, and concluded that those favoring the death penalty are more conservative
in their legal, social, and political-views.275 Similarly, White's review
of the studies revealed "a difference in attitudes on the part of the
267. United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D. N.Y.), ajfd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 973 (1973).
268. See note 254 supra & accompanying text.
269. Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 98, 593 P.2d 595, 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737
(1979).
270. See Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the JJeath Penalty 26 STAN. L. REV.
1245, 1258-62 (1974) (discussing studies). The propriety of relying on such studies to demonstrate cognizability was recognized in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 n.12 (1975),
where the Supreme Court cited social science studies, in support of its finding that women met
the test, that reported that women bring to jury service "their own perspectives and values that
influence both jury deliJ?eration and resulL"
271. Girsh, The Witherspoon Question: The Social Science and the Evidence, NLAJJA
BRIEFCASE 99, 100 (SepL 1978); White, supra note 68, at 370.
272. H. ZEISEL, supra note 164, at-24.
273. Id at 25, 51.
274. Jurow, New JJata on the Effect ofa "JJeath-Qual[!ied" Jwy on the Gtlilt JJetermination
Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 567, 598 (1971) (discussing studies by Boehm, Crosson, Bronson,
Wilson, Goldberg and Zeisel, cited in notes 164 & 165 mpra).
275. Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 270, at 1260 (discussing studies by Zeisel, Crosson,
Jurow, and Rokeach & McLellan, cited in notes 164 & 165 supra).
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two groups," particularly in attitudes bearing upon the adjudicatory
process in criminal trials. 276 These studies provide consistent and
impressive support for the conclusion that death penalty objectors
are attitudinally distinct from nonobjectors, and therefore meet the
"common thread" requirement. 277
The additional requirement applied by some lower courts - that
other segments of the community cannot adequately represent the
perspective of the excluded group 278 - also seems satisfied. A federal district court recently rejected a cross-section challenge to the
exclusion for cause of "automatic life imprisonment" venirepersons
on the basis of this requirement. 279 Because Witherspoon had authorized removal of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors but not
"oppose death penalty" jurors, the district court concluded that the
presence of the latter group on capital juries suffices to assure representation of the perspective of the former. 280 A systematic use of
prosecution peremptories to exclude the "oppose death penalty"
group would totally undercut this conclusion. As this case dramatizes, not only is the most likely surrogate group itself excludable for
cause, but in addition, the "oppose death penalty" group is already
being relied on to represent it. If both groups are eliminated, there is
no logical candidate group to represent the large and distinct segment of the community that opposes the death penalty.
In view of the size and distinctive character of the segment of the
community opposed to capital punishment, systematic exclusion of
this entire group would seem to raise a prima facie violation of the
sixth amendment cross-section requirement. 281 This conclusion is
276. White, supra note 165, at 1192 ("For example, death qualified jurors are more likely
to distrust defendants and to trust the prosecution; they are more likely to hold attitudes on the
determination of guilt which reflect antipathy toward constitutional protections afforded the
accused; and when faced with any kind of a simulated trial situation, they are significantly
more likely to render a guilty verdict.") (footnotes omitted).
211. See note 165 supra.
278. See cases cited in note 256 supra.
279. Grigsby v. Mabiy, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1385 (E.D. Ark.), mod!fted on other grounds, 631
F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980).
280. 483 F. Supp. at 1385. In two Fifth Circuit cases raising the same sixth amendment
challenge, the court declined to decide whether "automatic life imprisonment" jurors comprise
a cognizable class. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 583 n.26 (5th Cir. 1981); Spinkellink v.
Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 597 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979) (assuming
arguendo the "distinctiveness" of this group).
281. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 524-25, 528 (1968) (separate opinion of
Douglas, J.); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 48; cf. Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 308
(4th Cir. 1968), remandedfar farther consideration in light oJ Witherspoon, 393 U.S. 76 (1968),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1970) (exclusion of capital punishment objectors ''prevents the juiy
in its function of determining the issue of guilt from being fairly representative of the community, and thus violates equal protection of the laws").
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supported by the significant social and historical policies underlying
the cross-section requirement - the desire to increase public confidence in the fairness of the process,282 the desire to provide an assurance of at least some degree of "diffused impartiality" among the
triers of fact, 283 and a desire to protect the defendant against the
over-zealous prosecutor and over-conditioned judge by interposing
the "common sense judgement of the community."284
3. Substantial Underrepresentation of Scrupled Jurors
If death-scrupled jurors are considered a cognizable class, two
other requirements must be met in order to establish a prima facie
violation of the cross-section requirement. It must also be shown
that the representation of this group "is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community," and that
"this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group
in the jury-selection process."285 ·The study reported on in this Article would seem to satisfy both requirements.
Application of the "rule of exclusion"286 to the data demonstrates
the substantial underrepresentation of death-scrupled jurors on capital juries. If the extent of death penalty opposition in Florida's
Fourth Judicial Circuit is estimated at 13.2% - the percentage of
death penalty opposition revealed among the 1,116 venirepersons examined during the five-year period287 - then one would expect that
of the 360 jurors actually selected in the 30 cases analyzed, 288 about
47 or 48 of them (13.17%) would have been death penalty opponents.
In fact, as Table A-3 in the appendix reveals, only 9 of the 360 jurors
selected were death penalty opponents.289 The chances of 9 or fewer
death-scrupled jurors being selected is calculated at approximately
19 in ten billion (.000,000,001,9), or the equivalent of 6.1 standard
deviations. This presents an astronomical degree of statistical significance, the equivalent of flipping 30 or 31 heads in a row with an
unbiased coin. When the results for total venirepersons selected both as jurors and as alternate jurors - are analyzed, the underrepresentative. result is equally striking. Because 426 jurors and al282.
• 283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See note 219-20 supra and accompanying text.
See note 218 supra and accompanying text.
See note 222 supra and accompanying text.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).

See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
See note 262 supra and accompanying text.
Table A.3 in the appendix.
Id.
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temates were selected,290 one would expect that 56 or 57 of them
(13.17%) would have been death penalty opponents. In fact, as Table 2 reveals, only 12 of the 426 jurors and alternates selected were
death penalty opponents.291 The chances of 12 or fewer being selected is calculated at approximately 29 in one hundred billion
(.000,000,000,29), or the equivalent of 6.25 standard deviations. This
too presents an astronomical degree of statistical significance, the
equivalent of flipping approximately 32 or 33 heads in a row with an
unbiased coin.
Thus, the study demonstrates that during the five-year period analyzed, death penalty opponents were substantially underrepresented
in capital juries in Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit.292 Moreover,
the study establishes that this underrepresentative result is due to the
systematic use by prosecutors of their peremptory challenges to eliminate those expressing opposition to the death penalty who were not
previously removed for cause.293
4. The State's Interest in Removing Scrupled Jurors: The Attempt
To Justify Substantial Underrepresentation

In sixth amendment cross-section cases, "systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant's interest in
290. Table 2, at p. 31 supra.
291. Id
292. It is also likely - although the study did not analyze the question - that the substantial underrepresentation of death penalty opponents on capital juries in the Fourth Judicial
Circuit also produced the underrepresentation of other cognizable classes. A considerable
number of studies have consistently shown that attitudes toward capital punishment are related to such demographic characteristics as race and sex. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d
1, 57-60, 616 P.2d 1301, 1339-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 164-66 (1980) (discussing studies), See
SoURCEBOOK, supra note 97, at 210-11 (table showing attitudes on capital punishment by demographic characteristics for 1972-1978 and 1980). Reviewing these studies, White concluded
that the exclusion of death penalty opponents results in a clear underrepresentation of "blacks,
women, those with less than a high school education, and people with certain religious beliefs,
especially Jews and agnostics." White, supra note 165, at 1193-94. Moreover, available evidence indicates that these groups are already underrepresented on juries, and that the process
of death qualification thus acts to compound existing underrepresentation. Haney, supra note
165, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY at 517-18.
The survey of capital punishment attitudes in Metropolitan Jacksonville suggests that these
conclusions may apply in the Fourth Circuit. The survey revealed that 40% of blacks or
"others" were opposed to capital punishment compared to 10% for whites; that 18% of women
were opposed compared to 12% for men; and that 16% of Jews and 20% of those listing themselves as having "no religion" were opposed, compared to 15% for Protestants and 12% for
Catholics. Survey, supra note 262 at 8-9. Several cases have regarded as significant to their
findings that various practices violated the jury trial rights of defendants that these practices
had the incidental effect of excluding disproportionate numbers of minority groups. Ballew v,
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,236 (1978) (five-person jury reduces. minority group representation on
juries); Labat v. Bennet, 365 F.2d 698, 720 (5th Cir. 1966) (en bane), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991
(1967) (exclusion of daily wage earners results in disproportionate exclusion of blacks).
293. See text accompanying notes 107-13 supra.
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a jury chosen from a fair community cross-section. There is no need
to show particularized bias against the defendant. The only remaining question is whether there is adequate justification for this infringement."294 The state bears the burden of justifying the
underrepresentative result "by showing attainment of a fair crosssection to be incompatible with a significant state interest."295 Moreover, the significant state interest asserted must be "manifestly and
primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury-selection process
. . . that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive
group."296
Undoubtedly, the state has 'a significant interest in excluding certain suo-groups of those opposed to the death penalty. It is clear, for
example, that the state interest in an impartial jury on the question
of guilt justifies challenge for cause of the "automatic acquittal"
group, those whose opposition to the death penalty render them unable to return a verdict of guilty.297 Moreover, the state's interest in
enforcing its capital punishment scheme has traditionally been
thought to justify the exclusion for cause of the "automatic life imprisonment" group, those who would automatically vote against
death in any case.298 It may be, however, that the wholesale exclusion of this group will no longer be tolerated in view of the "least
restrictive alternative" suggestion made in Witherspoon - that it
may be possible to accommodate the state's interests with the defendant's interest in an impartial jury by a bifurcated trial, with one
jury to assess guilt, on which "automatic life imprisonment" jurors
could serve, and another jury to fix punishment, from which such
jurors would be excluded.299 If this alternative would satisfy the
294. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (1979). This contrasts with an equal protection challenge to jury selection practices, in which both a discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose must be demonstrated. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493-95
(1977).
295. 439 U.S. at 368-69; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975) (the sixth
amendment right to a proper jury "cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds."). By
contrast, in an equal protection case, the state may rebut a prima facie cross-section case by
demonstrating that the jury selection practices that produced the underrepresentative result
were nondiscriminatory. See, e.g., Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 494 (state may rebut
prima facie case " 'by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.'"), quoting Alexander v. Lousiana, 405 U.S.
605, 632 (1972). Compare Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (jury selection practices resulting
in substantial underrepresentation of women violate sixth amendment cross-section requirement), with ~oyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (jury selection system resulting in substantial
underrepresentation of women held not to violate equal protection because there was a sufficiently rational basis for the exemption in question).
296. 439 U.S. at 367-68.
297. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978).
298. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
299. 391 U.S. at 520 n.18.
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state's interest,300 then that interest is not "manifestly and primarily
advanced" by the total exclusion for cause of such jurors.301 In any
event, even if the total exclusion of "automatic life imprisonment"
jurors is justifiable, a substantial number of death-scrupled jurors in
the "oppose death penalty" group would remain whose blanket exclusion cannot be justified.302
It might be argued that the state's interest in preserving the peremptory challenge justifies permitting the exclusion of the "oppose
death penalty" group by peremptory challenge, even though their
exclusion by other means would clearly be impe~ssible. However,
as was pointed out earlier,303 Swain indicates that the state's interest
in the peremptory challenge is not paramount. When systematically
used to eliminate death-scrupled jurors who fall short of the Witherspoon standard, the peremptory challenge, as I have argued earlier,
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's prohibition of the exclusion
of death penalty objectors on a "broader basis" than Witherspoon
authorizes.304 It therefore cannot be said that the state's significant
interest in securing impartial juries is "manifestly and primarily advanced"305 by the overbroad use of the peremptory challenge.
300. See notes 191-204 supra and accompanying text.
301. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1979).
302. More than one third of the venirepersons expressing opposition to the death penalty
in the study were not removed for cause, and therefore can be assumed to be in the "oppose
death penalty" group. Table A.I in the appendix reveals that out of a total of 128 potential
jurors expressing opposition to capital punishment, 48 (37.5%) remained after excuse for cause
and defense peremptories. Table 1, on p. 30 supra, reveals that out of a total of 147 venirepersons (jurors and alternates) expressing opposition to capital punishment, 52 (35.3%) remained
after excuse for cause and defense peremptories. These results are consistent with public opinion polls indicating that only between one half and two thirds of jurors opposed to capital
punishment would be subject to challenge for cause under Witherspoon. A 1979 survey conducted in Alameda County, California, revealed that of the 37.8% of those surveyed who expressed opposition to the death penalty, 9% indicated that they could not be fair and impartial
in determining guilt or innocence and 15.2% indicated that they could not consider imposing
the death penalty in any case. Ellsworth & Fitzgerald, .Due Process vs. Crime Control: Tlte
Impact of.Death Qua/!fication on Jury Allitudes (prepub. draft 1979), summarized in Hovey v.
Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 50-54, 616 P.2d 1301, 1333-37, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 161-64 (1980).
Thus, at most 64% of those expressing death penalty opposition in the survey would be excludable under Witherspoon (assuming no overlap between the 9% and 15.2% groups). A similar
figure was revealed by the 1971 Harris Poll, which indicated that of about 36% of the American population opposed to capital punishment at the time, 23% stated that they would absolutely refuse to vote for the imposition of the death penalty in any circumstances. See White,
supra note 165, at 1178 n.12. 53% of those expressing opposition to the death penalty in a 1968
Gallup Poll would be excludable under Witherspoon, while 47% would not be. See H. ZEISEL,
supra note 164, at 7-8 (53% stated that they would in no case vote for the death penalty; 38%
would vote for the death penalty "reluctantly, if there were no mitigating circumstances," or
"if it were a horrible murder and a most terrible murderer;" 9% were not <;ertain.).
303. See notes 24-32 supra and accompanying text.
304. See notes 136-38 supra and accompanying text.
305. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367 (1979).
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Rather, the state's peremptory challenge practices must be "appropriately tailored" 306 to its legitimate interest in securing impartial
juries.307 This interest would be fully protected by limiting the use of
peremptories in such a way that jurors may not systematically be
removed because of their views on capital punishment on " 'any
broader basis' than inability to follow the law or abide by their
oath."Jos
And since the "cognizable class" requirement involves more than
the attitudes of jurors solely with respect to the death penalty, in the
absence of such a class, the lack of a fair cross-section invalidates not
only the defendant's sentence, but his conviction as well.309
306. 439 U.S. at 370.
307. Certainly, the state's interest in an impartial jury justifies the peremptory challenge of
some "oppose death penalty" jurors. However, the substantial disparity between the prosecutors' use of peremptories for nonscrupled jurors - under 30% were challenged - and their use
for scrupled jurors - 81% were challenged (see Table A.3 in the Appendix) - suggests that
the state is not merely exercising its peremptory challenges to secure impartial panels. The
same inference is suggested by the combined data for potential jurors and potential alternates.
Absent justification, these data suggest that the state is systematically abusing the peremptory to secure juries perceived to be more conviction-prone and more death-prone than would
otherwise result. To the extent that the prosecutor has a legitimate interest in using his or her
peremptory challenges in this way, I have previously argued that this interest would not justify
the frustration of an overriding constitutional value. See notes 144-50 supra and accompanying text. Surely the cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment, a fundamental constitutional right, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975), would have predominance over
the prosecutor's purely partisan interest in the peremptory challenge. People v. Payne, 31
CRIM. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2229, 2230 (Ill. App., May 19, 1982); see People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 266-70, 281 n.28, 583 P.2d 758, 761-62, 768 n.28, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 896-97, 906 n.28
(1978) (applying state constitution cross-section requirement). However legitimate this partisan interest may be in the context of our adversary system, it should not count as a "significant
state interest" sufficient to outweigh the fundamental interest in jury representativeness reflected in the cross-section requirement. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368-69; note 295
supra and accompanying text. Table 2, on p. 31 supra, reveals that in selecting jurors and
alternates, prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to remove 28.2% of nonscrupled potential jurors, and 76.9% of scrupled jurors. The statistical analysis in the text at note I06supra
demonstrates that this disparity gives rise to the inference that the prosecutors used their peremptory challenges systematically to eliminate death-scrupled jurors. Moreover, the analysis
in the text accompanying notes 106-08 supra reveals that this systematic pattern produced a
substantial underrepresentation of death-scrupled jurors on the panels selected.
308. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980).
309. Reversal of any conviction returned by an unrepresentative jury is the traditional
remedy for violation of the sixth amendment cross-section right. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Indeed, as the very integrity of the factfinding process is cast in doubt by an unrepresentative jury, the Supreme Court has applied a
rule of automatic reversal for sixth amendment violations rather than examining for harmless
error. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Couifs reversal of a conviction "without a suggestion, much less a showing, that the appellant
has been unfairly treated or prejudiced in any way by the manner in which his jury was selected."). Nor would reversal of a conviction be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's rejection of this remedy for Witherspoon error, see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 516-18, as
Witherspoon was based on due process, rather than sixth amendment grounds. See notes 118,
206-08 supra and accompanying text.
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C. Systematic Exclusion ef Scrupled Jurors
and the Eighth Amendment
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the question of when
the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment forbids a sentence of death is neither certain nor consistent.
Few issues of constitutional law have generated a body of decisions
so characterized by plurality opinions,310 the precarious force of applicable precedents,311 and profound tensions in underlying doctrine.312 But some established principles do emerge from the decided
cases.
First, the process of deciding whom to execute may render a
death sentence "cruel and unusual," even if capital punishment does
not, by its nature, inherently deserve that description. 313 Second, the
310. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) set the tone for contemporary
eighth amendment jurisprudence; a majority of five justices agreed upon a stark half-page per
curiam decision, which was followed by five concurring and four dissenting opinions occupying two hundred and thirty additional pages. Succeeding plurality opinions include Enmund
v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) (plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
(plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247
(1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 n.9 (1976) (plurality opinion).
As is generally the case in a field marked by plurality opinions, the lower courts are left
confused, producing instability and uncertainty in the law and engendering wasteful and repetitious litigation. See Davis & Reynolds, Judicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme
Court, 1974 DUKE LJ. 59; Note, The Precedential Value ofSupreme Court Plurality .Decisions,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 756, 759 (1980). These problems are heightened in the capital punishment
context given the high stakes and the resulting pressures on defense attorneys to raise all conceivable issues in an effort to save their clients' lives.
311. Compare McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (jury sentencing in capital
cases without legal standards to guide jury discretion does not violate due process), with
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (capital punishment without legal standards to guide the discretion of the sentencing authority constitutes unconstitutional cruel and
unusual punishment). See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 449 ("Having so recently reaffirmed our historic
dedication to entrusting the sentencing function to the jury's untrammeled discretion,' it is
difficult to see how the Court can now hold the entire process constitutionally defective under
the Eighth Amendment") (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at
207).
312. Consider, for example, the essential paradox of Furman: "The freakish and arbitrary
nature of the death penalty described in the separate concurring opinions of Justices Stewart
and White in Furman arose not from the perception that so many capital sentences were being
imposed but from the perception that sofew were being imposed." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 315 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). One might
reject Justice Rehnquist's perspective, but considerable tension inheres in accepting that
Furman has come to mean that the process of deciding which convicted murderers to execute
can render one death sentence more "cruel and unusual" than another, but that that process,
however discretionary, will not give rise to a procedural due process claim under McGautlta.
313. See 408 U.S. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 310-14 (White, J,, concur•
ring). These pivotal opinions, which have become Furman's accepted meaning, agree that the
death penalty is not inherently "cruel and unusual," but that the procedures by which the
government decided to impose it in the cases at bar permitted "this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and freakishly imposed." 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). See Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Adams v. Texas, 448
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constitutionality of the sentencing process may depend upon its conformity with the values of society. Whether the eighth amendment
requires jury participation in the decision to impose the death penalty has never been determined by the Supreme Court.314 But the
Court has frequently emphasized the importance of jury sentencing
as an indication of community values in assessing the constitutionality of capital punishment.315 The data presented in this study indicate that prosecutorial peremptory challenge practices result in juries
that do not reflect the conscience of the community; rather, they reflect community sentiment purged of its reluctance to impose a death
sentence. The jury selection process that produces such a result runs
a serious risk of imposing death sentences that do not comport with
society's aggregated understanding of justice. When this risk inheres
in the process of deciding which offenders deserve to die, capital
punishment violates the eighth amendment.
The eighth amendment values that infuse Witherspoon strongly
support this conclusion. The Court noted that the jury from which
all death penalty opponents have been excluded cannot perform the
task demanded of it by states leaving the life or death decision to
jury discretion. For where state law leaves capital punishment to the
discretion of the jury,316 "a jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more - and must
do nothing less - than express the conscience of the community on
U.S. 38 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
314. The Court's statement in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,252 (1976) (plurality opinion), that the Court "has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required" is
dictum. See Gillers, supra note 2, at 6 n.22. Because the death sentence in Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1968), was reversed on other grounds, the Court found it unnecessary to address
the defendant's assertion of a constitutional right to a jury determination of penalty in capital
cases. 438 U.S. at 609 n.16. Various members of the Court, however, have expressed the view
that the Constitution does not require a jury in capital cases. See Westbrook v. Balkcom, 101
S. Ct. 541,542 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Lockett v. Ohio, 4381.T.S.
at 633 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For an extensive argument in support of such a constitutional right, see Gillers, supra note 2, at 39-74.
315. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3375-76 (1982); 102 S. Ct. at 3386
(O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.); Coker v. Georgia, 443 U.S. 584, 592, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, at 181
(1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 238, 299-300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); 498 U.S.
at 386 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 498 U.S. at 439-40 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by
Burger, C.J., Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ.).
316. Where the jury makes a recommendation on a penalty, with the judge exercising the
final discretion, the same concerns arise. Where the judge has complete discretion over sentence, and the jury plays no role, this argument fails. Whether statutes giving the judge complete discretion are prohibited by the eighth amendment is an open question. Se~ notes 14,
314supra.
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the ultimate question of life or death."317 A full measure of community participation in this vital decision is thus crucial.
The eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment is an evolving constitutional norm which changes over time
to reflect society's changing moral judgments concerning the limits
of appropriate punishment. 318 A capital jury from which all opponents of the death penalty are excluded fails to reflect the shared
values of the community. Sanctioning their systematic removal
would freeze the procedure for imposing death sentences in a structure that would prevent the progressive evolution of constitutional
norms over time. Professor Tribe has sounded this theme in his
analysis of Witherspoon as mandating a "structure through which
Eighth Amendment principles would be linked to community sentiments."319 In this way, a fully representative jury system, containing
the full spectrum of community views on the death penalty question,
would serve, through its conduct in imposing and rejecting death
sentences, as a reflection of evolving community values over time. 320
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly regarded jury determinations in capital cases as "a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values,"321 using the actions of juries as a basis
both to uphold death penalty statutes guiding jury discretion on the
life or death question, 322 and to invalidate mandatory death statutes
as cruel and unusual.3 23 The Witherspoon Court recognized the crucial importance of juries that are representative of the community on
the death penalty question by its statement that "one of the most
317. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
318. As early as 1910, the Court stated that the eighth amendment is "progressive" and
"may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,378 (1910). Since the language of the prohibition is not precise
and its scope is not static, "(t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100 (1958) (plurality opinion); accord, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,288 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
319. Tribe, Structural .Due Processs, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 294-96 (1975).
320. Id. at 296.
321. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (plurality opinion); see Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293
(1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 439-41 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
322. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 182 (ac;tions of juries in imposing 460 death sentences
in less than four years after Furman indicated continued acceptance of capital punishment).
323. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,293 (1976) (reluctance of American juries
to convict a significant portion of those charged under mandatory death penalty statutes indicated a repudiation of automatic death sentences). See also Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct.
3368, 3375-76 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 5~2, 596-97 (1977); notes 13 & 315 supra
and accompanying text.
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important functions any jury can perform" in deciding between life
and death "is to maintain a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system - a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' " 324 A jury
can perform this function only if it truly represents community attitudes on capital punishment.325
Witherspoon's approval of excluding for cause those who could
not, under any circumstances, impose the death penalty does not undercut this conclusion.326 Legislatures as well as jurors express a society's collective sense of political morality;327 the state can
justifiably object to representing on a jury individual viewpoints so
inconsistent with majority sentiments as to preclude the good faith
application of the law. But the exclusion of those who will never
approve a death sentence makes the representation of those reluctant
to do so imperative for the accurate reflection of community values.
The systematic elimination of death-scrupled venirepersons biases
jury composition, resulting in a distorted exaggeration of the community's willingness to impose the death penalty. Since it is unknowable whether a more representative jury selection process
would have resulted in a different weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors in a particular case, the death sentences of those condemned by the existing system should be overturned.
To summarize this Part, the prosecution's use of the peremptory
challenge to remove death-scrupled jurors is a violation of the defendant's due process rights, by analogy to Witherspoon, his sixth
amendment fair cross-section right, and his eighth amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment. Where a pattern of systematic abuse sufficient to satisfy the Swain standard exists, the defendant's sentence must therefore be set aside. Where the pattern also
undermines the representative character of the capital jury in viola324. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968), quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). This language was subsequently quoted with approval in Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295 (1976), and in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976).
See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (where the Court, in dicta, noted that no
state provides for fewer than twelve jurors in capital cases, and interpreted this fact as reflecting an "implicit recognition of the value of the larger body as a means of legitimating society's
decision to impose the death penalty").
325. See note 292 supra.
326. According to public opinion polls, only between one half and one third of jurors
opposed to capital punishment would be subject to challenge for cause under Witherspoon.
See note 302 supra.
327. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179-81 (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. at 294-95 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 436-38 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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tion of the cross-section requirement, his conviction must also be reversed. Moreover, reversal would also be required as a matter of
due process, even apart from considerations of representativeness
where it can be demonstrated that the systematic removal of scrupled jurors produces a jury that is conviction-prone and hence not
impartial in assessing guilt.
V.

PREVENTING ABUSE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE:
RESTRUCTURING VOIR DIRE IN CAPITAL CASES

The preceding results clearly demonstrate that prosecutors in one
Florida district systematically (and effectively) exercise their peremptory challenges to exclude death-scrupled jurors from capital juries. These results have devastating consequences for the
adjudication of capital cases. As this Article has demonstrated, the
systematic exclusion of death-scrupled jurors deprives capital defendants of their due process right to an impartial jury on sentence.
A substantial argument can also be made that this pattern in the use
of peremptory challenges, particularly in combination with the removal for cause of death penalty opponents able to assess guilt but
not to impose death, produces capital juries that are significantly
more prone to convict than would be neutral juries, thereby depriving the capital defendant of his due process right to an impartial jury
on guilt.328
In addition, the practice distorts the representative character of
capital juries by eliminating virtually all members of the community
who oppose capital punishment. Death-scrupled jurors are sufficiently numerous and distinct that they may not be substantially
barred from participation in the capital trial process consistent with
the sixth amendment requirement that juries represent a fair crosssection of the community. Moreover, the substantial underrepresentation of capital punishment objectors on juries that try
death cases prevents such juries from serving as a link to contemporary community values regarding the limits of appropriate punishment. Capital punishment is constitutional only on the assumption
that its continued imposition does not violate the enlightened conscience of the community. For the jury to serve as the conscience of
the community, it must decide cases the way the community would,
and to do this, it must be fairly representative of the community.
Prosecutorial peremptory challenge practices that frustrate the ability of capital juries to "express the conscience of the community on
3~8. See notes 162-205 supra and accompanying text.
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the ultimate question of life or death," 329 are thus fundamentally inconsistent with eighth amendment values.
The result of these violations is that defendants tried before the
juries in this study must be retried, at least as to sentence, unless the
state can show that their particular juries did not involve the removal
of any scrupled jurors by prosecutional peremptory,330 or that even if
sucli removal was involved, that peremptories were justified on some
basis other than opposition to the death penalty.
It would seem unlikely that the pattern revealed is unique to the
district studied. Although more studies of this type need to be done
before generalizations concerning prosecutorial behavior can safely
be made, many knowledgeable observers of the criminal process suspect that substantial numbers of prosecutors use their peremptory
challenges in precisely this way. And while differences may exist
among geographic regions, the determinants of prosecutorial jury selection tactics following a decision to seek a death sentence do not
depend on local conditions. When the only empirical evidence yet
available strongly suggests unconstitutional prosecutorial behavior,
the risks of uncertainty weigh heavily against inaction. If the available evidence does not permit universal generalizations, it does suggest the widespread use of the prosecutorial peremptory to exclude
death-scrupled individuals from capital juries. The government
should bear the burden of proving an exception.331
329. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
330. In such cases the defendant would lack standing to raise a constitutional claim.
33 I. The question of which party - the defendant or the state - should bear the burden
of demonstration concerning possible abuse of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges is related to the general procedural problem of allocating burdens of pleading and persuasion.
Professor Cleary, in an influential essay, has suggested that implicit in the case law dealing
with problems of allocation are three somewhat related factors: fairness, probability, and policy. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 11
(1959). Consideration of these three factors in the peremptory challenge context leads to a
persuasive case for allocating to the state the burden of demonstration concerning
prosecutorial use of the peremptory, perhaps after the defendant has carried a preliminary
burden of going forward to demonstrate that peremptories were used in his case to eliminate
all or virtually all scrupled venirepersons.
By fairness, Professor Cleary means that, other things being equal, where evidence relating
to a particular issue lies more within the control of one party, that element should in fairness
be allocated to him. Id at 12. Clearly, the state has greater access to evidence concerning how
its prosecutors used their challenges than does the defendant, particularly as Swain makes the
critical issue prosecutorial conduct over a significnt number of cases, rather than just in the one
case in which the defendant was involved.
The factor of probability, according to frofessor Cleary, involves a general, nonstatistical
estimate of the probabilities of the situation, with the burden allocated to the party who will be
benefited by a departure from the supposed norm. Id at 12-13. The general view of knowledgeable observers of the criminal processes, acknowledged by some prosecutors, is that prosecutors routinely use their peremptories in capital cases to eliminate scrupled jurors. See note
17 supra. The only empirical evidence available - this study - strongly supports the existence of a systematic pattern in the use of peremptories in this way. As a result, the factor of
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Given Swain, which continues to be the law in the federal courts
and in all but a handful of the states, studies of the kind undertaken
here must be done for the defendant to raise these constitutional issues. But studies of this kind are considerably beyond the resources
of the typical capital defendant. As a result, the prospect of such
legal challenges may not deter the continuation of prosecutorial
abuses in the use of the peremptory. Judicially or legislatively
designed prophylactic measures are thus necessary.
One solution to the problem is to allow capital defendants to establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of death-scrupled
jurors based on the prosecutor's conduct during the voir dire in the
defendant's case alone. This is the approach adopted by the California Supreme Court in People v. 1¥hee/er332 for showing systematic
exclusion of members of a cognizable class. Although extending to
prosecutors the presumption that they are acting on the basis oflegitimate considerations whenever a peremptory challenge is exercised,
the court held that this presumption may be rebutted by evidence
adduced in a single voir dire. Under this approach, a prima facie
case of abuse of the peremptory challenge can be established by a
showing that the prosecutor is disproportionately excluding members of a group from the jury, that the group is cognizable for sixth
probability argues in favor of the state bearing the burden of demonstrating what would ap•
pear to be a departure from the norm. This conclusion might seem inconsistent with Swain's
presumption that prosecutors use their peremptories for proper, trial-related reasons. Swai11
may, however, be distinguishable based on the factor of probability; it may be the norm in
capital cases for prosecutors to use their peremptories systematically to remove death penalty
opponents, but not the norm in criminal cases generally for prosecutors to use their peremptories systematically to remove blacks. Indeed, the failure of the many attempts by defendants to
carry the burden imposed by Swain for demonstrating abuse of the peremptory on racial
grounds, see cases discussed in notes 49-51 & 57-59 supra and accompanying text, suggests that
such abuse in the racial context may not be the norm. See also note 139 supra.
The final factor noted by Professor Cleary - policy - is more difficult to assess in this
context as there are conflicting policy considerations at stake. The need to protect the utility of
the peremptory, relied on by the Swain Court as the justification for its restrictive rule, see text
at note 29 supra, clearly argues in favor of placing the burden of demonstration on the defendant. On the other hand, in view of the extreme social disutility of imposing the death penalty
erroneously or based on unfair procedures, see notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text, note
161 supra, the scales of policy may well tip in favor of allocating the burden to the state.
Swain's general presumption that peremptories are exercised based on trial-related factors
may thus be relaxed in death penalty ~es, where more in the way of due process should be
required than in ordinary cases.
Considerations of fairness, probability and policy thus point decisively to the future allocation of the burden to the state to demonstrate that prosecutorial peremptories are based on
acceptable trial-related considerations rather than merely on attitudes toward the death penalty, once a capital defendant has gone forward to demonstrate a prima facie case of abuse
based on his case alone. Whatever the merits of the Wheeler approach generally, see notes 4445 supra and accompanying text, it appears reasonable in the capital trial context, particularly
in view of the results of this study.
332. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); see notes 40-43 supra and
accompanying text.
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amendment cross-section purposes, and that it is likely that the exclusion is based on group membership. 333 The trial judge can be
asked to find that exclusion is based on group membership if their
group affiliation appears to be the only characteristic shared by the
jurors excluded. Applying this approach in the death penalty context, if the trial judge "from all the circumstances in the case" concludes that there was a "strong likelihood" that a disproportionate
number of venirepersons were excluded because of their· opposition
to capital punishment, the burden will shift to the state to show that
the challenges were based on trial-related factors, rather than on
death penalty attitudes.334 Jurisdictions disinclined to adopt the
Wheeler approach for all criminal cases may consider it in the limited context of capital trials. The substantially higher degree of due
process required to impose the death penalty justifies adopting more
restrictive procedures in selecting a capital jury than are applied in
selecting juries in ordinary cases. The approach in Wheeler, however, may intrude further into the state's legitimate interest in the
peremptory challenge335 than many jurisdictions will be willing to
accept.
An alternative solution would be to restrict the prosecutor's ability to question prospective jurors concerning their attitudes toward
the death penalty. A prosecutor's ability to develop grounds for a
challenge for cause should not unreasonably be restricted. But the
use of voir dire to develop grounds for the improper exercise of peremptory challenges is not as worthy of protection.336 Thus, inquiry
into prospective jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty could be
strictly limited to determining whether they require disqualification
under the standards set forth in Witherspoon. Rather than being permitted to ask whether a venireperson has conscientious or religious
scruples against the death penalty, prosecutors could be restricted to
asking whether venirepersons ''would automatically vote against the
333. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
334. See 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. Under the Wheeler
approach, the prosecutor would similarly be able to challenge defense exercises of peremptory
challenges based on group '!>iases.
335. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
336. See Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 376, 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920
(1967); People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 819, 506 P.2d 193, 195, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1973).
This has, however, been its tradition. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965)
("The voir dire in American trials tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a predicate
for the exercise of peremptories.••."); Babcock, supra note 24, at 551. I do not question the
propriety generally of allowing broad voir dire to explore attitudes and characteristics relevant
to the informed use of peremptory challenges. The prophylactic rule suggested should apply
· only in the limited situation where there is concern that the information gathered at voir dire is
being used in exercising peremptory challenges in an unconstitutional manner.
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impostion of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that
might be developed at the trial of the case before them," or would be
unable to make "an impartial decision as to the defendant'sgui/t."337
If the venireperson answers in the negative, no further questions
concerning attitudes on the death penalty should be permitted. The
venireperson's general attitude toward the death penalty is, under
Witherspoon, irrelevant to the determination of whether he or she is
qualified for jury service. 33s
The trial juq.ge can limit juror confusion concerning these inquiries by prefacing such questions with a brief explanation of the qualifications necessary to serve as a capital juror. The trial judge could
explain, for example, that a prospective juror who adamantly opposes capital punishment may still be able to serve as an impartial
juror if he can set aside his opposition and follow his oath as a juror
to uphold the law; only if the juror's attitude toward capital punishment makes it impossible for him to follow the law must he be excused. 339 The prospective jurors also could be cautioned not to
volunteer their opinions about capital punishment. Only if that attitude interferes with their ability to serve as jurors is it necessary for
them to speak out. Finally, it would be desirable for the trial judge
to explain that jury service by persons opposed to capital punishment, provided they can follow their oath as jurors, is necessary to
effectuate the constitutional requirement of a representative jury,
which in death cases must reflect the values of the community on the
discretionary life or death question.
After this general explanation of the basic qualifications for capital jury service, the prosecutor could be permitted simply to ask
whether, in light of the judge's explanation, the prospective juror
feels that he would automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence or would be unable to render an impartial
decision as to guilt. Only if a prospective juror volunteers some con-;cem with his abilities in this regard should further questioning be
allowed.
Of course, voir dire questioning would be even further limited in
jurisdictions using the bifurcated trial system suggested in Wither337. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. S10, 522-23 n.21 (1968) (emphasis in original). Accord, Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 (1969).
338. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
339. The Supreme Court has recognized that even a ''.juror who believes that capital punishment should never be inflicted and who is irrevocably committed to its abolition" might be
able to "subordinate his personal views to what he perceived to be his duty to abide by his oath
as a juror and to obey the law of the State." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,514 n.7;
accord, Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 484 (1969).
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spoon, with one jury to determine guilt, that would include death
penalty opponents able to convict but not to impose death, and a
second jury to assess penalty, from which such jurors would be removed. In such jurisdictions, voir dire questioning preceding the
guilt phase should be limited to inquiries about death penalty attitudes that would prevent the making of an impartial decision as to
the defendant's guilt. No further inquiries concerning attitudes on
the death penalty should be permitted until a second voir ·dire, occurring before the penalty phase.
The limited questioning suggested as a means of curtailing
prosecutorial peremptory challenge abuses could be conducted
either by the prosecutor or by the judge alone. In the federal system,
"the court has the discretion either to conduct the examination itself
or to permit counsel to do so."340 This is also the practice in about
ten states.341 Approximately eleven additional states provide for examination only by the judge; in twenty-two other states provision is
made for questioning by both the judge and the attorneys, and in the
remaining states, examination is left to counsel. 342 Regardless of
who conducts the questioning, there is ample precedent for imposing
restrictions on the scope of voir dire. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the conduct of voir dire is a matter within
the broad discretion of the trial judge.343 For example, absent "special circumstances," such as when racial issues are "inextricably
bound up with the conduct of the trial" and there are substantial
indications of the likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting
the jurors in the particular case, the Constitution does not require
questioning prospective jurors about racial or ethnic bias.344 Nor is
it unconstitutional to refuse inquiry about other types of possible
340. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). See Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1928) (upholding the constitutionality of judge-conducted voire dire).
341. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES,
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1344 (5th ed. 1980).
342. Id.; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 164, 281-84 (App. D). For conflicting views concerning who should conduct the voir dire, compare Babcock, supra note 24 (voir dire should be
conducted by the attorneys with little or no restriction by the court), and Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir .Dire ofJurors: A Constitutional Right, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 290 (1972)
(same), with Braswell, Voir .Dire - Use and Abuse, 1 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 49 (1970) (trial
court should actively participate in voir dire and may severely restrict questioning by the attorneys), and Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir .Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S.
CAL. L. REv. 916 (1971) (advocating the federal method of questioning by the court with the
attorneys given the opportunity to submit proposed questions).
343. E.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1629, 1634 (1981); Ristaino v. Ross,
424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528 (1973); Aldridge v. United
States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931).
344. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 1634; see Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at
594-96.
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prejudice, such as prejudice against facial hair where the defendant
wears a beard,345 or in an obscenity case, about whether the jurors'
educational, political, and religious beliefs might affect their view on
the question of obscenity. 346 These cases permit the trial judge to
restrict inquiries into bias to the ultimate disqualifying question, and
to disallow more specific inquiries and detailed probing into the basis for the venireperson's answer. The trial court's broad discretion
should thus include· the imposition of similar limits on the prosecutor's ability to question prospective jurors regarding their attitudes
on the death penalty.
Professor Haney's research on the effects of the death-qualification process on capital juries suggests an additional method of curtailing prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge. Haney
suggests that the typical elaborate voir dire inquiry into attitudes
concerning the death penalty, generally conducted before the entire
venire, may itself bias the venire in favor of death and perhaps also
in favor of guilt.347 Prolonged discussion of the death penalty at voir
dire suggests to prospective jurors that the defendant's guilt is presumed by the attorneys and the judge, desensitizes jurors to the possibility of imposing the death penalty, communicates the law's
disapproval of death penalty opposition, increases the acceptability
of pro-death penalty attitudes, and increases both the likelihood that
jurors will convict and their willingness to vote for the death penalty.348 In response to testimony concerning Professor Haney's research, and to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects it revealed,
the California Supreme Court has ordered that future voir dire questioning of a capital venireperson be performed outside the presence
of other prospective jurors.349 Requiring that voir dire in capital
cases concerning juror attitudes on the death penalty be done indi345. Ham v South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528 (1973).
346. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S 87 (1974). See also United States v. Barnes, 604
F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (trial court's refusal to allow questioning about jurors' ethnic backgrounds or their addresses was not error); United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 909 (1977) (refusal to allow questioning about juror's educational background
was not error); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963)
(refusal to ask prospective jurors if they would give more weight to the testimony of a police
officer was not error).
347. See Haney, .Death Penalty Rptr. 1 (no. IO, June 1981); Haney, 26 CRIME & DELIN·
QUENCY, supra note 199, at 525 ("Rather than simply discovering prejudice, the process of
death qualification tends to create it."); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 69-81, 616 P.2d
1301, 1347-55, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 174-82 (1980) (ordering that future voir dire questioning ofa
venireperson be performed outside the presence of other prosepective jurors "in order to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects identified by the Haney study.").
348. See note 347 supra.
349. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 69-81, 616 P.2d 1301, 1347-55, 168 Cal. Rptr,
128, 174-82 (1980).
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vidually and in sequestration reduces some of the biasing effects of
the death qualification process that Haney documented. 350 These
objectives, in addition to the curtailment of prosecutorial peremptory challenge abuse, could be accomplished by including on questionnaires that prospective jurors must fill out in advance of voir dire
the limited question(s) necessary to assess whether the venireperson
should be removed for cause under Witherspoon. 351
Limiting inquiry concerning the death penalty attitudes of prospective jurors in any of these ways would deprive prosecutors of
information concerning a venireperson's opposition to the death
penalty, other than to the extent that such opposition would render
him excludable for cause under Witherspoon. Admittedly, an astute
prosecutor may occasionally correctly suspect reluctance to impose
capital punishment, because death-scrupled individuals share many
common correlative opinions. But just as certain well-established
cognizable classes of potential jurors, such as those classes de.fined by
various religions, may share common viewpoints from which the essential trait of the class may not easily be deduced, just so death
penalty opposition will rarely reveal itself through those elements of
the common viewpoint shared by the class of death-scrupled individuals which the prosecutor can ascertain through other voir dire
questioning.
Since the defense would similarly be denied extraneous information on death penalty attitudes, the prosecution could not claim a
right to use its challenges to offset systematic defense challenges of
death penalty advocates.352 This would avoid the difficult question
of when these two tendencies reach equipoise.
Such restructuring of the voir dire in capital cases would eliminate the ability of prosecutors to use peremptory challenges to exclude death-scrupled jurors "on any broader basis" than authorized
by Witherspoon. Prosecutorial peremptories could continue to be
used, and some no doubt would result in the removal of death-scrupled jurors not subject to removal for cause. But the virtual elimination or substantial underrepresentation of death penalty opponents
350. A recent empirical study has also suggested that examination of venirepersons while
individually sequestered enables better identification of bias than other voir dire methods.
Nietzel & Dillehay, The Effects of Variations in Voir .Dire Procedures in Capital Murder Trials,
6 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 1 (1982).
351. See Babcock, supra note 24, at 563. See also Gillers, supra note 2, at 97 n.446 (suggesting that voir dire on death penalty attitudes be conducted by the trial judge with the lawyers absent but with a court reporter present. The defendant, but not the prosecutor, woµld
later be permitted to review the transcript and argue the validity of the judge's exclusionary
rulings.).
352. See notes 152-56 sup~a and accompanying text.
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would not continue. The result would be capital juries able to assess
guilt and punishment with increased impartiality, and with an increased ability to reflect the conscience of the community. If we are
to have death sentences at all, nothing less should be tolerated.
APPENDIX

This appendix presents a more detailed breakdown of the data
presented in Part III of this Article. Table A. I presents the total
number of venirepersons who were examined as potential jurors,
subdivided into scrupled and nonscrupled categories. Table A. I also
shows the numbers of venirepersons removed for cause, those removed by defense peremptory challenges, and those remaining and
subject to the exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenge. Table
A.2 shows the equivalent data for venirepersons examined as possible alternate jurors rather than as jurors.
Table A.3 shows how the prosecutors used their peremptory challenges against potential jurors, divided into scrupled and nonscrupled categories. Table A.3 reveals that for nonscrupled potential
jurors subject to exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenge
(those remaining after challenge for cause and defense peremptories), the prosecutors challenged 151 out of 502 (30.08%). For scrupled potential jurors subject to exercise of prosecutorial peremptory
challenge, 39 out of 48 (81.25%) were challenged. Given that prosecutors used peremptory challenges for 30.08% of nonscrupled potential jurors, one would expect that 14 or 15 of the 48 scrupled jurors
would have been challenged. The chances of 39 or more scupled
potential jurors being removed by prosecutorial peremptory challenge at random is calculated at fourteen in one hundred billion
(.000,000,000,14), or the equivalent of7.57 standard deviations. This
presents an astronomical degree of statistical significance, the
equivalent of flipping approximately 33 heads in a row with an unbiased coin.
Moreover, the data demonstrates that the pattern in the use of
peremptories by the prosecutors produced a substantial underrepresention of scrupled jurors on the jury panels selected. Table
A.I reveals that 128 out of 1000 (12.8%) venirepersons examined as
potential jurors expressed opposition to the death penalty, and that
872 (87.2%) did not. After those excused for cause and by defense
peremptory challenge were eliminated, 550 venirepersons remained.
Of these, 48 (8.73%) were scrupled and 502 (91.27%) were nonscrupled. Table A.3 reveals that 360 jurors were actually selected.
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VENIREPERSONS EXAMINED AS POTENTIAL JURORS
(Based on 30 cases)
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TABLE A.2
VENIREPERSONS EXAMINED AS POTENTIAL ALTERNATE JURORS
(Based on 30 cases)
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TABLE A.3
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
IN SELECTING JURORS
(Based on 30 cases)
Potential jurors subject to
exercise of prosecutorial
peremptory challenge
(those remaining after
excuse for cause and
defense peremptories)
Nonscrupled
(not opposed
to death
penalty)
Scrupled
(opposed to
death
penalty)
Total

Challenged

Not challenged
(those selected as
jurors)

151

351

(30.08%)

(69.92%)

502

39

9

48
(81.25%)

(18.75%)

190

360

(34.55%)

(65.45%)

550

Given that 360 jurors were actually selected, one would expect that
31 or 32 of them (8.73%) would have been scrupled jurors. In fact, as
Table A.3 reveals, only 9 scrupled jurors were selected, the remaining 39 having been removed by prosecutorial peremptory challenge.
The chances of 9 or fewer scrupled jurors being selected at random is
calculated at approximately 43 out of one million (.000,043), or the
equivalent of 3.93 standard deviations. This presents a high degree
of statistical significance, the equivalent of flipping approximately 14
heads in a row with an unbiased coin.
In addition, the Swain burden of attributing the underrepresentative result shown to action of the prosecution rather than the defense
is met, since prosecution peremptory challenges eliminated 39 of the
48 scrupled potential jurors who but for these challenges would have
served on the juries selected. Moreover, even if we consider those
scrupled potential jurors who were challenged by defense peremptories - adding them to the 48 subject to possible prosecutorial peremptory challenges, Tables A. l and A.3 demonstrate that the
substantial underrepresentation of scrupled jurors that was produced
is attributable overwhelmingly to prosecutorial action.353 Of the 42
353. If the above calculation of the effect of prosecutorial peremptory challenges on the
representative character of juries selected is recomputed by adding back in those potential
jurors subject to defense peremptory challenge, the results still indicate a statistically signifi-
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potential scrupled jurors removed by either party by means of peremptory challenge, 39 (92.86%) were removed by prosecutorial peremptories and only 3 (7.14%) by defense peremptories.
TABLEA.4
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
IN SELECTING ALTERNATE JURORS
(Based on 30 cases)
Potential alternates subject
to exercise of prosecutorial
peremptory challenge
(those remaining after
excuse for cause and
defense peremptories)
Nonscrupled
(not opposed
to death
penalty)

75

Scrupled
(opposed to
death
penalty)

4

Total

Challenged

Not challenged
(those selected as
alternate jurors)

12

63

(16%)

(84%)
3

(25%)

(75%)

13

66

(16.46%)

(83.54%)

79

Table A.4 shows the results equivalent to those shown in Table
A.3, but for potential alternates, rather than potential jurors. Because of the relatively small sample size, these numbers do not provide the same degree of statistical significance conveyed by the data
in Table A.3, but the trends are qualitatively the same.
Tables A.5-A. l l show the detailed data used in the multivariate
analysis to show the effect of potentially confounding variables on
the study results.
cant underrepresentation in the number of scrupled jurors selected. Table A. I reveals that
after those excused for cause were eliminated, 812 potential jurors remained. Fifty-one of
these were scrupled potential jurors (6.28%) and 761 were non-scrupled (93.72%). Table A.3
reveals that 360 jurors were actually selected. Given that 360 jurors were actually selected, one
would expect that 22 or 23 of them (6.28%) would have been scrupled jurors. In fact, as Tables
A.I and A.3 reveal, only 9 scrupled jurors were selected, the remaining 42 having been re•
moved by peremptory challenge (39 by prosecutors and 3 by defense attorneys). The chances
of 9 or fewer scrupled jurors being selected at random is approximately 22 out of 10,000
(.0022), or the equivalent of 2.85 standard deviations. Moreover, this substantial under•
representation was produced overwhelmingly by prosecutorial peremptory challenges. Of the
42 potential scrupled jurors removed by peremptory challenge, 39 (92.86%) were removed by
prosecutorial peremptories and only 3 (7.14%) by defense peremptories.
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TABLEA.5
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
BY VENIREPERSON'S SEX AND DEATH
PENALTY ATTITUDES
(Based on 629 venirepersons)
MALE
NONSCRUPLED SCRUPLED

FEMALE

TOTAL

NONSCRUPLED SCRUPLED

TOTAL

TOTAL
VENIREPERSONS

CHALLENGED

17
(77.27%)

81
98
23
(29.89%) (33.45%) (76.67%)

82
105
(26.8%) (31.25%)

203
(32.27%)

NOT
CHALLENGED

5
(22.73%)

190
195
7
(70.11%) (66.55%) (23.33%)

224
231
(73.2%) (68.75%)

426
(67.73%)

TOTAL

22

271

293

30

306

336

629

TABLEA.6
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
BY VENIREPERSON'S MARITAL STATUS AND DEATH
PENALTY ATTITUDES
(Based on 609 venirepersons)
MARRIED
NONSCRUPLED SCRUPLED

NOT MARRIED

TOTAL

NONSCRUPLED SCRUPLED

TOTAL

TOTAL
VENIREPERSONS

CHALLENGED

18
(64.29%)

76
94
19
(19.49%) (22.49%) (90.48%)

15
94
188
(44.12%) (49.21%) (30.87%)

NOT
CHALLENGED

10
(35.71%)

314
324
(80.51%) (77.51%)

95
97
421
(55.88%) (50.79%) (69.13%)

TOTAL

28

390

418

2
(9.52%)
21

170

191

609
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TABLEA.7
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
BY VENIREPERSON'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND
DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES
(Based on 611 venirepersons)
EMPLOYED

NOT EMPLOYED

SCRUPLED

NONSCRUPLED

TOTAL

TOTAL
VENIREPERSONS

11
(84.62%)

43
(31.39%)

S4
(36%)

192
(31.42%)

323
(70.07%)

2
(15.38%)

94
(68.61%)

96
(64%)

419
(68.58%)

461

13

137

ISO

611

NONSCRUPLED

TOTAL

(73.53%)

113
(26.46%)

138
(29.93%)

NOT
CHALLENGED

9
(26.47%)

314
(73.54%)

TOTAL

34

427

SCRUPLED
CHALLENGED

25

TABLE A.8
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
BY WHETHER VENIREPERSON KNEW DEFENDANT AND
DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES
(Based on 599 venirepersons)

CHALLENGED

KNEW DEFENDANT

DID NOT KNOW DEFENDANT

SCRUPLED

NONSCRUPLED

TOTAL

SCRUPLED

NONSCRUPLED

TOTAL

TOTAL
VENIREPERSONS

0

s

s

(0%)

(83.33%)

(83.33%)

38
(76%)

151
(27.81%)

189
(31.87%)

194
(32.39%)

0

NOT
CHALLENGED

(0%)

I
(16.67%)

1
(16.67%)

12
(24%)

392
(72.19%)

404
(68.13%)

405
(67.61%)

TOTAL

0

6

6

so

S43

S93

S99
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TABLEA.9
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
BY WHETHER VENIREPERSON WAS UNSUCCESSFULLY
CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE BY PROSECUTOR* AND
DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES
(Based on 629 venirepersons)
UNSUCCESSFULLY
CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE

SCRUPLED
CHALLENGED

10

(90.91%)

NONSCRUPLED

TOTAL

7
(100%)

17
(94.44%)

NOT CHALLENGED FOR
CAUSE

SCRUPLED

NONSCRUPLED

TOTAL

TOTAL
VENIREPERSONS

30
(73.17%)

156
(27.37%)

186
(30.44%)

203
(32.27%)

NOT
CHALLENGED

(9.09%)

0
(0%)

l
(5.56%)

11
(26.83%)

414
(72.63%)

425
(69.56%)

426
(67.73%)

TOTAL

11

7

18

41

570

611

629

I

• As this table includes only venirepersons subject to possible prosecutorial peremptory challenge, it excludes
those successfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor (as well as those successfully challenged for cause
by the defense and excused for cause by the court without motion). Table I illustrates those excused for
cause.

TABLE A.IO
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
BY WHETHER VENIREPERSON WAS UNSUCCESSFULLY
CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE BY PROSECUTOR*
BASED ON DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES AND DEATH
PENALTY ATTITUDES
(Based on 629 venirepersons)
UNSUCCESSFULLY
CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE
BASED ON DEATH PENALTY
ATTITUDES

NOT CHALLENGED FOR
CAUSE BASED ON DEATH
PENALTY ATTITUDES

SCRUPLED

NONSCRUPLED

TOTAL

SCRUPLED

NONSCRUPLED

TOTAL

TOTAL
VENIREPERSONS

CHALLENGED

10
(100%)

0
(0%)

10
(100%)

30
(71.43%)

163
(28.25%)

193
(31.18%)

203
(32.27%)

NOT
CHALLENGED

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

12
(28.57%)

414
(71.75%)

426
(68.82%)

426
(67.73%)

TOTAL

10

0

10

42

S77

619

629

• As this table includes only venirepersons subject to possible prosecutorial peremptory challenge, it excludes
those succesfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor (as well as those successfully challenged for cause
by the defense and excused for cause by ~e court without motion). Table I illustrates those excused for
cause.
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TABLEA.11
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
BY WHETHER VENIREPERSON WAS QUESTIONED BY
PROSECUTOR ON ABILITY TO BE IMPARTIAL IN DECIDING GUILT AND DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES
(Based on 629 venirepersons)
IMPARTIALITY NOT
QUESTIONED

IMPARTIALITY QUESTIONED

SCRUPLED

NON•
SCRUPLED

TOTAL

TOTAL
VENIREPERSONS

0
(0%)

14
(73.68%)

14
(73.68%)

203
(32.27%)

421
(69.02%)

0
(0%)

(26.32%)

(26.32%)

s

426
(67.73%)

610

0

19

19

629

NON·
SCRUPLED

TOTAL

(76.92%)

149
(26.7%)

189
(30.98%)

NOT
CHALLENGED

12
(23.08%)

409

(73.3%)

TOTAL

52

558

SCRUPLED
CHALLENGED

40

s

